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AN
ESSAY

UPON

REASON,

AND THE

Nature of Spirits.

By *Richard Burthogge*, M. D.

L O N D O N :

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To the Learned

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Mr. JOHN LOCK,

Author of the

ESSAY

Upon

Humane Understanding.

SIR,

I Take the Liberty of making a Present of the following Essay unto you, as to a Person who being ac-

A 3 know-

The Preface.

known by all the Learned World for one of the Greatest Masters of Reason, are therewithal allowed a most Proper and Competent Judge of any Discourse concerning it. Whatever my Performance is, the Design I have is no small one ; since it is to show the true way of Humane Knowledge, and by shewing that it is REAL NOTIONAL, to unite and reconcile the Experimental, or Mechanical, with the Scholastical Method. This Thought, Sir, affords me abundant matter of enlarging in many others ; but I ought to remember, that I am

The Preface.

*a stranger to you, and this my
First Visit, and therefore I
must make it short, which I
will do, by hastning to own my
self among the Croud of those
who do admire you, and to as-
sure you, that I am with great
Respect,*

S I R,

Your very Humble Servant

RICH. BURTHOGGE.

ERRA-

ERRATA.

PAge 6. Line 3. for *Toubing*, r. *Touching*.
p. 10. l. 25. for *preception*, r. *perception*. p.
25. l. 14. for, r. *or else*. p. 33. l. 25. for *do*, r.
doth. p. 42. l. 22. for *diffusiovum*, r. *diffusivum*.
Ibid. l. 28. for *est*, r. *is*. p. 52. l. 9. for *spect*, r.
respect. p. 57. l. 7. for *or*, r. *of*. Ibid. l. 15. dele
time. Ibid. l. 17. for *Appre*, r. *Apprehends*. p. 60.
l. 24. r. *conceptions as are*. p. 62. l. 24. dele *the*.
p. 74. l. 18. for *word*, r. *world*. p. 77. l. 21. dele
not.

Of Human Reason.

The First Part.

Chap. I. Of Reason in general.

SECT. I.

In what sense Reason is taken and discoursed of here. A double account of it ; the first, more Notional ; the second, more Real. Of the Agreements of Reason, Sense, and Imagination. (1.) That all three are Cogitative and Conceptive Powers. Cogitation what. Monsieur des Cartes, and Honoratus Faber, their Opinion, that Sensation is not Cogitation, considered, (2.) That Sense, Imagination, and Reason are Mental and Spiritual, and not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers. The Differences of those Powers ; that all Sensation is Imagination, and what is commonly called Imagination, is but Internal Sensation. Intellection or Reasoning, is Knowing without Imagination. Instances, setting out these several Notions. The power of Knowing without Imagining, why called Reason.

REASON taken for Human *Mind*, or Understanding (which is the sense I take it in now) is defined by most, the faculty whereby a Man is said to be Reasonable, or Understanding ; in like manner as *Sight* is defined, the faculty whereby a Living Creature is Denominated Seeing, or Visive, or Reason is that faculty whereby a Man does Exercise the acts of Reason, or doth Understand ; as Sight, the faculty whereby a Man or any other Animal doth see, or discern Objects.

Nor are they altogether without Reason, who do so define and explicate it ; for *Acts* of Perception properly so called, are not Known, or Knowable, but in and by themselves ; we Know not, nor are capable of Knowing, what the Act of Seeing is, but by seeing ; nor what that of Hearing is, but by Hearing ; or what the Act of Understanding is, but by Understanding. And again, *Perceptive faculties* are not Known, or Knowable, but by their Acts : We Know not what the faculty or power of Seeing is but *relatively*, with relation to the Act of Seeing : Nor what the faculty or Power of Hearing is, but by the Act of Hearing ; nor what the faculty or power of Understanding or Reasoning is, but by *Acts* of Understanding or Reasoning

soning: In a word, no Faculties, no Powers are Known, or Knowable, but by their respective Acts or Exercises, and therefore they cannot be defined or set out but by them. All this is certain.

However, since this is but a notional fruitless way of Explicating Reason, and too short, too narrow to satisfy a Curious and Inquisitive Mind; therefore to settle an *Idea* of it, that may be more to purpose, more real, and more edifying; I will show, in the first place, the *Agreements* it hath with other Conceptive Cogitative faculties, what it holds in common with them; and afterwards, set out the *Differences* that do discriminate and divide these several faculties, each from other, and this particularly from the Rest.

The *Conceptive Cogitative* Faculties that are in Man, (for so I call the Faculties by which he makes acquaintance with external Objects) are his external *Sense*, *Imagination* (as it is called) and *Reason* or Understanding: *Three* Faculties which do all *Agree* and *Concur* in this, that they are *Conceptive* and *Cogitative*, and consequently *Mental* and *Spiritual*, and not meerly *Mechanick* and *Material* Powers.

First; All three are *Conceptive, Cogitative* Powers; Sensation and Imagination, as well as Reasoning or Intellection, are

Cogitations. Cogitation is conscious Affection ; *Conscious Affection*, is Affection with Consciousness of that Affection ; and by another name is called *Knowledge*. Knowledge, as it has a double relation, so it may be considered two ways, to wit, either in reference to the *Object*, which is Known, and so, properly, it is *Apprehension* or Conscious Perception ; or, as it respects the *Image* and *Idea*, by means of which we do perceive or know that Object, and so it may be called *Conception*. Conception properly speaking, is of the Image, or Idea ; Apprehension, Knowledge, or conscious Perception is of the Object, by means of that Idea, or Image : It is as proper to say, that the Sense and Imagination do conceive, as that the Reason or Understanding doth ; the former does as much conceive Images and Sentiments, as the latter does Ideas and Notions.

Conception and Cogitation, really are but one Act, and consequently, all Conceptive are Cogitative Powers, and Cogitative Powers Conceptive. Only, to clear the Notion of *Consciousness*, by which *Cogitation* or Knowledge is distinguished, tho' never divided, from *Conception*, we must further consider the *Way* and *Manner* how Consciousness Arises. And it seems to me to *arise*, ordinarily, from the distinction
and

and difference that is in Conceptions ; for, should any person have his Eye perpetually tied to one Object, without ever closing of, or turning it to another, he would no more be sensible that he *saw* that Object, or know any more what it was to *see*, than if he had been blind from his Birth. For since *Consciousness of Seeing* is nothing but a perceiving by the Eye, that one is Affected, or otherwise Affected than he was, with the appearance of Light, or Colour. If a person had never seen but one thing, and never but seen it, he could have no perceivance (that) he is so Affected, that is, he could not be sensible or conscious (that) he did see. Thus, tho' in our Members the parts that do compose them are contiguous one to another, and do always touch, yet we do not feel them touch, that is, they touch, but we are not sensible they do, because no difference being in the Affection, there is no Sense, no Consciousness of it: But Dislocation is soon perceived ; as also it is when any part is pressed unusually. I conclude, that as difference of Conception arises from different Affections of the Faculties by Objects, so Consciousness, or Sense of Conception, arises from the difference of Conceptions. Did we know but one thing, or had but one Act of Conception, we should not know

that we did know that one, that is, that Conception would not properly be Cogitation, but would be, as touching without feeling. However, since there is so great a diversity of Objects in the World, all-around us, and consequently, so many various Impressions made upon the Mind, by those Objects, so that its Conceptive Power cannot but be diversly Affected, and moved, and the Mind also have a perceivance of that diversity; hence it comes to pass, that Conception is always Cogitation. In short, Conception is Modification of Mind, and Cogitation is Conception with Consciousness of it. Consciousness of Conception is a sense of the Alteration made in the Mind by that Conception (of which it is conscious;) *si nihil (says Cotta apud Cicer. l. 1. de Nat. Deor.) inter Deum & Deum differt, nulla est apud Deos cognitio nulla perceptio,*

I know very well that Monsieur *Des Cartes*, the ingenious *Honorato Fabri*, and many others do differ from me, for denying (as they do) that Sensation is Knowledge, and consequently, excluding both Conception and Consciousness from the Idea of it, they must also deny, that Sense is a Cogitative or Conceptive Power. But then, it is hard to say, what that Idea is, that they have of Sensation. Besides, 'tis

most

most certain that in Men, Sensation is Conscious Perception, for whatever Impression is made upon our Eye by any Object, we do not for all that, discern, or see the Object, if we do not attend unto, as well as receive, the Impression; that is, we do not discern or see, but when we Know we do. Then only we have a Sensation of Objects, when we are Conscious that they do Impress us; that is, when our Organs being Impressed, there arise and spring up in us, by means of those Impressions, certain Images or Conceptions, that (many of them) by a Natural delusion do seem as really to Exist without us, in the Objects themselves, as if they were indeed so many real Affections of them, or Inherent Accidents in them. And those Images being but Modifications of Mind, arise not in us upon any Impressions but when the Mind Attends to them, for else they cannot Affect it.

But happily it will be told me, that this Consciousness of Impressions, which is in men, when they do see, or hear, or otherwise perceive Objects, by the Affections of their External Organs, Arises in them only from the *Concomitance* of the Understanding; because in men, whatever Affects the Sense, is also perceived by the Understanding; but that there neither is, nor

can be, any such thing in other Animals, which are as void of Consciousness of any Impression made upon their Organs, as they are of that Reason and Understanding that makes it in Men. But as this may be said, so it may be as easily Replied to; for 'tis as impossible, that Men should have any clear, or indeed any *Idea*, at all of Sensation, in other *Species* of Animals, but by that, which they have of their own; as it is certain, that Sensation in Men cannot be understood to be without Conception, nor Conception without Attention of Mind. *Attention of Mind*, is the Application of it unto Objects, and therefore in Men, is called *Minding*: Without Attention no Conception, and without Conception no Consciousness; Consciousness being (as I have said) nothing but a Sense of Alteration made in the Mind, by some new Affection of it, that is, by a new Thought or Conception. Besides, there are many other things that do make for this Opinion, that all Animal Sensation is Cogitation; particularly, that great *Sagacity* that is in some Animals, which cannot be accounted for with any clearness, but by allowing to them a great degree of Knowledge and Consciousness.

And hence it follows, that Sense and Imagination, as well as the Understanding

ing and Reason, are Mental and Spiritual, not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers. By Mechanick and meerly Material Powers I understand such as do result from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter; from Local Motion and Rest, and from Size, Figure and Texture. By *Mental Spiritual* Powers, I understand such as cannot be conceived to arise from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter, without the Influence of Mind; and in the number of these I reckon Sense, and Imagination, as well as the Understanding or Reason. It is true, the term [*Mind*] is Appropriated, by way of excellency, to the Understanding or Reason, this being a faculty that hath the participation of Mind in a higher degree than the others have: But yet, there is Mind, and as much of Mind in all the Conceptive Cogitative Acts of Sense or Imagination, as there is of Conception and Cogitation in them. Thus I have shewed how Sense, Imagination, and Reason do *agree*, now I am to shew how they *differ*.

Sense, (by which I mean the power of Seeing, of Hearing, of Tasting, of Smelling, and of Feeling,) is that by which we make acquaintance with External Objects, and have Knowledge of them by means of Images and Apparitions, or
(which

(which is a better expression, as being more General and Comprehensive,) by *Sentiments* excited in the External Organs, through Impressions made upon them from Objects. *Imagination* is internal Sense, or an (After) Representation of the Images or Sentiments (that have been) excited before in the Sense: This is the Basis and Foundation of it; Composition, Division, and Enlargement of Images, is but Accessory, but Superstructure, and an Improvement of Sense. *Reason* or Understanding, is a faculty by which we know External Objects, as well as our own Acts, without framing Images of them; ; only by *Ideas* or Notions. In short, *Sensation*, properly, is Imagination, for every Sense Imagines; and that, which commonly is called *Imagination*, is but Remembrance, or Recollection of Sensation. Imagination, is *Repetition* of Sensation made from within, Sensation, is Imagination occasioned by immediate Impressions from without us. *Reason* or Understanding, is refined, Sublimated Sensation, that is, a conscious perception of things by *Notions* or Ideas, and not by Images, or sensible Representations. And thus, *all* the cogitative powers that are in Man, may be reduced to *Two*, to *Sense* and *Reason*; the former comprehending the Imagination, which is but
the

the power of Remembring Sensations, and of Amplifying them ; and the Letter comprehending Intellectual Remembrance, which is only a recollection of Ideas or Notions.

But to make a Reflection of more light, it may be minded, that when we look on a *Book*, (to Instance in a thing that is next to hand,) and read any *Sentence* in it, as this, *God is a Spirit*, we have at that time in our Eyes the *Figures* of the *Letters* that compose the Words, and so do know by *them*, what the words are ; and this is *Sense*. But if putting aside the Book we will endeavour to *Recollect* those words, we must do it one of *two ways* ; *either* by Retrieving in our thoughts the very *Figures* and *Imagies* of the *Letters* and *Words* before presented to our Eyes ; or (which we oftneft do) by recalling the *Words* and *Sentence*, and saying to our selves, or unto others, *God is a Spirit*, without thinking in the least, of any *Figures* of the *Letters* that do make the *Words*, or of the *Images* of the *Words* that compose the *Sentence*. In the former we do *Imagine* the *Sentence*, as raising again the *Images* of the *Words* that make it, and this is *Sensible* Remembrance ; but in the latter, though, when we *Recollect* the *Sentence*, we must withal (some way
or

or other) mind again the words that compose it, yet we do it *without* Imagining them, and this is *Intellectual* Remembrance, or the act of the Reason. Add, that at the same time that we do see the Schemes and Figures of the Letters, and have the portraictures and draughts of the words presented to our Eyes, which is *Sense*, we have, or may have, in our minds the sense and meaning of those words, of which sense or meaning however, we have neither Picture or Figure ; and this is *Understanding*: In the former we have *Images*, in the latter only *Ideas* ; we *See* the words, but understand the meaning This power of the Mind, (of perceiving without Imagining,) is called *Reason*, because in those Acts in which it does converse with things by means of words (and those are most of the Acts exerted by it) the sense and meaning of the words is (as it were) Inferred and Reasoned from them. What I have said, suffices to make the Notion or Idea of Reason or Understanding conceivable, by men who use Attention, and do *think*, but nothing will be enough to explicate and set it out to such as cannot endure that trouble, but will swallow all things without chewing-

SECT. II.

Of Reason as taken for Contrivance, Contrivance, what, Sagacity what. Reason taken but for Contrivance, not Characteristical to Man. Of the Imaginative Contrivance in Irrational Animals. An Instance of it in a certain Hen. Apprehension, Composition, Illation, Aëts of the Imagination, as well as of the Reason or Understanding. Composition of Phantasms, how Illustrated by Mr. Hobbs. That Reason taken for the Understanding (in the Notion of Understanding settled before) agrees to no other Animal but Man. Of Prince Maurices Parrot. The Aëts of Reason as taken for the Understanding, reduced to two, to wit, Apprehension and Judgment.

I Know very well, that most Men, and even most Philosophers do take Reason but for *Contrivance*, or for *Discourse*, which is a sort of *Contrivance*; and that *Contrivance* (a dexterity in which they call *Sagacity*,) is a thinking upon means to compass and attain ends; as first upon the nearest means, then upon the means to that, and so on till all the necessary means are thought upon. But those who think

think so, (to wit, that Reason is nothing but Contrivance,) can never evidence that Reason is the Character or sole Privilege of Man, (which yet it is commonly belived, and said to be ;) since there is Imaginative, as well as Intellectual Contrivance, and Imaginative Contrivance must be owned to belong to Inferior Animals, as well as to Men. My meaning is, that other Animals besides Men, and below them too, have a faculty or power by which, after a sort, they do conceive the next means (though not under the Notion of a Means) to what they would have, and then the means to that, and so by a train of Phantasms, go on till they have found enough for compassing the thing which they desire and prosecute. I have seen an *Hen* whose Chickens ran from her through a little hole that was in a Gate, through which she could not follow them, into a Court Inviorned with a very high Wall, that being in a passion to come to them, first she looks to see if she could fly to the top of the Wall, which was the nearest way and means, but upon Trial finding that unfeasible, and spying at some distance a Pent-House, from which she was able to gain it, away she flies to That; though it was to go farther than before from her Chickens, and consequently, no
ways

ways for her purpose, but as it was a means to reach the top of the Wall, which was the nearest means to get to them : Thus did this *Hen* contrive for her purposes.

The Instance I have given is a small one, and in a Creature not remarkable as many others are for Acts of *Sagacity* ; it is not an Instance in the Elephant, in the Castor, the Fox, the Dog, or such other subtle Animals ; and yet an Instance serving well enough for my design, which is to shew, that Reason which is proper and Characteristical to Man, is not meer Contrivance or Discourse. For this it plainly sheweth, since it manifests, that Inferiour sensitive Creatures are Contriving and Discursive, and capable of making network of their Sentiments and Fancies ; and withal (manifests) that Apprehension, Composition and Illation are in some sort, as well the Acts of the Imagination, which is common to all sensitives, as of the Understanding and Reason, which is peculiar to men. More, and Nobler Examples may be had in *Rorarius*, and in others of the Moderns ; and in *Cicero l. 2. De Natura Deorum*, for the Ancients.

The way how Phantasms are compounded by the Imagination, is prettily, though perhaps not adequately, Illustrated
by

by *M. Hobbs*, in a Similitude taken from Water ; ‘ Water (fays he) when moved
 ‘ at once by divers movements, receiveth
 ‘ one motion compounded of them all ; fo
 ‘ it is in the Brain or Spirits stirred by di-
 ‘ vers objects ; there is composed an Ima-
 ‘ gination of divers conceptions ; that ap-
 ‘ peared fingle to the Senfe. As Senfe at
 ‘ one time fheweth the Figure of a Moun-
 ‘ tain, at another of Gold, and the Ima-
 ‘ gination afterwards composes them in a
 ‘ Golden Mountain.

But without determining that Images are compounded in the Imagination, juft the fame way as *Mr. Hobbs* has represented, this is certain, a composition of them there is, and contrivance too in that composition ; and this as well in Animals that are called Irrational, as in Men, who may, in fome meafure, guefs at the latitude and extend thereof in other Animals, by what they find in themselves, in common *Dreams*.

But whatever Contrivence (that Re-
 fembles Reasoning) fuch Animals as are
 called Irrational may have, certain it is,
 that Reason taken for the Understanding,
 as the Understanding is a power of percei-
 ving without Imagining, cannot be evi-
 denced to be in them ; they may Imagine,
 and by force of Imagination, after a fort
 Contrive,

Contrive, but it cannot be shewed that they Understand, or that they do Contrive the same way that men do, who do it by vertue of their Understanding. The Contrivance (and consequently the Discourse) of Irrational Animals, is a pure Effect of Sense and Imagination, and performed only by the *Sequel* of Images, which Sequels is not properly Illation made by way of Judgment, but as (in effects of the *Plastick*) the Images follow one another by means of their *Congruity*; or of some other Antecedent connexion; wherein the Memory, which is the Exchequer or common Treasury of all Sensations, and the disposition and order of Images in it, serves to good purpose. Such *Animals*, as they have not that use of *words* that Men have (of which hereafter,) so they have not that Power of Understanding which is termed *Judicative*; a power that so Estimates, and Weighs and Ballances Things, and their proportions one to another, by Comparing and Conferring them, that accordingly it pronounces upon them; *This is That*, or, *This is not That*, and *This is Such*, or, *This is not Such*; Which *Sentences* so pronounced, are called *Propositions*, or *Enunciations*, and are, really, *Judgments*. Whence it follows, that the so much talkt of *Syllogisme* of Hounds, (for

fo *Reisch* in his *Margarita Philosophica* calls it, when he says, *In bivio, feram alterâ declinasse parte Sillogizant canes,*) is meer fallacy ; the *Hare* is gone either this way or that way, he smells out the minor with his nose, he is not gone this way, and therefore concluding he is gone the other, doth with open mouth run that way, without his putting Nose to ground. All this is but Sensation, and following of the *Scent*, without any thing of Enunciation or Judgment ; there is nothing of *Propositions, Major, Minor, or Conclusion*, in the case : The Hound perhaps does put his Nose at first where the Scent is not, and not finding it, turns another way, where it happens to be, so that upon turning being presently struck with the Scent, he follows it, with an out-cry ; without putting of his Nose to the ground, to seek for what he has found already.

I confess, the story of Prince *Maurice* his Parrot is stupendious, and if no Illusion was in it, as none Appears ; or that it was not an Effect of Witchcraft, which I most suspect, (the Country of *Brasil* in which it was Acted, (as all the *Indies*) having many Diabolical Agents, that work by Magick ;) I should think it a very *Cross* Instance to my former Discourse. But considering it, as I do, only as an Effect

fect of Diabolical power, I put it in the number of the Extraordinary Events, with the Tricks of the *Divining Ape* which Mr. *Terry* writes of, in his Relation of a Voyage into the East-Indies ; and then it may not be drawn into Argument. However, that thinking men may have an Occasion to employ their Thoughts, and to make an Impartial Judgment, I will tell the story as I find it in Sir *William Temples* Memoirs p. 57. Ed. 2. in his own Words, together with the Reflexion he makes.

“ With the Prince of *Orange* (says he)
 “ returned most of the General Officers to
 “ the *Hague*, and among the rest Old
 “ Prince *Maurice* of *Nassaw*, who, as the
 “ Prince told me, had with the greatest in-
 “ dustry that could be, fought all occasions
 “ of dying fairly at the Battle of *Seneffe*
 “ without succeeding, which had given
 “ him great regrets ; and I did not won-
 “ der at it, considering his age of about
 “ Seventy Six, and his long habits both
 “ of Gout and Stone. When he came to
 “ visit me upon his return and before he
 “ went to his Government of *Cleve*, it came
 “ in my head to ask him an idle question,
 “ because I thought it not very likely for
 “ me to see him again, and I had a mind
 “ to know from his own Mouth the Ac-
 “ count of a common but much credited
 “ story,

“ story, that I had heard so often from
 “ many others of an old Parrot he had in
 “ *Brafill* during his Government there,
 “ that spoke, and asked, and answered,
 “ common questions like a Reasonable
 “ Creature ; so that those of his train
 “ there, generally concluded it to be
 “ Witchery or Possession ; and one of the
 “ Chaplains, who lived long after-
 “ wards in *Holland* would never from that
 “ time endure a Parrot, but said they all
 “ had a Devil in them. I had heard many
 “ particulars of this Story, and assevered
 “ by People hard to be Discredited, which
 “ made me ask Prince *Maurice* what there
 “ was of it. He said with his usual plain-
 “ nels and dryness in talk, there was some-
 “ thing true, but a great deal false, of
 “ what had been reported. I desired to
 “ Know of him, what there was of the
 “ first, he told me short and coldly, that
 “ he had heard of such an old Parrot when
 “ he came to *Brafill* ; and though he be-
 “ lieved nothing of it, and it was a good
 “ way off, yet he had so much curiosity as
 “ as to send for it ; that it was a very great
 “ and a very old one ; and when it came
 “ first into the room where the Prince was
 “ with a great many Dutchmen about
 “ him, it said presently, *What a company*
 “ *of White men are here ?* They askt it what
 “ he

“ he thought that Man was ? pointing at
 “ at the Prince. It answered, *Some Gene-*
 “ *ral or other.* When they brought it close
 “ to him, he askt it, *Dou venes, vous ?*
 “ [Whence come you ?] It answered, *De*
 “ *Marinnan.* [From *Marinnan.* The
 “ Prince, *A qui est es vous ?* [To whom
 “ do you belong ?] The Parrot, *A un Por-*
 “ *tugez.* [To a Portugez.] Prince *Que*
 “ *fais tula ?* [What do you there ?] Par-
 “ rot, *Je garde les poulles.* [I look after
 “ the Chickens ?] The Prince laughed
 “ and said, *Vous gardes les poulles ?* [You
 “ look after the Chickens ?] The Parrot
 “ answered. *Ouy moy & je Scay bien faire,*
 “ [yes, I, and I know well enough how to
 “ do it.] And make the Chuck four or five
 “ times that people use to make to Chick-
 “ ens when they call them. I fet down the
 “ words of this worthy Dialogue in
 “ French, just as Prince *Maurice* said them
 “ to me. I asked him in what Language
 “ the Parrot spoke ? And he said in Bra-
 “ silian. I asked whether he understood
 “ Brasilian ? He said, no, but he had taken
 “ care to have two Interpreters by him,
 “ one a Dutch-man that spoke Brisilian,
 “ and the other a Brisilian that spoke
 “ Dutch ; that he asked them separately
 “ and privately, and both of them agreed
 “ in telling him just the same thing
 “ that

“ that the Parrot said. I could not (says
 “ Sir *William*) but tell this odd Story, be-
 “ because it is so much out of the way, and
 “ from the first hand, and what may pass
 “ for a good one; for I dare say this Prince
 “ at least believed himself in all he told
 “ me, having ever passed for a very honest
 “ and pious man. I leave it to Naturalists
 “ to reason, and to other men to believe as
 “ they please upon it.

Thus that excellent Person. But to re-
 turn, (for indeed, what I have said in this
 Section is a Kind of Digression, as be-
 ing more proper for another place.)

The Acts of Reason (taking Reason for
 the Understanding) may be aptly enough
 reduced to two, to wit, *Apprehension* and
Judgment; to the latter of which that dis-
 position of our Conceptions into order
 and method, which commonly is called *Or-*
dinative Discourse, as also Argumentation
 and Deduction, which is termed *Illative*,
 and hath the name of *Reasoning* appropriat-
 ed to it, do (both) belong, as *Instruments*
 and *Means*.

CHAP. II. *Of Apprehension.*

SECT. I.

Apprehension, the first Act of Reason. Of Words, the ordinary Means of Apprehension. The Ends and Uses of Words, 1. To distinguish things as they are in the Mind, in which, words do stand for things. Why Mind is called Understanding. 2. To express our Thoughts and Conceptions one to another. The Importance of Words unto Knowledge, in this second Use of them. Of the Sense of Words. Of Canting. All Use of New Words, not Canting. The Sense of Words twofold; Verbal, and Reall. This distinction of the Senses of Words Illustrated, and the Usefulness thereof explained. Why the Meaning of Words is called Sense.

Apprehension, or that Act of the Reason or Understanding, in respect of which it is said to see or perceive things, is the same in reference to this faculty, that seeing is unto the Eye: for the mind to apprehend, perceive, or know any Object, is the same (to speak by way of allusion and similitude) as for the Eye to see, or discern one.

What I have said in the former *Chapter*, does cast some Light on this Subject; but yet to set it out more fully, I will consider, *First*, the Ordinary Means the Understanding uses in its Acts of Apprehension, and those are Words. *Secondly*, The immediate Object of Apprehension, and that is Notion, or Intellectual Sentiment; Sentiment of the Mind. *Thirdly*, The two chief Affections of Apprehension, and those are clearness and distinctness; of which three considerations; the Second properly is a Subject of Metaphysics; the Third of Logic; and the First is common to both.

Apprehension properly and primarily is of things, as things are taken largely, for (external) Objects of the Mind. By an (external) Object of the Mind, I mean whatever any wise is without, and thought upon by, it. Now, the mind may think upon Objects, two ways. *First*, it may think upon them nakedly and abstractly, as they are in themselves, (without considering them as marked and distinguished by Words, or any other Characters and Notes, that should betoken or signify them,) only by having the *Idea* or notion of them. And this is to apprehend an Object *immediately*. For example, without considering of the *Word* [whiteness,] or having the least thought of it, one may consider

consider the *Image* of Whiteness, as it doth appear in Snow, in Paper, or on a White wall. But *Secondly*, the mind may also think of things, and consider them by *means* of Words, that signify them; as when having in our thoughts the word [whiteness], we do not think of the thing or Image, but under that word, which stands for it; or perhaps do think and speak of whiteness, without having the Image of whiteness at all; for both *ways* we may think of things by means of words, since words may be used to call the Images or Notions of things into our minds, for else themselves may stand in our minds for these Images or Notions, and so may be discoursed of, or used in the Discourse of other things. This Instance I acknowledge is an Imaginative Apprehension; and I use it rather than another that is Intellectual, because the Understanding in its Acts of Apprehension, if not always, doth very often, summon in the aid of the Imagination; as also, because it serves well enough to manifest my meaning; which, in short, is, that the mind may think on things either immediately, without the help of words; or *mediately* by means of them.

Words are the Names of things, and of the Notions, Thoughts and Conceptions that we have of things. *Names* are Articulate

culate Sounds, appointed to signifie things and Notions.

All Articulations of Sounds, all Voices (for Articulations of Sound are call'd *Voices*) tho they be, or may, by composition and conjugation, be multiplied, almost to infinity, yet they are reducible within the compass of the Alphabet, and can be expressed by the four and twenty Letters, in their Combination; which certainly was an excellent Invention, and full of Admiration. For Words, as properly they are but Sounds, so, as Sounds they could not be spoken, and consequently could not signifie, but unto persons that are present, and within hearing, and to them too but for the present. Whereas by means of *Letters*, becoming capable of being permanent and fix'd in *Writing*, they become communicable, both to those that are present, and to those that are absent; even to the most remote, in time, and place. *Again*, Since *Writing* is a representation of our Words, as, Words of our Conceptions and Thoughts; so that Writings do signifie, and stand for, our Words, as Words do signifie, and stand for, our Thoughts; therefore when I do discourse of Words, I would be understood to discourse of those that are written, as well as of those that are spoken. And *in fine*, since thoughts
 may

may be signified by gestures and other Signs, as well as by Words; (for there are *three* ways of discoursing, or communicating of thoughts; to wit, by *Words*, by *Writing*, and by meer *Signs* and *Gestures*;) therefore what I say of *Words* must be taken as intended to be equally meant, *mutatis mutandis*, of Gestures and other Signs (so far as they are used to signify our thoughts) as well as of words themselves.

The *Uses* of words are divers. The *First*, to be as so many marks and tokens upon things, to signify and show them; so that every man may be able to know them again in his own mind, and to distinguish and discern them in it.

For the clearing of this use, it must be considered, that the Understanding hath not of its own, (as the Imagination hath) any *proper Images*, any Figures of the things it converses with, whereby to know or distinguish them; the only Images it has of things (besides those of the Sense, or the Imagination) are the *Words* which signify them; which do stand therein for the very things themselves. For to give an Example; There is no such thing in the Understanding as an Image, or sensible Figure, of Substance, or of mind, or of matter, or of colour in general, as there is in the sense, or imagination of white, of black, of red,
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of green, or of other particular Colours : The *only* Images it has of these, and of all things else that are purely intelligible and mental, are the *Words* that signify them : Ay, the very *Ideas* the Understanding hath of things, are nothing but its definitive conceptions of them, or *definitions* ; and definitions as properly they are of *Words* (which *Words* since they stand in the mind for things, are commonly mistaken for, and consequently miscalled, *Simple Ideas* of these things ;) so they are made by words. To such a degree, in this respect, are words of use to the understanding, which cannot work without them ; a thing so certain, that even the *denomination* it self of [*understanding*] at least in part, arises from hence ; for the *Mind* is called (the) Understanding, because it has a power of seeing things *under* Words that *stand* for them ; as well as because it has one of perceiving Substances under Accidents ; and had Beasts this power, they would come but little short of men, as to Acts of mind.

But besides this use, (which is more private and particular, an use that every man must have of Words for himself) there is a *Second*, an use that men have of them one for another ? to wit, mutually to express their Sentiments and Thoughts ; in respect of which, words are said to be as *Money* :
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the meaning is, That words used to convey our minds to others, must be such as are current, and in use, or else they will not pass.

Speech or Language (the cloathing of our Sentiments and Thoughts in Words) is, in respect of *both* the mentioned uses, especially the latter, of so much moment to *Reason* (taken for Discourse, or Contrivance at large ; that some have conceited, that men are little beholding to any thing else but the *former*, for that degree of the *Latter*, that doth divide and distinguish them from Beasts. Reason in their Opinion, in the Seeds and principles of it, being but as a Spark, which in men, by the advantage of Speech, becomes improved and blown into such a flame as has engrossed the Title ; so that tho the same Principles of Reason are common to all Animals, yet this *Improvement* of them (that only carries the Name) is proper to man, because Speech is. And in truth, by means of Speech, or communication of Sentiments and Thoughts, as one man becomes assisted and aided by another ; so if we do add *Writing* and *Printing*, which are but Fixations of Speech, it may be said, that every man is assisted and aided with the Sentiments and thoughts of all ; and how much help this may bring toward the improving

proving of Reason, is nothing hard to be conceived by one that shall consider the great advantage a Consult has, for the ripening of Business, or making a judgment upon things, above the reasoning of any one particular solitary person ; or hath observed the difference that Cultivation and Savagenes , do make, in men. Should one permit himself to imagine that Elephants, Castors, Dogs, Foxes, and other sagacious Animals , which can contrive and do so much singly, (as we find by experience they can, and do) should have the united Ingenuity of their several Kinds ; it would be hard for him to say, to what they might not improve, or to distinguish the near approaches that they would make to what commonly is called Reason, from the real use and enjoyment of it. Especially if he also consider, that Savage wild men, who want the benefit of Education, and of large Converse ; so that tho they have the use of *Speech*, yet they receive not this advantage by it, do very little excel such Animals, but come infinitely short of civilized and well bred men ; who living in great Societies, have all the furtherance that aid and mutual assistance can give unto them.

Some in regard of the former use that *Words* have, do call them *Notes*, or Marks ;
and

and in respect of the latter, term them *Signs*; but in truth, in referenc to both their Uses, Words are *Signs*, since, in both, they do signifie, either to ones self, as in the first use, or unto others, as in the second. Words are *Signs*, but *Signs* that signifie but by agreement, consent, and Institution: For should any do it by *Nature*, the Language that consisted of them would be universal, spoken and understood of all, which none is: so that the way of tryal in *Herodotus*, of the most Ancient Language, was as ill grounded, as the Discovery made by it ridiculous. 'Tis true, *Jacob Behman* talks of a *Language of Nature*, but I think he rather intended by it the *Language of Signatures*, than that of Words; since the *Language of Signatures*, if understood, may be interpreted (as he affirms his *Language of Nature* may) in *Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Dutch, English*, or any other vernacular Tongue: And in this sense too, That *Adam* understood the *Language of Nature* (as he says he did) was a truth, and perhaps implied in the History, which tells us, That *whatsoever Adam called every living Creature, that was the Name thereof*. But tho this may be, as he says, yet I cannot believe that That is so which he adds, That *Adam* had the Gift [of understanding the *Languages of Nature*] which was lost by
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his Fall, restor'd to him by his Regeneration: For that the New Birth, that consists in renovation of the Mind, after the Image of God in Christ, has any thing to do with *Philosophy*, or the Knowledge of Nature, is a conceit that cannot enter into my thoughts: I do not find in the Holy-Scriptures, which can give us any certainty herein, that our Saviour Christ himself did teach, or that his Apostles and first followers did profess, *Philosophy* and *Science of Nature*. But enough (if not too much) in this place, of the Language of *Nature*, since here we are to speak of the Language of men, and the Language of men is words, which are not natural but only instituted and imposed, signs.

The use of words of usual and current signification is called *speaking*; the use either of uncurrent *Fictitious* words, or of current words *abused* from their usual common signification, to a private particular meaning, is called *canting*. Of the former sort of canting *Basiliides*, *Valentinus*, and all the *Gnosticks*, in *Theology*; *Paracelsus*, *Van-Helmont*, and all the *Chymists* generally, with many others, in *Philosophy* and *Medicine*, are not only common, but justly noted, Examples. Not that the use of every *new* Word is canting, or that we need be as nice as *C. Cæsar* in *Aulus Gellius*,
and

and avoid a new word, tho' necessary to express our meaning, as we would *Charybdis*, or *Scylla*. Words are but the cloathing of Thoughts, and therefore must be made and fitted to them; and if we keep (as near as conveniently we can) to the ordinary Rules and Laws of Speaking, the making of new Words, when none, or none so apt, are stamp'd already, to signify our Sentiments, is a practice that calls for imitation, since *Cicero* himself has set us a *Copy*; many of the Words that now enrich the *Roman* Language, and do make it so expressive, were Innovations of his: And *Epicurus* did so before him: For, (as *Cicero* tells us, *l. i. de Nat: Deorum*) he either invented, or first applied the Word $\pi\rho\acute{o}\lambda\eta\psi\iota\varsigma$; *Sunt*, says *Cicero*, *rebus novis, nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus, ipse πρὸ-λῆψιν appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat.*

The *Essence* of Words, if words are taken, not materially, only for Articulate Sounds, but formally; for Articulate Sounds as they are Signs, do lie in their *signification*; and their *signification*, (or that which is signified by them) has the Name of *sense* or *meaning*.

The *sense* or *meaning* of words (the want whereof we call *Nonsense*) is two fold; the *sense* and *meaning* of words in reference to

our common ordinary *Conceptions* ; and the *sense* and *meaning* of words in reference to the *things* expressed and signified by them : The former may be term'd *Verbal*, the latter *real sense* ; or (perhaps to speak more properly,) the former may be called the *sense* or *meaning* of the words, the latter the *conception*, the *notion*, or the *Idea* of the *Thing*. Should a *Roman Catholick* tell me he means by *Transubstantiation*, that a real and substantial mutation of the Elements of Bread and Wine is made in the Holy *Sacrament*, into the very Body and Blood of Christ, but yet so, that notwithstanding this mutation, the *Species* or *Accidents* of Bread and Wine do still remain to affect our senses : 'Tis possible I may conceive the sense and meaning of the several words he uses, and also apprehend what it is he would have me believe, when yet at the same time, I cannot apprehend that such a thing can really be, since I see a plain contradiction it should ; it being equally impossible to make a *Conception* ; (that is, to frame a coherent consistent *Notion* or *Idea*) of the thing he means, and make all the parts of it to hang together, as to make *one* of a circular *square*, or of a *Triangular Circle*. *Ecquem, says Cotta in Cicero, l. 3. de Nat. Deorum pag. 129. tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo Vescatur, deum credat esse ?*

A *Distinction* then there is (and that a remarkable one too) between the verbal, and real, meaning of words ; which to set out more fully, I will show, *First*, The the Occasion, and Rise of it, and then *Secondly*, The Use and Benefit of it.

First then, this distinction *Arises* from the Imperfection and Inadequacy of Human Knowledge ; we Knowing little of things but under words, and words being (immediately) the signs but, of our Conceptions, which are always short and narrow, and, too often, indistinct and confused. Now if the sentiments we have according to the Vulgar and Ordinary way of conceiving, which is but general and confused, do cohere and hang together, when one of them is affirmed or spoken of another, so that the Notions are compossible in common acceptation, we *call* it sense, though really the things themselves (for which those words are understood to stand) be Impossible, and repugnant each to other, and therefore *indeed* it is Nonsense. This is to be better understood in Examples. Such *Propositions* as these, that *Colours* (even as to their Images) are in the Objects in which they do appear ; that *Odours* are in the things smelled ; that *Savors* are in the things that are tasted ; these and the like Assertions are not com-

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monly understood, or said, to be Nonsense, because, Knowing in the general and confusedly, what is meant by colour, what by Odor, and what by *Sapor*, as likewise what is meant by the thing seen, by the thing that is tasted, and by the thing which is smelled ; nothing appears in those confused general Notions (which we have,) to hinder us from thinking that Colours, Savors, and Odours do as really Inhere in those external objects, as they seem to do. And yet to a Person that hath distinct, real, and just conceptions of the several subjects and predicates in those propositions, it is evident, that 'tis as gross and palpable *Nonsense* to affirm that Colours, Savors, Odours, and other Accidents, (which are but *Phænomena* and Intentional beings) do really exist in the Subjects where they seem to be, as to say, that there are Notions and Cogitations in a Wall, in a Figg, or in a Rose, than which there cannot be a greater Bull or absurdity.

The *Usefulness* of this distinction, is greater than most will think ; since from the want of making, or of observing it, it comes to pass, that so many do run into great mistakes and errors, in their discourses ; *Do* skirmish one with another, to no purpose, and without end ; and of-

ten *do* differ from themselves, as much as each from other. For few there are that do fix and settle even the verbal Sense of words, (which often have a doubleness of meaning, and then are called *Ambiguous*;) and fewer that do think of the real, without which yet, they can never come to any certainty ; so that, (as Mr. *Hobbs* has ingeniously said ; words that are Wise Mens *Counters*, become Fools *Mony*.

The meaning of words, as well the verbal, as the real, is called *Sense*, because the Perception of it ought to be as *Clear*, and distinct, and as steady and fixt, as that of Sense is : For words, to be understood as they ought, must have their meanings be as clearly and distinctly perceived, by the mind, as objects of Sense when they are Seen, or Heard, or Tasted, or Smelled, are by the Senses.

S E C T. II-

All Falsity is not Nonsense ; but all impossible Falsity is. Repugnance in the mind to yield assent to propositions that are Nonsense. Whence it arises. Of Enthusiasm, as it is a Kind of Nonsense. What Enthusiasm is. The distributions of it. Examples of the several Kinds of Enthusiasm, out of Dr. Fludd, and in the Magick Aphorisms of the Rosy-crusians. That Enthusiasts when they seem to understand one another, do so by Sympathy only, and not by way of Apprehension and Judgment. How this may be, set out in a story very Remarkable.

I Have spoken of Sense and Nonsense in the general ; but toward a further clearing of the Notions of them, and especially that of the latter, it must be observed, that falsity and Nonsense are not Synonymous terms ; For all *Falsity* is not Nonsense, that is, every Proposition that is false, is not also Nonsensical ; for many things are *possible*, that are not *Actual* ; and therefore many propositions that are not actually true, might have been, or may hereafter be so ; and as what is true, is
Sense

Sense, so Sense is *compossibility*, not actuality ; not that only which at present is true, but whatever is any wise possible to be so. But though all Falsity is not Nonsense ; all *impossible* Falsity is. I mean, every proposition is Nonsense, that is false to that degree, that it is impossible (absolutely impossible) it should be true ; for no proposition is absolutely impossible to be true but that which implies contradiction, and that which implies a contradiction must needs be Nonsense ; since the Understanding cannot frame any Notion or Idea of it, and so cannot make any real sense of the words, that compose it. Contradiction in *Terms* is plain or gross Nonsense, (called a *Bull* in English, or an *Absurdity* ;) and where the terms in common acceptation are not Contradictory, yet if the thing they are designed to express do really imply a Contradiction, the propositions, though Verbal Sense, are really Nonsense ; as in the Instances above.

Observe again, that there is in the mind a certain sensible *Reluctance* to give assent to Propositions that are Incongruous, and really Nonsensical ; for whoever Attends to what does pass within himself, will be Conscious of a *Pain* (as it were of dislocation) upon a serious predication of Abstracts one of another ; as when he says, good-

ness is Justice ; or of Contraries, as when he affirms, love is hatred, and the like in other Instances. The *Reason* is plain. For as this is to say, that one thing is another, so he that says that one thing is another, says also, that neither is it self, that is, says a Contradiction, and a Contradiction (whither explicite or implicite,) being Affirmation and Negation of the same thing, and consequently an Assent and Dissent at the same time, and Assent and Dissent being contrary Motions, or Modifications; it follows, that to say, or go about to Assent unto, a Contradiction; is to *distract* and distort the mind, and put it to pain, because it is to draw it contrary ways at the same time.

Nonsense in persons who pretend to supernatural Assistances; may be called *Enthusiasm*, *Enthusiasm* properly, is a false conceit of being inspired ; to be *inspired*, is to receive immediate motions and instincts from the Spirit of God; the person that has this false conceit of his being immediately Instincted, and moved by the Spirit of God, is called an *Enthusiast*. A person may be an *Enthusiast* as well in matters of *Philosophy*, as in those of *Divinity*, and many Examples there are of both sorts of *Enthusiasts*, some of which I have touched before ; but I forbear to say any
more

more of them now, in reference to their *Original*, or the *Quality* and *Causes* of their *Distemper*, &c. Since now, it is not my business to treat of *Enthusiasm*, and to set out the *Nature* of it, under the Notion of an *Imaginary Inspiration*, so much as to speak of the *Language* of *Enthusiasts*, which usually is Nonsense.

And of this I find a full Example in Dr. *Fludd*, in the third Book of his *Mosaick Philosophy*, the first Section and fourth Chapter, when having cited the Seventh Chapter of the the Book of *Wisdom*, the 25th, verse. He infers in these terms, ‘ So that we may discern by this
 ‘ Discription of the Wise Man, what is
 ‘ the Spiritual Christ, who is the Wisdom,
 ‘ Vertue, and word of God, and how by
 ‘ his Apparition out of Darknes, that is,
 ‘ by the mutation or change of the first
 ‘ principle, (which was in Darknes, *Quasi*
 ‘ *si verbum in Principio,*) from Dark Aleph
 ‘ to Light Aleph, the Waters which were
 ‘ contained in the profound Bowels of the
 ‘ Abyss were revealed, and were anima-
 ‘ ted, that is to say, by the emanation or
 ‘ emission of this self same Spirit of Eternal
 ‘ Fire or Light, and afterward by his ad-
 ‘ mirable activity, and restless motion and
 ‘ penetration (for by *Solomon* it is said to
 ‘ be *Omnibus mobilibus mobilior,* &c. Sap.

‘ 7. 24.) It first distinguisheth and separ-
 ‘ rateth the Darkness from the Light, the
 ‘ obscure and gross Waters from the subtle
 ‘ and pure, and then it disposeth the
 ‘ Heavens into Spheres; lastly it di-
 ‘ videth the grosser Waters into Sublunary
 ‘ Elements, as by the words of the first
 ‘ Chapter of *Genesis* each Man may plainly
 ‘ discern.

This is a full Example, and yet in further entertainment of the Curious, and for more variety, I will add another in the *Magick Aphorisms*, (for so I find them called) of the *Brethren of the Rosy-Cross*, which are as little capable of real Sense (at least in my Understanding,) as that I cited before from Dr. *Fludd*: And I will give them in the same Language in which I find them, without pretending to the skill of Translating them exactly.

1. *Ante Omnia punctum extitit, non τὸ ἄτοπον aut Mathematicum, sed diffusivum, monas erat explicitè, implicitè myrias; lux erat & nox, Principium & finis Principii, omnia & nihil, est & non.*

2. *Commovet se monas in Diade, & per triadem egressæ sunt facies luminis secundi.*

3. *Exivit ignis simplex, Increatus, est sub aquis, induit se tegamento ignis multiplicis.*

4. *Respexit*

4. *Respexit ad fontem superiorem & inferiorem, deducto typo, triplici vultu sigillavit.*

5. *Creavit unum unitas, & in tria distinxit, trinitas est & Quaternarius nexus & medium reductionis.*

6. *Ex visibilibus primum effulsit aqua, Femina incumbens ignis, & figurabilium gravis mater.*

7. *Porosa erat intevix & corticibus varia, cujus venter habuit caelos convolutos & astra indiscreta.*

8. *Separatus artifex divisit hanc in amplas regiones, & apparente fetu disparuit mater.*

9. *Peperit tamen mater filios lucidos, Influentes, in terram Chai.*

10. *Hi generant matrem in novissimis, cujus fons cantat in luco miraculoso.*

11. *Sapientiae condus est hic: esto qui potes promus.*

12. *Pater est totius creati, & ex filio creato per vivam filii Analysin pater generatur. Habes summum generantis circuli mysterium: filii filius est, qui filii pater fuit.*

This it seems is the *Rosycruean Creed*, in which perhaps there may be much of deep mystery and sense; but for my part I can make none, that is real; and I believe that
 most

most of my Readers will be able to make of it as little as I ; and therefore I have set it down as an Instance and Example of Nonsense, that Nonsense which I called Enthusiasm.

And here (since it may be demanded if such *Enthusiasms* really are Nonsense, and consequently unintelligible, how it comes to pass that *Enthusiasts* do understand one another?) I conceive it fit to observe, that when *Enthusiasts* think, that they understand One Another (as in truth they profess to do, and this so seriously, that 'tis hard not to believe them to have some impressions common to them, which may support their Profession ;) yet for as much as no sober man, tho never so sagacious or inquisitive, can understand them, it must be reckon'd an effect of Sympathy, and not of *Intellectual Apprehension* ; I mean, they understand one another not *judiciously*, by conceiving ; that is, by framing clear and consistent Notions of what is said, but only *sympathetically*, by having, upon such Expressions, some Notions, and consequent Thoughts, excited in them, that are conformable to theirs that use the Expressions: it being with *Enthusiasts*, who possess the same Frame and texture of mind, as with *unison Lutes*, or other *Instruments* fitly tuned ; in which to touch one, is to affect and stir all within a convenient distance. To

To evidence how much conformity in Body and mind may signifie to that purpose I will make a relation of a very credible Story which I have read of *Twins* ; who exactly resembling each the other in all the Features and Lineaments of Body, and consequently in Frame and Texture of mind, did also *sympathize* to a wonder ; so that being at great distance one from another, they would notwithstanding be stirred with the same Affections and motions. The Story is to be found in a Book entitled, *Remarkable Antiquities of the City of Exeter*, (pag. 42, 43.) and is this ; *Henry Tracy*, an Inhabitant of the City aforesaid, had a numerous Issue, being the Father of eight Sons, and eight Daughters ; the the Sixth and Seventh Sons were of one Birth *Twins*, and so well like in a all Lineaments, and so equal in Stature, so coloured in Hair, and so like in Face and Gestures, that they could not be known one from the other, no not by their Friends, Parents, Brothers or Sisters, but privately by some secret marks, and openly by wearing some several coloured Ribbands alike, which in sport they would sometimes exchange to make tryal of their Friends Judgment ; yet somewhat more strange was, that their *Minds* and *Affections* were *as one*, for what the one loved,

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‘ the other desired ; and so on the contrary ;
 ‘ the loathing of any thing by the *one*, was
 ‘ the distasting of the same thing by the o-
 ‘ ther ; yea, such a consideration, or in-
 ‘ bred Power or Sympathy was in their na-
 ‘ tures, that if *Nicholas* were sick or grie-
 ‘ ved, *Andrew* felt the like pain, tho’ far *di-*
 ‘ *stant* and remote in their persons, and that
 ‘ too, without any intelligence given to ei-
 ‘ ther party ;) and ’twas also observed that if
 ‘ *Andrew* were merry, *Nicholas* was like-
 ‘ wise so affected, altho’ in different places
 ‘ which long they could not endure to be
 ‘ asunder ; for they ever desired to eat,
 ‘ drink, sleep and walk together ; yea, so
 ‘ they lived and died , for they both served
 ‘ the King in Arms against his *Barons* ; and
 ‘ in a Battle, the one being slain, the other
 ‘ stept presently into his place ; where in
 ‘ the height of danger (no perswasions able
 ‘ to remove or hinder him) was there like-
 ‘ wise killed.

The like (if not the same ` Story I find
 reported by the *Author* of the Book, Enti-
 tuled, *England’s Worthies* in Church and
 State, Printed London 1684. : (pag. 165.)
 who tells it in these Words : ‘ *Nicholas* and
 ‘ *Andrew Tremane* says he) were Twins
 ‘ alike in all Lineaments, and felt like
 ‘ pain, tho at distance, and without any
 ‘ Intelligence given ; they equally desired
 ‘ to

‘ to walk, travel, sit, sleep, eat and drink to-
 ‘ gether. In this they differed, that at
 ‘ *New-Haven in France*, the one was Cap-
 ‘ tain of a Troop, the other but a Private
 ‘ Soldier; there they were both slain toge-
 ‘ ther *Ann. 1564.*

These (two, if two) Stories open a great light for the understanding the Sympathies and Consents that are in the World of Nature, as well as in the World of men; but I think it not so proper to insist any longer upon them at this time, since the very occasion that I have taken of mentioning them here, is but incident, and indirect.

SECT. III.

Of Questions, their Nature, and their distribution. That a Question is neither true, nor false; neither Affirmative, nor Negative. An Objection removed. That proceeding by way of Question, or as it were of Inquiry, in Common Discourse, is very useful, as well as Civil. Judgment required in putting Pertinent Questions.

AS Words when they are joined and put together; for Example, a Vertuous

tuous Woman, an Excellent man, are called *Oration* or Speech; and if joined by way of Affirmation, or Negation, are called *Propositions*, and Propositions joined by a Conjunction, a *Compound Proposition*; so a Proposition when there is added to it a Sign of Interrogation is called a *Question*. For Instance, Whether the *Baptism* of *John* is the same with *Christ's*? Whether the Heavens are solid? or Fluid? Whether the Sun is a Flame? Whether the Earth move? And since a Sign of Interrogation may be added to any Proposition whatever; it follows, that Questions are of as many *kinds* as Propositions themselves, in respect of their *Substance* and *quantity*; so that they are either *Simple*, or *Compound*; *Universal*, or *Particular*; *Indefinite*, or *Singular*. Only as to the *quality* of Propositions, as well the *Verbal*, (which is the Affirmation, or the Negation is in them,) as the *real*, (their verity, or falsity,) it must be owned, that Questions are not capable of the same distribution in respect of this, as Propositions are. For tho' *Propositions* may be divided into *true* and *false*, and into *Affirmative* and *Negative*, *Questions* cannot; since he who only asketh the Question, whether a thing is so? or not so? neither affirmeth, nor denieth it to be; and he that neither affirmeth, nor denieth a thing to be, speaks
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nor true nor false of it. And yet it must be confessed, that as a Question may be *asked*, there may be implication of Affirmation, or Negation in it; so that in this regard a Question may have the Denomination of being affirmative, or negative, accordingly as it is made: But this is but accident, and arises not from the *nature* of a Question, nor belongs unto it as such, but rather is contrary, and only springs from the *manner* of putting the Question. I will give an Example in each: This *Question*, Is not Jesus Christ the Son of God? may be called *Affirmative*, because, being made in that manner, it seems to imply, that he who puts it, would have the Answer to be, he is; and this is Jesus Christ the Son of God? especially as it is *toned* in pronouncing, may be termed a *Negative Question*, because it seems to imply, he is not. But then either way of proposing the Question, is not barely the *putting* a *Question*, but also a directing the *Answer*: For to make a fair and naked Question, it should be worded thus; Whether Jesus Christ be the Son of God? else it may be only verbally a Question, but in effect an Assertion. *Quaestio* (says Cicero, *lib. 4. Academ Quaest.*) *est Appetitio Cognitionis, Quaestio- nisque finis Inventio.*

But to leave a Discourse that certainly will appear but dry and barren to some, and to refer such others, who are better pleased with it, and with the like, unto *common Logicians* and *Summulists* ; I will only observe, that in common Discourse and Conversation, to make Objections by way of Question, as it is less offensive than that of asserting and dogmatizing, so, being well managed, it is no less convincing and perswasive. For this Reason the way was much in use with the Ancients, especially with *Socrates* and *Plato*, who prefer'd it before the Method of Syllogism, and Opposition ; and in truth, to question, since it is not to affirm, or to deny, does not contradict, or put a mistake upon Any, but seems only a further Inquiry, rather than Opposition of what is Affirmed ; and yet as it requires a great proportion of Judgment, and of strength and clearness of understanding, to do it pertinently and well ; so being done in this manner, it gains more easily, and as it were by surprize. Besides, the way of questioning is *broader* and larger than that of Syllogizing, which is confined to one medium, and which too is often used to divert and carry one off from the business in hand, for which purpose it serves most excellently well, if managed with dexterity..

 CHAP. III.

Of Notion, *the immediate Object of Apprehension.*

S E C T. I.

That Notion may be considered two ways. 1st. In general; and 2ly. more specially. Of Notion in the general sense of the Word. No Original Native Notions. Why it seems as if there were. The Notion of Apprehension cleared. Of Notion in the special and limited Sense of the Word, what it is. That the understanding apprehends things but inadequately, and under Notions in the limited sense. This evidenced by several considerations. An Objection against it removed.

I Have spoken of words the ordinary, but instituted, means of Apprehension; I am now to speak of *Notion*, the immediate Object (some would call it the natural means) of Apprehension.

The word *Notion*, may be considered two ways, either as it does signifie more generally and largely, or as it is taken in a more restrained, special and particular sense.

A Notion in the general and larger acception of the word, is *any* conception formed by the Mind in reference to Objects; and so taken, is the same with a *thought*, or that, in respect of the Mind, that a Sentiment largely taken, is, in respect of the sense. I say a Sentiment largely taken; for instance; when Sentiment is taken in respect of the Visive Power. not strictly and properly for light, or colour only; but largely, for any perception that the Eye has, by way of sight, of things, or of their relations and habitudes. And since there is so great an Analogy between the Eye and the Understanding, and between the Sentiments of the one, and of the other, it will be an easy inference, that no reason can be given why there should be Original *Innate Notions* in the Understanding (as some imagine there must) that it may be able to apprehend, which will not equally *argue*, that there should be the like *original Figures and Images* in the Eye, which should enable it to see; and yet none will Allow of *these*.

But to show how It comes to pass, that there are (as there are) appearances as if the mind had some original innate Notions, which for that reason are called *Prolepses* and Anticipations, and withal to bring some light to the business of Apprehension, which

which (as to the *way* of it) is obscure enough, and but seldom touched to any purpose: I will offer an Observation very common, but (as it may be applied) very luciferous in reference to this Subject.

Every body observes, that if a Blow is aimed at the Head of any person, he will hold up his Arm to receive it, and keep it from his head, without thinking either *that*, or *why*, he does so; and this is said to be done *Naturally*, and by instinct; because, in truth, it is done without premeditation, and so at that time, without any actual conceived design.

And yet again it is certain, that an Infant will not do so, or any Child before it has been taught and instructed to do it; which makes it plain, that the doing so in those who are come to reason, is no effect of natural instinct, but of use; only the Child was taught to do it so early, that by the time he comes to the Age of Discretion, having forgotten, or rather, having made no observation, when it was first taught, or first did it, and upon what Motives, and doing it now *without deliberation* it hath the aspect of a thing effected by *Nature*, and not of a *custom* or habit.

In the same manner in the business of *Reason*, we may, and often do proceed up-

on Principles instilled into us very *early*, and are Acted by them, without Knowing *how*, or *why*, it being no Effect of present consideration. *Experience* confirms this, since we may be certain, if we do but attend to our own Actions, that, many times, we are carried to the Affection, or Disaffection of things, and the Approbation or Disapprobation of them, we know not *why*, and yet all the passions and Motions of our Mind, have *Reasons* for them; for all Effects must have *Causes*; but *these*, sometimes, are so *early* grafted in us, and, at other times, so *unawares*, that we remember not they were so; and then the *Effects*, only being observed, and the causes lying deep, hidden and secret, we do call it *Nature*, or *Instinct*, though in truth, it be *Reason*, and habit, as much as any thing else is.

Again, much the same way we do compute or *reckon*; for when we use any greater numbers, either in Addition, or in Subtraction, or in any other Arithmetical operation, we do it without any actual consideration of what the lesser particular numbers are that make the greater, for that we have done before, (perhaps long,) and consequently are possessed of the *Ideas* (may I so express it) without the *Images* of them. But at first, we had

a particular Knowledge. As, when we Multiply and say, Six and Six is Twelve, and Twelve and Twelve is Four and Twenty, we do it without considering actually at that time, that six is so many unites, though at first (but possibly so long ago that we do not remember it) we did so, and must (do so) to Know the particular value of that number ; and the like is of others.

And thus also with an easie Application may it be conceived, *how words come to stand in the mind for things*, and that when we have the *word*, we think we have the simple *Idea* of the thing ; it is just as the Figure [6] doth stand for the number [Six.] And that when once we have had a distinct Idea or Notion of the *Number*, afterward, (without actual thinking thereof,) we use the Figure instead of it, and that as well, or better than if we did distinctly consider the Number it self. Now, words do carry the same Relation unto things, that Figures do unto Numbers, and both Words and Figures seem to derive the power which they have of standing in the Mind as Representatives, from the connexion they have, Figures with Numbers, and Words with Things ; after the same manner as we hold up our Arm, or a Stick, to save our Head, with-

out thinking of saving it. For though the Action prevents all actual thought of the End of it, yet 'tis done for an End, in vertue of it its first *Direction* and Use. This Discourse attended to, and well digested, will open a great light into the way in which the Understanding comes to have Apprehension of things by the means of Words; and to form its Ideas and Notions, taking Notions largely for any Thoughts or Conceptions.

But besides the former Sense of the Word [Notion,] there is *Another* which is more Restrained and Limited; in which a Notion is *Modus Concipiendi*, a certain particular manner of conceiving; a manner of conceiving things that corresponds not to them but only as they are *Objects*, not as they are *Things*; there being in every Conception some thing that is purely *Objective*, purely Notional; in so much that few, if any, of the Ideas which we have of things are properly *Pictures*; our Conceptions of things no more resembling them in strict Propriety, than our Words do our Conceptions, for which yet they do stand, and with which they have a Kind of Correspondence and Answering: just as Figures that do stand for Numbers; yet are no wise like them.

To make this clearer, it must be considered that the *Eye* has no perception of things but under the *Appearance* of Light, and Colours, and yet Light and Colours do not really exist in the things themselves, that are perceived and seen by means or them, but are only in the Eye. Likewise the *Ear* has no perceivance of things, as of a Bell, of a Lute, or of a Viol, but under sounds and yet sound is only a sentiment in the Ear that hears, and is not, or any thing like it, in the Bell, or Viol, or Lute that is heard. For as the Eye has no Perceivance of things but under *Colours* that are not in them, (and the same time with due alteration, must be said of the other Senses.) So the *Understanding* Apprehends not things, or any Habitudes or Aspects of them, but under *Certain Notions* that neither have that being in Objects, or that being of Objects, that they seem to have ; but are, in all respects, the very same to the mind or Understanding, that Colours are to the Eye, and Sound to the Ear. To be more particular, the Understanding conceives not any thing but under the Notion of an *Entity*, and this either a *Substance* or an *Accident* ; Under that of a *whole*, or of a *part* ; or of a *Cause*, or of an *Effect*, or the like ; and yet all these and the like, are only *Entities of Reason* conceived

ceived within the mind, that have no more of any real true Existence without it, than Colours have without the Eye, or Sounds without the Ear. Every person that hath the least Understanding of the way in which we do apprehend things, will yield this to be true as to *Whole* and *Part*, to *Cause* and *Effect*, and to all the *Notions* which are commonly termed by Logicians the *Second*; and it is as certainly true in reference to *Substance* and *Accident*, to *Quantity*, *Quality*, and those other *General Notions* under which the Understanding apprehends its Objects, though commonly they are called *First* ones, and in comparison of the others are so.

I have laboured the more to make the Notion that I have in this business plain and easie, because much of what is to be said hereafter will depend upon it; and now taking it for granted that my meaning is *Intelligible*. what remains, is to evince *true*; and this I shall do, from the very Nature of Cogitation in general, (as it comprehends Sensation as well as Intellection,) since that the Understanding doth *Pin* its Notions upon Objects, arises not from its being *Such* a particular Kind of Cogitative Faculty, but from its being Cogitative *at large*; let us then reflect
again

again on the Nature of Cogitation at large.

It is certain that things to us Men are nothing but as they do stand in our *Analogy* that is, in plain terms, they are nothing to us but as they are known by us ; and as certain, that they stand not in our *Analogy*, nor are Known by us, but as they are in our *Faculties*, in our *Senses*, *Imagination*, or *Mind* ; and they are not in our *Faculties*, either in their own *realities*, or by way of a true *Resemblance* and *Representation*, but only in respect of certain *Appearances* or *Sentiments*, which, by the various impressions that they make upon us, they do either *Occasion* only, or *Cause*, or (which is most probable) concur unto in *Causing* with our *Faculties*. Every *Cogitative Faculty*, though it is not the *Sole Cause* of its own immediate [*apparent*] *Object*, yet has a share in making it : Thus the *Eye* or *Visive Faculty* hath a share in making the *Colours* which it is said to see ; the *Ear* or *Auditive Power*, a share in producing sounds, which yet it is said to hear ; the *Imagination* has a part in making the *Imagies* stored in it ; and there is the same Reason for the *Understanding*, that it should have a like share in framing the *Primitive Notions* under which it takes in and receives *Objects* : In
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summ, the *immediate Objects* of cogitation, as it is exercised by men, are *entia cogitationis*, all Phænomena; Appearances that do no more exist without our faculties in the things themselves, than the Images that are seen in water, or behind a glass, do really exist in those places where they seem to be.

But as this is a truth that Many will admit with more facility in reference to the Objects of Sense, and Imagination, as Colours, Savors, Sounds, &c. Than to those of the Mind or Understanding, such as Substance, Accident, Quality, Action, &c. So I find my self obliged to give a farther *demonstration* that it holds in these, as well as in those; which I hope to do by the following Considerations.

First, the understanding converses not with things ordinarily but by the Intervention of the sense, and since sentiments of sense are but Appearances, not Pictures, or proper Representations, it is hard to conceive how such conceptions are framed only by their occasion, and only wrought out of them, should be pourtraits of the things themselves, and made just and exact to them.

Secondly, The understanding is a power
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of that nature that many think it doth not immediately Attinge (as they call it) or reach particular singular beings, which yet are the only beings that compose the Universe, as members or parts of it; and really, it uses to proceed by way of *Abstraction*, and therefore doth more Connatually converse with Universals, that are not of Mundane existence, than with singulars that are. Now, since things as they are in the mind, do undergo an *Abstraction* and sublimation, certain it is, they must put on another dress there, and so appear in quite another shape than that they have in the World. In short, All Agree that our conceptions of things are but *inadequate*, as indeed they must needs be, since things have much Refraction (may I so express it) both before they come, and after that they come, to the mind; and if they are inadequate, they cannot be commensurate, that is, they cannot be so just and exact, to things, as to show them as they be, and in their own existences.

Thirdly, It may be Argued from the very nature of an *Idea* or notion; since this after a sort is a sentiment of the mind, as a sentiment (properly so called) is, after a sort, an *Idea* or Notion of the sense; the
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immediate objects of the sense are *sensible* sentiments, and those of the understanding are *Intellectual* ones; which they must needs be, because the understanding it self is a kind of sense, only a more sublimed and raised. *Mens ipsa* (says *Cicero*, l. 4. *Academ. Quæst.*) *quæ sensuum fons est, etiam ipsa Sensus est, &c.*

In fine, this is so certain a truth, that whosoever reflects, tho' never so little, cannot chuse but observe, that as he takes in nothing by his sense but under *sentiments*, which are the *notions* of sense, so he receives in nothing in his understanding, but under *certain notions*, which are the *sentiments* of the mind; since he knows nothing Intellectually but either in general only, under the notion of a *thing*, or more specially under that of a *substance*, or else of an *Accident*; and what are all these but *Objective Notions*? as will appear in particular upon the examination and Tryal of them.

Let us then inquire *first* into the *thing*, (for we shall shew it of *Substance* and *Accident* hereafter) and what is thing but *modus concipiendi*? a notion or sentiment that the mind has, of whatsoever any wise is, because it is? Thing indeed is the most *general* notion, but then it is but a *notion*, because it is general; and has the most of

a notion, because it is the most general. To be more particular; If the Question be asked, *what thing* is? or what is meant by that word? *Some* have no other Answer but this, that a thing is *that which hath essence*. But then it may be farther demanded, what is meant by *essence*, which is said to be had? What it is to *have* essence? And what is meant by *that*, which hath it? Or if it be said, that a thing is *that, which is*, (as it is by others;) the same difficulties again occur: for it may be demanded, what *that* is, which is? And what is meant, when it is said to *be*? And whether Existence be Essence? especially since Existence seems not the first conception of a thing; but is a second, or after-conception; as not being that, which makes a thing to be what it is, [a thing;] but what only makes it a thing in being.

By this, it plainly appears, that the meaning of the word [*thing*,] is but an *inadequate* conception, arising in the mind upon its conversing with *Objects*, and so doth speak a certain particular sentiment, which the mind has of *them*; a sentiment better understood, than defined by words; but a sentiment too, that doth not enter us into the knowledge of the Reality it self (may I so express it,) of *that* which is; *which* we only apprehend *inadequately*,
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under the Disguise and Masquerade of notions. As, that it is *that*, which is ; or *that* which has essence ; or the like ; but not by any adequate exact conception. And as for *Substance* and *Accident*, which yet are the first steps we make toward a distinct Perceivance and knowledge of things ; what are they, but likewise *Modi concipiendi*? Entities of Reason, or notions, that (it is true) are not without *grounds*, but yet that have, themselves, no Formal being but only in the *Mind*, that frames them ; there being no such thing in the World as a *Substance*, or an *Accident*, any more than such a thing as a *Subje&ct*, or an *Adjunct* ; and yet we apprehend not any thing but as one of these, to wit, as a *Substance*, or as an *Accident* ; so that we apprehend not any at all, just as they are, in their own realities, but only under the Top-knots and Dresses of Notions, which our minds do put on them.

But here it will be told me, that plain unlearned men, who yet do exercise the Acts of Reasoning well enough, and perhaps in the best manner, as doing it without *Art*, and in a way the most agreeable to *Nature*, do conceive and speak of things without conceiving or minding of Notions, such as I have mention'd ; for they conceive and speak of *man*, of *good* and *evil*,

evil, of *vertue* and *vice*, and the like, without conceiving or minding of *Substances*, or *Accidents*. But this is easily got over. For tho' unlearned plain men do not explicitly and in terms denominate *goodness*, *vertue*, *vice*, &c. Accidents, yet since they do conceive them (as All do) all things that *are in* a man, or in some other thing, tho' they do not call them Accidents, yet do they conceive them *as* Accidents: And when they do conceive, or say of a *man*, for instance, that he is *vertuous* or *vicious*, or the like, they do conceive him to have *vertue* or *vice in* him; that is, tho' they do not think of the *name substance*, yet they do really conceive that person to be *one*; since a substance is nothing but a *subject*, or a thing that has other things in it as Accidents; whereas in truth, neither Accident, nor Substance hath any being but only in the mind, and by the only vertue of cogitation or thought.

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SECT. II.

Inferences from the former Discourse ; first, that human knowledge for the most part is but intentional, not real. The usefulness of this Inference ; an Objection against it removed. (And yet) Secondly, That the immediate Objects of the cogitative Powers are somewise external to those powers ; and this, both as to appearances, (which is sensibly demonstrated) and as to their grounds. Two other Inferences added ; the first in reference to the grounds of the Doctrine of the old Academy ; the second concerning the obligation we are under ordinarily to conceive and speak of things as they are in our Analogy, and do appear to our faculties.

Infer from the former Discourse ; First, that human knowledge (at least for the most part) is but Intentional, not Real ; and that we have no Perception of any thing, (In any degree to speak of,) *just as it is* in its own Reality and being. For all our notions and conceptions of things, are of them under *sentiments* ; the understanding it self (as I argued before) being

being but a higher and more sublimated *sense*; and sentiments (as such) are in their own *formalities* but *apparently* only, not existently, without the faculties that do conceive them. To be particular, we have no perception or knowledge of any thing but as it is a Substance, or an Accident, or a Quality, &c. And these are only notions: for example, as to *Water*; we have no knowledge of it by all, or any of our senses, what really it is in it self, just as it is, and absolutely speaking; for we are utterly ignorant (otherwise than by Conjecture) of the Magnitude and size of the little parts that compose it; Ignorant of their figure and shape; and Ignorant also of the kind, and degree of motion they have; all this we are Ignorant of, and yet this is all that is Real in Water. But as Ignorant as we are of what it *really* is, in it self, and absolutely considered, we have much *Comparative* Relative Knowledge of it; for we know it by sense to be fluid; to have some degree of tenacity or viscosity; to be moist; in a word, to have so many Qualities (for so we conceive and speak) that all put together, do give the mind a sufficient rise to distinguish it, as a different substance, from Earth, or Fire; So that a person that has at any time had

the perception of them all, will not mistake them afterward, one for the other.

But here it must be remembered, that (as I have shewed before) tho' we do not see the *reality* of things immediately, and just as it is in the things themselves, yet by means of sentiments and notions, we do, somewise, perceive *it*: as the Eye that sees not any thing immediately but Light or Colours, yet by means of Light and Colours, discerns Gold, Silver, Stones, Wood, as also the Magnitudes, the Figures, the motions, the distances of things; with a thousand other Realities, so the understanding discerns infinite Realities, infinite habitudes of things; not indeed immediately, but either under the sentiments of sense, or by means of its own, which I call notions; as of Substance, Quality, Cause, Effect, Whole, Part, &c.

I have been somewhat longer in the Explication of this Inference, because to know the *nature* of our Knowledge, must needs be of great advantage unto us; and much relieve us in our Inquiry after the nature of Things; since it frees us from the confusion, that our mind must necessarily be in, should it take the Apparitions of things (for such sentiments and notions are) to be external and real Existences. Would not a thinking man be much perplexed,

plexed, to make a satisfying conception, what that Image is, that he sees in a glass, or in water, if he was persuaded of its being a Reality (of Existence,) and not a meer Apparition? The like must he be, who takes Objective Notions for *real* Existences, and who confounds *Attributes* that are only Objective, and that do belong to things but as they are Objects with those that do belong unto them as they are Things, and that are Real,

However, it will not follow, as some have weakly Objected, that then nothing is Real; for tho' the Images themselves of Whiteness, Blackness Redness, Greenness, that do *seem inherent* in visible Objects, are not really so, yet really there are Dispositions and textures of particles in those Objects, that, by the various Modifications which they give the Light, do occasion in the Eye, to which the Light is reflected, all that diversity of sentiments (which we call colours) that does appear in those Objects. The same, *mutatis mutandis* must be said of sounds, sapsors, odors, and of Tangible qualities, and in proportion will hold also in mental notions. For tho the very Notions of Entity, Substance, Accident, Whole, Part, Cause, Effect, and the like, do not really exist without the mind; yet as they do *seem*, Real, and some

more Real than others, so *really* they have in things without us certain *grounds* or Foundations, that, upon our converse with these things, do naturally Occasion, or Excite, such notions and sentiments in us. But I will speak to this matter more particularly, because it is of importance.

First then, the *immediate* Objects of Cogitation, both the Sensitive, and the Intellectual, are, in *appearance*, *external* to their several faculties; that is, such Objects do so *seem* to be without their several faculties, to which they correspond, *that*, in appearance, they are either the very *ultimate Objects* themselves of those faculties, or, at least, do *Exist* in them, and upon this account are called *Objects*; for Whiteness *seems* to the Eye to be *in* snow, or in a white wall; and sound to the Ear, to be in the Air; a Man doth seem to the understanding, to be really a Substance, or a thing that is invested with Accidents.

If it be *inquired* how it comes to pass, that sentiments and notions, which really are not in the things that are without us, do yet appear as if they were, and consequently that they seem to be Objects? it must be *Answered*, that this arises from the very nature of cogitation it self, and of the

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the cogitative faculties; and that both Reason and Experience do evidence, it must be so.

First, *Reason* sheweth that it must be so; for as we are conscious that we have a perceivance of Objects under certain Images, and Notions, so we are *not* conscious of any Action by which our faculties should make those Images or Notions; and therefore being sensible that we are Affected with such Images, and Notions, so long *as*, and no longer *than* we do Attend to things without us, (which things are therefore called *Objects*;) and not being sensible that we are so by any Action from within our selves, it cannot but appear unto us that we are Affected *only* from the things without us, and so, what really is only in our selves, must *seem* to come from those things, and consequently to be really in them.

Experience also shews; (to wit, that what is *really* but in the cogitative faculty, does yet *seem* without it;) for if the Eye by any accident becomes infected with *Colours*, as, (to instance in a more received, than often experienced, Matter,) with *yellow*, by the yellow Jaundice, or with *Green*, (as I have sometimes observed, before the coming of Convulsions;) that is,

(for this is the Reality) if the Visive Spirits, or whatever other parts of the Eye, that are immediately concerned in the Act of Vision, be Preter-naturally put into the same motions with those, which by the Impressions of Yellow or Green Objects they are naturally put into, in either of these Cases, the *Object* beheld by *that* Eye, will appear as yellow, or green, tho' to every bodies else, it is but White, or Red, or of some other colour. And whence comes this, but hence? that the Images conceived in the Eye, (for in the Instances alledged, the Images of yellow and green are no where else,) are naturally *pinned* upon the Object. As is farther evident in *Dazling*; which is, when an Impression made upon the Eye by one Object, becomes translated to another; thus, coming out of a bright Sun-shine, on a Summers day, into a darkish room, one sees a *splendor* in every corner, and upon every Object. The like Appearance there is, upon the beholding of Objects thro' tinctur'd *Glasses*: So that it must be concluded, that the immediate Objects of cogitation, I mean the very Images and sentiments that are perceived, do, to all *appearance*, seem as external to the cogitative powers, as even the ultimate Objects themselves, that are perceived

perceived under them; which was the first thing to be shewed.

The second point to be shewed is, that the immediate Objects of cogitation are external in their *ground*, as well as in appearance, and in truth, are therefore external in appearance, because they are so *really* in their grounds. And this is as certain, as that every Effect must have a Cause. For *things without us*, are the Causes that do excite such Images and Notions *in us*: In the order of Nature, we do *see* a thing so long *as*, and no longer *than*, we keep our Eye upon it; and therefore that we do see it, must come from some *impression* from the Thing; and since to *see* a thing, is nothing but to have some Image *from* it, and so *of* it, in the Eye, and the Image is as the Impression, and the Impression as the Thing that makes it, it follows that the *grounds* of the Image is in the Thing without us. And since the Image (by which I mean Light or Colour) is the immediate object of *Vision*, and, that what is instanced in one Act of cogitation, will equally hold in all, it follows, that the immediate Objects of all other cogitations, as well as of vision, are ordinarily and naturally as external in their *grounds*, as in *appearance*; that is, are fundamentally external, as well as apparently. I

I thought once to have ended this Chapter here, but now before I do so, I will add an Inference or two from the former Doctrine ; the first is, that we learn from it the *Foundation* of that Opinion the *Academicks* of old were in, That *no judgment could be made of Truth* ; that things do seem to us, but cannot be perceived by us ; and that no *certainty*, but great *probability* only, is to be Attained unto by men. For as this Opinion had all the *Phænomena* of cogitation to give it countenance, so those *Philosophers* saw it ; for they evidently perceived, that they saw not the Realities, but only the Appearances of things ; *Plato* the chief of them, one of the most penetrating, as well as the most elegant, of all that ever were, affirmed that the present, was a word, of *Veri similitude only*, and not of Truth and Reality ; That the beings in this World were only *Shadows*, but that the *Substances* themselves were in the *Ideal*. How far herein he went with the Truth, may easily be perceived by what I have discoursed before, concerning the Nature of Cogitation ; as also, where he strikes out.

The *Second* Inference is, That since Sentiments, and Notions bottomed upon Realities, do seem, the former to the Sense, the latter to the Understanding, to be Realities ; and since we are obliged to conceive,

ceive, and speak, of things, ordinarily and popularly (for all are not Philosophers) in that way and manner that they seem to be; it follows, that we are obliged to conceive, and speak of Sentiments and Notions in Common Conversation, and to the people, *as if* really they were the things themselves that are perceived; or at least were in **them**: And so may say, the Snow is white, the Emerald is green, and the like.

CHAP.

C H A P. IV.

Of the distribution of Notions in the Restrained sense of the Word.

S E C T. I.

Notions are either the Notions of things, or Notions about things. Of the Notions of things. And first of Entity or Thing. The Pinax Entium, or general Table of things. Things are either Real, or Cogitable. And these either meer Cogitables, or real Cogitables. A Reality what. A Cogitable what. Of Real Cogitables. Real Cogitables, either Proper, or Reductive. Proper Real Cogitables of two sorts; of the Sense, or of the Mind. These of the Sense, of two kinds; Connatural, or Preternatural. Apparent colours, are real Connatural Cogitables. Real Cogitables of the Mind, like those of the Sense, of two Kinds; Connatural, or Preternatural. Real Cogitables Reductive, subdivided into those of sense (External, Internal) and those of the Understanding.

Notions taken in the limited Sense of the word, for *Objective Ideas*, by and

and under which the Understanding apprehends, and conceives, of, things, and which, for this reason, may be called *Fundamental* (as being essential to the business of Knowledge,) are either Notions of things; such as Entity, Reality, &c. Or Notions about Things, such as whole, part, cause, effect, &c. of which the former are conceived as *absolute*, the latter more as *relative* Notions.


The Notions, (or *Modi concipiendi*, that I call the Notions) of things, may be reduced to four, to Entity or thing, Reality, Substance and Accident.

Entity or *thing* is taken in several senses; either first, in the largest, in which it is the same with *something*, or *Aliquid*. Or 2dly. more strictly, as it comprehends *but* substances, Accidents and Modes. Or 3dly. Most strictly, as it stands for *Substances* only. I take it not at this time in the *largest* Sense.

Thing in the largest Sense, is that which any wise *is*, or that is Knowable, directly: for Nothing, no wise is, nor is Knowable, but indirectly, and by means of thing, of which it is a Negation; Nothing is Not a thing.

And

And thing, or Entity, taken in the largest sence for



For that which any wise *is*, is either without the thinking of any one upon it ; or it is no longer than while one is a thinking , and because he is a thinking, on it.

That which is without the thinking of any one upon it, and whether it be minded or no, is a *real* Thing, or a Reality ; a thing that so is in the world, as that it is a part, or Appurtenance of it, and such a thing is *matter*, and every Affection, and every System of matter ; and such a thing also is Mind.

That which no longer is than while one is a thinking, and because he is a thinking, on it ; [so that tho it have that which is called

called in the Schools an objective being, a being in the Cogitative Faculties, yet hath none without them in the World:] this I name a *Cogitable*; a Cogitable thing, or Entity. And thus, all the *Sentiments* of Sense, those of the Mind, and even meer Objective Notions, are Things, not things of Mundane and External Existence, but of Cogitation and Notion; Intentional, not Real things. For such are Colours, Sounds, Savors, Time, Place, Substance, Accident, Cause, Effect; &c. they are *Intentional* things, things that, as such, have only an *esse Objectivum*, an *esse Cognitum*, as the Schoolmen phrase it.

Cogitables, or Things that have being only in the Faculties that apprehend them, and by vertue of their being apprehended, are of *two* sorts; For either they have a being in *Faculties* by means of the Impressions made upon *them* from external Objects, and consequently have *Grounds* and *Foundations* in the things that are without us; or, they have a being in our Faculties, only by a working of the Faculties themselves, without any such Grounds.

Those Cogitables, that have being by means of Impressions made upon our Faculties, by External Objects, I call *Real Cogitables*; Cogitables, because the being which they have, is, *formally* a being in
Cogita-

Cogitation only; Real Cogitables, because they have Grounds and Foundations, in things that are Real. Thus the *Sentiments* of Sense, such as Colours, Sounds, &c. the *Fundamental Notions* of Mind, those of things, and those *about* them, such as Substance, Accident, Cause, Effect, Whole, Part, &c. are Real Cogitables; Cogitables, for that the very Images themselves, the very *Ideas*, are Entities only of Cogitation, as having but an *esse cognitum*; and Real Cogitables, because they have *Grounds*, in things that are Real; for, antecedently to any Operation of the mind concerning these Cogitables, there do really exist, in the world, Things that in their own natures are fitted to produce, or to occasion them in our Faculties, in a certain correspondence to themselves.

Real Cogitables are either properly so, or but reductively.

Real Cogitables *proper*, are such things as have being in our Faculties, by the impressions of External Causes, that are *Objects*, as well as Causes, of the Acts that make those Cogitables. And these are of two sorts. For Example, (for things of this nature are best conceived in Examples) there is *Greenness* in Grass, as also in an Emerald,

emerald, and there is *Bowedness* in an Oar, or a Staff, that is in the Water, so, as that part of it is in, part out: Now *both these* [the *Greens* and the *Bowedness*] are but Appearances, or *Pænomena*; and having equally (one as much as another) their Grounds and Foundations in the things that are external to our Faculties, both are *equally* Real; and yet every one that considers must Acknowledge, that they are of very different natures, and that Bowedness is Not, in all respects, of the same sort of Appearance that Green is, as to its General Nature.

The differences that are in such Appearances, depend upon the differences that are in their *Grounds*, and therefore must be accounted for from these.

Some Appearances there are, that do *Arise* from sensation (for I will begin with *those of sense*) when it is made with all the Conditions and Circumstances that are Requisite, to make it *Right*; and these I call *Gonnatural* Appearances; such as the *Greens* in Grass, or in an Emerald: But there are others that arise from sensation when it is not made with all the Conditions and Circumstances that are requisite to its being right and natural; as, when Vision is made thro' a double *Medium*, a thicker and a thinner; and these Appearances I call *Pre-*
G
ternatural,

ternatural, of which sort is that of *Bowedness* in the Oar, or Staff. These Appearances I call, the former Connatural, the latter Preternatural; not in reference to Nature as it is taken for the complex of all, or any, Causes; (for in relation to their proper Causes, all Effects are equally natural;) but as Nature is taken in a more restrained special sense (of which more hereafter) for a certain *particular* order of Causes and Effects.

As for the Colours in a *Rainbow*; those of a *Pigeons neck*, and others of like nature, *tho'* they are commonly call'd *Apparent* and *Emphatical*, and by that Denomination distinguished in *School Philosophy*, from those that are *Real* and *Existent*; yet I think not fit to make another *Classis* for them. For those fugitive *changeable* Colours, *tho'* they are not so fix'd and permanent as others are, yet they are as *Real*, and as *Connatural* as they; the fugitive waving Colours of *Changeable Taffata*, and those of standing *Corn* (while *Green*) *Agitated* and *waved* by the wind, are equally as *real* and *Connatural*, as the certain fixed Colour in *Scarlet Cloth*, or in *Purple*. Only, *tho'* all these Colours are equally *Real*, as having causes of their Appearance that are equally *real*, and all equally *Connatural*, because *All* (alike) are *Results* of sensations duly made, with all their requisite *Circumstances*; yet, since their

their Causes are not equally permanent and fixed, but some are more, some less; it follows, that some of these Colours are more abiding and permanent, and some but *Transient* and *Fugitive*; for all Effects must be, as their Causes Are. But to return.

What I have said concerning Real Cogitables of *Sense*, as to their Distribution, may likewise be said of those of the *Understanding*, that some are Connatural, some Preternatural: Those I call Connatural that result in the Understanding when it has all the requisite Conditions and Circumstances; and these *Preternatural*, that arise from the working of the Understanding when it wants at least some of the Requisite Conditions and Circumstances; particularly, when it is *Prejudiced*, or not well *Ballasted* with Observations, and Experiments, made by sense: In a word, there are *Visa animi*, as well as *Visa sensus*; and some of them Connatural, some Preternatural; of the former, every one that is well weighed, and well Grounded, is an Example; and for the latter, we have as many Examples, as there are ungrounded and senseless distinctions, and Notions; of which the Schoolmen afford us but too many, in their *Substantial Forms*, *Inherent Accidents*, &c.

Real Cogitables *Reductive*, are such as come from Causes that are Causes only, and not Objects as well as Causes, of the Act of Cogitation, which immediately produces them: And these as well as those that are proper, are either of the External *sense*, or of the *Imagination*, or of the *Reason* and *Understanding*: Since whatever is an Effect of Cogitation, and withal arises from an external Cause that is but a Cause, and not also an Object, of that Act, is a Real Cogitable Reductive, and not a *Fiction* only of the mind; and there may be such in the sense, and Imagination, as well as in the Understanding and Reason.

Before I give any Instances of Real Cogitables Reductive, it may be necessary that I shou'd explain the meaning of a Term that I have used, to wit. [*External Cause*;] by which I understand whatever is *without the Faculty*, and forreign to it; tho' in other respects it may be internal, as being within the Agent: To be plain, whatever the Understanding, the Imagination, or any of the external Senses conceive, by means of any Impressions, (even of Causes within the Agent, if they act without its *will*) is intended by me to come from an external Cause; and these Objective Conceptions, if they come from Causes, that are not also Objects, I call *Real Cogitables Reductive*.

In this *Classis* of Beings I do reckon *Dreams*, not only Divine (if any such there be) and Angelical Dreams, Dreams that are the effects of Divine, or of Angelical Impression, but also ordinary Dreams; as also the *Visions* of the Feaverish, the Melancholly, and the Hysterical: And here likewise I reckon that Appearances in our ears, of the *Ringing* of Bells, which is only made by Agitation of the Internal Air, as also those *Sparkles* as of Fire, that do appear to the eye, upon a smart percussion or shaking of the Fibres of the Optick Nerves, either by a vehement Agitation of the spirits within, or a violent Stroke, or a strong Friction of the eye from without.

SECT. II.

Of meer Cogitables, or Fictions. What a Fiction is. That all Fictions are Creatures either of the Mind, or of the Internal Sense; None made by the External Senses. The Reason of it. Two Philosophical Doctrines observed, one concerning meer Cogitables, the other about Real Cogitables Reductive. Why the Representations of things in Prophetical Dreams, are always made as if they were present.

ALL that I have said already, relates to things that are in our Faculties, by virtue of impressions made upon them from External Causes, which Causes are either Causes and also Objects, or Causes only and not Objects; there are others that do arise in us from the working of our Faculties, (of themselves,) without any grounds for it, in any thing that is external, either as a Cause, or as an Object; and these I call *meer Cogitables, or Fictions*; such as an *Hirco-cervus*, or a *Chimera*, a Golden Mountain, and the like.

Fictions are all forged, either by the Mind and Understanding, or by the Imagination.

gination and internal Sense; there are none in the external, the Eye, the Ear, or the like; and the *Reason* is evident, for Fictions are voluntary things, things that have always something of the *Will* in them, and therefore cannot be created by any Faculty but That, which is under the Empire of the Will, which the External Senses are not, but the other Powers are: For though we may think, and also imagine, what we will, we cannot See, or Hear, or Taste, or Smell, or Feel, what we will. The Reason of which difference may be this, that if the Understanding, and Imagination, were not some wise under the power of the Will, there could be no *Discourse*; and if the External Senses were so too, there could be no *certainty*; and therefore that there may be both *Discourse* and *certainty*, our Faculties are so contrived, and so ordered, with excellent Wisdom.

Here it must be observed,

(1) That there is *some* Reality even in *meer* Cogitables, (not indeed the same that is in those that are *real*, which have a reality of Grounds and Foundations; but a reality) both in respect of the Cogitative *Act*, which doth produce them, and of that Cogitable and Objective *Existence*, which they have in the Mind;

since it is as truly said, that one does think, or conceive such things, as it is of him that Dreams, or sees a Vision, that he does Dream, or see a Vision. Wherefore such Cogitables as these, in respect of their Objective Existence, may be referred to Realities of *Appearance*, as Dreams and Visions are ; for as the Act of Dreaming Really *is*, and the thing Dreamt doth Really *seem* ; so the Act that produces a Fiction Really *is*, and the Fiction also really seems. However, meer Cogitables, and Real Cogitables Reductive, or more plainly, meer Fictions, and Dreams, and Visions do not *agree* in all respects, even in point of Appearance ; but as in some regards there is an Agreement, so in others, there is a difference, between them, in this point ; for if any is to be made (as doubtless some is) between Real seeming, and a seeming to be Real ; there is this between the foresaid Cogitables ; that Dreams and Visions do not only Really seem, but seem to be Real ; Whereas Fictions, do only really seem, but do not seem to be Real ; at least not always, and as Fictions.

2. It must be also noted, that in the Real Cogitables which I call *Reductive*, though their Causes are not Objects, yet they do impress our Faculties the same

way,

way, and with the same kind of *motions*, that Objects use to do, and that *such* Objects as do seem to Appear would really have done, had they been indeed the Causes of these Images and Forms, that do Represent them, in such Instances. Thus when we have the *sound* as of Bells in our Ears, and ye none are Ringing, the Internal *Air* in them, though Agitated only by a Vapor, Affects the Auditory Nerve the same way it would have done, had the External Air been really Agitated by the Ringing of Bells, and the Internal moved by the External. Thus also a smart Percussion of the *Eye*, Affects its *Nervous* parts the same way, and with the same kind of Motion, that a spark of Fire beheld by it would have done : And thus too in ordinary *Dreams*, the Spirits of that part of the Brain (if indeed it be the Brain) that is the Organ of Imagination, are moved by the internal causes of such Dreams, just in the same manner that they would have been, had they been impressed by Eternal Objects ; which also must be said of Angelical Dreams, and of *Visions*.

And if our Faculties be moved by External causes that are not Objects, in the same manner as they be by external causes that are Objects, it can remain no longer

a Wonder, that the Images and Forms excited in us by such Impressions, should seem as real, and as much external, as if they were excited by Objects, Since our Faculties can make no difference. Hence it is, that in *Angelical Dreams*, as also in *Visions*, all the Representations which are made unto the Prophet, are as of things that *Are* in present, not of things that *Shall be*, in Future; *I saw a stone cut out of the Mountain without Hands*, says *Daniel*; or if a declaration must be made of somewhat which is to come, that declaration is made by way of Discourse, by a person present; so that still the Dream or Vision is *Narrative* and *Historical*; as in that of the Angel to *Joseph*, *Thou shalt call his Name Jesus*. Many Divines have taken notice of this Appearance, in the *Old Testament Prophecies*, having observed that these are always made in a *Narrative* Form, and as Representations of things present; but the Reason which they give for it, which is, that it is done to signify, that the things Predicted shall as certainly come to pass, as if they were already, seems not so well grounded as the Observation it self; for I take it, the account [that I have given is the more Genuine and Natural, which is, that External Causes that are not Objects do yet impress the Faculties which they

they Act upon, in the same manner that Objects do ; and therefore all the Images that do Arise from such Impressions, must be of things as present , and in being; because they Represent them as if Really they were *Objects in Act*, that had excited and stirred the Faculties.

S E C T. II.

Of Thing strictly taken, and of the Difference betwixt the Notions of things, and those that are only about things. Of the Idea of Substance, and that of Accident. Spinozas Notion of Substance, and that of an Accident considered. Maxims of Thing in general.

THing taken strictly, as it comprehends but Substances, Modes and Accidents, is whatever seems *External* to any Faculty, and consequently, seems to have Being in the World, as a Part, or an Appurtenance, of it, whither it be really so or no. And in this sense of the Word , as *Real Things* themselves , (which are eminently called Things.) So likewise the *Sentiments* we have of these things, as Colours, Sounds Savors, &c. are Things; and thus also, *Notions* are Things,

Things, both the more general and common Notions, those of Substance and Accident, and the more special, the Notions of the several *Species* of Quality, and *those* of Relations, &c.

But when I say, that not only things themselves, but the Sentiments and Notions we have of them, are Things, it must be understood with *distinction*; for the Things themselves, (so I call the *grounds* of Sentiments and Notions) are Realities of *True Existence*; but Sentiments and Notions being only Real Cogitables, are only *seeming* Realities; Realities of *Apparition* only, not of *Existence*: Thus, the *Notion* of *Substance* is a Reality of Appearance only, but the things that we apply it to, are Realities of Existence.

By the Notion of thing as taken strictly, we have a Rise afforded us to apprehend the difference between the Notions the Understanding hath of things, and those it hath only *about* things; for the Notions that I call the Notions of things, appear to the Understanding as *Things External* unto it; for (not to mention Substances) even some Relations, and Intelligible Qualities do seem to the Understanding, as really Inherent in the things they are Attributed to, as the sentiments of

Colours, Odors, and Sounds do unto the Senses. But for Notions that are only framed by the Mind about Things, such as Cause, Effect, Measure, Measured, &c. they seem not to it to have being in the things themselves, but to arise from its own Reflexions, upon comparing and considering of Things. Thus, at the same time that the mind conceives of Almighty God, that he is the Cause of all, as it does conceive, that the word [God] is the name of a Real Being, so it conceives also, that the term [Cause] is not, but that it only signifies a certain Kind of Relation between God and Things, as these do spring from him, and so is only the name of a certain Objective, and not of a Real Being.

Of the things that do Appear unto our Faculties to have a Reality of being, *some* are perceived by them *immediately*, in their own proper Formal Natures, and those are either *Modes*, or *Compleat Accidents*; *Others* are not perceived by them immediately, in their own proper Formal Natures; but only by *means* of, and under, those that are perceived so; and *these* are called *Substances*: Compleat Accidents and Modes are Appurtenances, Substances are the things to which they do Appertain.

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It is true, *Spionosa* is in another persuasion; who tells us, that he understands by *Substance*, that which is in it self, and is conceived by it self, that is, as he expresses it, a thing in whose conception that of another is not involved. Adding, that by *Attribute* he understands the same that he means by *Substance*, to wit, a thing conceived in and by it self, in whose conception that of another is not involved. Thus says he, *Extension*, in as much as it is capable of being conceived in and by it self, is an *Attribute*; but *Motion* that cannot be conceived but as something in another thing, is *None*. Only he says too, to prevent Objections; that a Notional distinction may be made between a *Substance* and an *Attribute*, in this manner, that a thing may be called an *Attribute* in respect of the *Understanding*, which doth *Attribute* such a certain Nature to a *Substance*; and then a *Substance* is the thing that the *Understanding* doth *Attribute* that Nature unto.

But as what this Philosopher says on this occasion is not very clear, so it is certain, that the Notion of *Substance*, as also that of an *Attribute*, is *Relative*; nor are the Instances he puts so well adjusted, but that some exceptions may be brought against them. I can no more conceive
any

any *Real Extension*, than I can any *Motion*, but as a thing that belongs to another; Extension to the thing extended, as Motion to the thing moved. And tho' I do not believe my Understanding, the measure of other mens ; yet I cannot but think, it will be found on tryal, as hard a task for any other, as it is for me, to think otherwise ; For what is meer Extension, but an Extension that belongs to nothing? And what is Extension that belongs to nothing, but an Extension of nothing? and certainly, an Extension of nothing, is nothing really, whatever it may be in Imagination ; but more of this in another place.

Maxims concerning Thing in general.

1. Nothing can be, and not be at once.
2. Things that but Appear, do equally Affect the Mind as those that really are.
3. Things are not to be Multiplied Unnecessarily ; as they are, when the Fictions of Men, are made to pass for the Creatures of God.

CHAP. V.

Of Substance.

S E C T. I.

The Idea or Notion of Substance. Self Substance, how in the Idea of it. The Idea of Substance only Relative. Neither Extension nor Existence the Idea of it. Substances are either Principles, or Principiates. The Grounds of this Division. Substance that is a Principle, is either Mind, or Matter. Considerations premised for the better Understanding of this Discourse. The Ideas of Mind and Matter. The Grounds of the distribution of Substance into Mind and Matter. Abstracted Mind is as conceivable as Matter, under the Notion of Substance. Spinoza's Notion of Mind rejected.

THE Primary Notion or Idea which we have of *Substance*, is (as I have hinted in the former Chapter) that of a thing which is a *Subjeēt*, or an *Ultimate Object*; that is, we have not any Real immediate Conception of it, but only a Notional. Or (to speak more plainly, according

according to the Principles laid before) Substance as such, is not a thing conceived just as it is in its own Reality, but a thing conceived under a certain notion; that is, a substance is a thing that is a Subject. For when the Understanding does think of the things we call Accidents (which are the only things that do immediately, and at first present themselves unto us,) for example, when it thinks of Odours, Colours, sapers, figures, &c. it doth at the same time conceive, that besides *these* there must be other things that have them, in which those odors, colours, sapers, figures, &c. are. And those things that are conceived to *have* others, we call *substances*; as those that are conceived to be *had* of others, or to be in them, we call *Accidents*: but what those things, which we do Denominate Substances, Are, in themselves, stript of all their Accidents, is no wise known; All we know of any substance is, that it is the subject of such and such Accidents; or that it is Qualified so or so; and hath these, and the other Qualities.

This Notion of a substance [that it is the same with a subject,] I call Primary, because though that [of subsisting by it self,] is deemed so by others, yet, in our ordinary way of Reasoning, and Investigating of things, this [of self subsisting] is a consequent one, to that of being

a subject. For conversing with things ; as the first that do present themselves to our consideration, are the Accidents of them ; so the first Reflection the understanding makes, upon these Accidents, is, that other things are under them, which do uphold and support them, and consequently, that are *subjects*, or substances. But then indeed, when it comes again to consider, whether these subjects are also *in* subjects, finding in its self a certain Reluctance to conceive (that) they are, because, if they were, there would be no end, things would be in one another infinitely ; therefore it concludes, that that, which is a subject of Accidents, is it self in no subject ; that is, it is self-subsistent. Thus the notion of being self-subsistent, arises from that of being a subject : Nor is the notion of [being self-subsistent] a more Real one, than that of [being a subject.] For what is Self-subsistence but an *Attribute* that belongs to something else ? but what that something else is, to which it belongs, I am willing to learn ; and will ever honour as my great Master, that Person who will effectually teach me. We have no Ideas of any substances, but such as are Notional and Relative ; that is, such as do arise from them as they stand in our Analogy, and are cloathed with Accidents.

A truth that might be made to appear by a full Induction of all the particulars; But will instance but in some; but those the most obvious, and most commonly discoursed of. For what Idea have we of *Earth*, but that it is something material, that it is fixt and tasteless? What of *Salt*? but that of something sapid, and easily soluble in water? And what Idea have we of *water*? but that it is something material, moist, and fluid in such a degree, and the like? So that the Idea of a substance is that of a thing which is a subject; and this is a Relative Idea.

But many, who cannot satisfy themselves with the former, do conceit that they have found a Better, a Real, a Positive Idea of Substance. Of these, some do hold, *Extension* is that Idea, so that substance is *Extension*; and accordingly as *Extension* is either Penetrable, or Impenetrable, so they frame the Notions of *Spirit*, and *Body*; or the species of substance, as it is immaterial, or material. Others hold, that *Existence* or *Being* is the Idea of substance in general, and that substances of this or that particular species, are only determinate *Realities* of *Being*; for since in being is the Idea of an Accident, being (say they) must be that of a substance, and as to be is to exist, so *being* is nothing but *existence*.

I shall have another occasion hereafter to consider the first of those Opinions when I come to Answer a certain Objection, touching the Idea of God; but will say of it now, that those who profess it, cannot make out (as they ought to do) a clear and satisfactory Idea of *Extension in general*, that shall agree in common, both to that which is Impenetrable, and to that which is Penetrable. *Besides*, it is not conceivable, that a Spirit should be only a Penetrable Extension, since (as will appear more fully hereafter) Extension has but little to do with mind or thought, which is Essential to a Spirit, and without which a Spirit cannot be a Spirit: and Penetrability, and Impenetrability has all as little.

Nor is the *second* Opinion more conceivable. For not to Insist, that Existence properly taken is only of Causes, (*existere* properly being [*esse extra causas*,] and nothing properly is [*extra causas*] that was not first (*in causis*;) I will take it at large, for *any* being in act; yet even so, it is not of the Idea, or first Conception, of substance: for [being] taken not as a *Noun*, but as a *Participle*, (as here it is taken,) is in the very sense of the term, a word of Relation; *being* is not a *thing*, but of a thing; not a thing, but a *mode* of it,
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and consequently presupposing it; and that which presupposes thing or substance, cannot possibly be in the Idea, or first conception of it. In short, Accidents have being, tho' not the same being as substances; but to proceed.

Now, if this is the proper notion of substance in general, that it is a thing that is a subject of Accidents, it will follow, that we cannot frame any *Notions* of substances in particular, or make any agreeable *Distributions* of them, but according to the several Accidents, of which they are subjects. And this I desire may be noted, because it will be of very great use in clearing what I shall say hereafter, in the prosecution of this Discourse.

Of Substances some are *Principles*, some *Principiates*. By *Principles*, I mean substances that are causes of other things, but are themselves uncaused. By *Principiates*, (give me leave to make an English word of one not very good Latin) I mean substances that are caused, or composed of Principles. Principles make, Principiates are made to be.

That there are substantial Causes, and substantial Effects, in the World, is evident to sense; For even to sense, some substances *begin* to be, and some do *cease* being. Now that which begins to be, is

made to be after having not been, must of necessity have Something, (and this something must of necessity be another thing,) that makes it to be; that is, it must have a *Cause*. So that Causes and Effects there are; else nothing could begin to be, or cease being. And if there are Causes, either those Causes, all of them have Causes also, and consequently, as they (as Causes) make other things to be; so, (as things that have Causes) themselves are made to be by others; or else, at least some of them have no causes, but are self-subsistent and uncaused. If all Causes have Causes, then an infinite Progression must be owned in the account of Causes, than which nothing can be more repugnant to the mind of Man; to Science; and to the Order and Unity of the Universe. And indeed then, there must be a number actually infinite, since all Causes are actual. But if any Causes are uncaused, (as certainly some must be, for the reasons Alledged) those uncaused Causes are *Principles*, or first Causes. More shortly, either something in the Universe of being is uncaused, and so is a Principle, for what is uncaused is a Principle; or else, every thing is Caused; but every thing cannot be Caused; for if every thing is Caused, Nothing must be the cause of Something. For if
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every thing is caused, every thing was once nothing, for what is Caused was nothing before it was Caused; and if every thing was once Nothing, either Nothing must be the Cause of some, or, (which in effect is the same) nothing may become something without any cause, than which No thought can be more unreasonable.

Again, as nothing is more certain than that there is some Principle, so the *Stoicks* (the Wisest of all the Philosophers, as well as the most Devout) affirmed, that there are *two*, Mind, and Matter. Thus *Seneca* in his Epistles (*Ep. 65.*) *Universa ex Materia & ex Deo constant.* All things (says he) are composed, or, do Consist of God and Matter. And indeed, we cannot be more assured by all our faculties, that there is *Action*, and *Passion* in the World, and that the World could neither be, or perlevere in being, without them, than we are to speak Philosophically, that there are *two* Principles, *one*, the Principle of all the Action; the *other*, the Principle of all the Passion is in it; the former the *Active* Principle, or first subject of Activity, the latter the *Passive* Principle, or first subject of Passivity; of which, I call the first, *Mind*, the second, *Matter*. This Assertion *Zeno* in *Laertius* fully agrees unto, when he tells us, that the Principles of

things are *two*, τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, the Active, and the Passive; Nor doth the great Originist *Moses* say much less, when in his *Genesis*, he writeth of the *Spirit* of God that moved, and of the *Abyss* and Waters upon which he moved; and methinks, in all *Animal Generations*, in which there must be a *Male* and a *Female*, as who should say, an Active and a Passive Principle, there is some (and this no very Dark or Obscure) Adumbration of it.

Before I do proceed to a more particular Consideration of these Principles, I would have it be observed, that we ought to *Distinguish* what is manifest, certain, and of undoubted truth concerning them, from that which is but doubtful and uncertain. Now it is certain, *that* there is such a thing as we do call *Matter*; such a thing as *Mind*, such a thing as *Motion*; and *that* Matter is alter'd, figured, textur'd, and infinite ways wrought upon & moulded by means of motion. *Again*, it is certain *that* all things have not Mind in equal proportions, but that some exert the acts of it in a higher way and degree, and some in more ways for kind than others do; and also certain, *that* the exercises of Acts of Mind in all the ways and all the degrees of them in Corporeal Animals, (for we are not so well acquainted with others,) do much depend upon

upon the Nature and Qualifications of their Organs ; that is, upon Texture and Disposition of matter. These things we are as certain of, as that our selves be, and have a true use of our faculties. But if we advance farther, and to endeavour to Enter and Penetrate into the very *nature* of Matter, into *that* of Mind, and into the *Nature* of Motion ; here being forsaken and destitute of sense to hunt for us, we are much at a loss, and as unable to proceed in our search an inquiry after them, as to their just Realities, as we are in that of things, which are wholly out of our view. It is hard to conceive just what *matter* is in its own Positive Reality ; also what *Mind* is, and even what *Motion* is, (as taken for a subordinate Principle.) Nor can it be Demonstrated, that (as some will have it) there is only *one* substance in the Universe, and that Matter and Mind are only several *Modifications* of that one substance ; nor be Demonstrated, that *Matter* (for this I think they mean by substance.) is in its own Nature, a *vital* Energetical thing ; and that the diverse *Gradations of Life*, that are observed in the several species of Animals, arise only from the several Modifications of Matter, and of that *life of nature* (as those Philosophers call it) which is Essential thereto, and is

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the *root* of those Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive Powers that do dress up being in all the Shapes and Forms in which it appears upon the Stage of the World. I will not build upon such *Hypothesis*; which being unevident, must needs be doubtful and uncertain, if not false. A Philosophy that shall be *solid*, and found, must have its Ground-work and Foundations firmly laid; which none can have, but that which is bottomed, rais'd and built upon *evidence*; I mean, upon the certain *Testimony* of our faculties. And therefore since our *faculties* do rather go upon *Notions*, than on Realities, and do plainly *Distinguish* between Mind and Matter, and (as I will show in the Progress of this Discourse) do Contradistinguish them, I hold my self obliged to treat of these distinctly, but still in the *Real Notional* way.

Mind then is Cogitative, thinking, or perceiving substance; or, Mind is the first subject of Cogitation. *Matter* is Extensive, spacious, substance; or, the first subject of dimensive spacious Quantity. In other, but Equivalent terms; *Mind* is Active substance, *Matter* Passive substance. I affirm, that these latter Definitions are equivalent to the former, because, in effect, it is the same to say, that Mind is *Active*, as to say, it is *Cogitative*; and the same to say,

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say, that Matter is *Passive*, as to say, it is *Spatious* Extensive substance. Nor is Mind Cogitation, or matter extension, as *Des Cartes* makes them; but the former is Cogitative, the latter Extensive substance. We find a Reluctance in our minds to conceive that Cogitation is a substance, as also to conceive Extension as one; and yet we cannot conceive Mind and Matter but as substances.

The main Reason why I do *distinguish* Substance into Mind and Matter, as into *first* Original kinds, is, because (as I hinted before) Cogitation and Extension, that do Constitute their several Ideas, are of no Relation one to another, for what hath a Thought to do with a Cube, or a Triangle? or with Length, or Breadth, or Depth? Certainly Cogitation and Extension are quite different Accidents, without any thing in their Ideas, that is *Common* to both; and therefore the first subject of the one, cannot be conceived the first subject of the other; their subjects must be substances of quite as different kinds as themselves are, at least to us; since all the diversity we can conceive in substances, is and must be, taken from the accidents they have, these being the Characters by, and under which alone, we do perceive and know, and by consequence, can only distinguish them.

I insist herein the more, for that many think that *Mind* is only an Accident, and that taken for a substance, it is unintelligible, and a meer *Chimera* : so that, tho' Matter is acknowledged (by them) to be a substance, it will not be yielded, that Abstract, separate mind can be one. But those that think it so, if they consider'd, that men have no conception of substance, nor can have any of it, but as it is a subject of Accidents, they would soon change their Opinion. For the Accident of *Cogitation*, or of Activity, that Mind is the subject of, is as distinctly and clearly conceivable, as that of Extension, or of Passivity, which matter is the subject of. Nor is the *thing* it self that is the subject of Extension, or of Passivity ; any more Conceivable but by, and under *this* ; that is, the substance of mind and matter are equally conceivable, and equally unconceivable. They know no more what *that* is in it self, that is extended, than what *that* is, that is Cogitative ; and may be as sure, that they do think, as they are, that they are spacious, ay, they cannot know that they are spacious, but by thinking. But of spaciosity or extension, (the Accident that constitutes matter,) I shall have occasion to discourse hereafter, when I come to speak of quantity, I proceed now to discourse of Mind.

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The Idea I have given of Mind, that it is the Immediate subject, or (as others perhaps would chuse to say) the Immediate Principle, of Cogitation, Energy, or Activity, is much more easie to be conceived than that of *Spinoza*, when he defines the human mind to be the Idea of a body, or thing, actually existing: for Mind, even the human, is not so properly said to be an Idea, as to be the Principle, our Cause efficient, of Ideas; since all Ideas (even in common sense) are conceived; and Mind is that, which conceives them. Thus it is in our Refracted, Inadequate, *Real-Notional* way of conceiving; and for an Adequate and just one, as it is above our faculties, so I do not find that *Spinoza*, or *Mal. Branche* after all their Ambitious Researches in that higher way, have edified the World thereby to any great Degree. This way of *seeing* all things *in God*, and in their own proper *Realities*, is a way much out of the way. Otherwise, when *they* keep the lower way of sense, many of their thoughts are surprizing, and excellent.

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SECT. II.

A two fold Consideration of Mind; one, as it is Abstracted from Matter; the other as it is Concerned with Matter. What is meant by Concernment of Mind with Matter- Of Mind. That is the Idea of God. God as pure Mind, is in himself, and directly incomprehensible. However, he is knowable as it were by Refraction, and Reflection; in an Hypothesis, and by way of similitude. That a Parabolical, Comparative way of knowing God, ought to content us. Of the Divine Attributes; the true conception of them. The vanity of those who talk of seeing all things in God. Spinoza's Opinion that God is all substance Rejected, for several Reasons. That this Opinion seems to imply, that God is no singular self-existent, self-subsistent Being. The Ground of this Opinion touched. Another sentiment concerning God, that he is infinite Extension indued with Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, considered. The Ground of this undermined, and the nature of the Divine Omnipresence represented.

MIND may be considered, either in it self, as it is *Abstract* and simple, free from all Concretion and Composition with matter ; or else as it is *concreted* or concerned therewith.

By the *Concretion* of mind with matter, I mean nothing but the acting of Mind in this or that particular manner, by means of matter. As it is in our selves, who do not see, or hear, or feel, but by means of Organs, that is, of matter.

Mind as it is in it self, *Abstract* and *Simple*, free from all concretion or concernment with Matter, I call *Pure Mind*; Mind *Concreted* with Matter, I term, *Mind in Matter*.

Pure Mind, is the Notion or Idea of *God*; as is implied by our Saviour, when he says, *John 4. 24.* God is *Spirit*; he does not say, God is a Spirit, but God is Spirit; *πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*, All Spirit, nothing but Spirit. In like manner *Seneca*, in the Preface to his natural Questions, first demanding what God is? Answers, he is *Mens universi*, the mind of the Universe; and being obliged, for the clearing of his notion, to show the difference between the nature of God, and that of Man, adds, Mind is only the Principal *part* of *our* nature, but the *whole* of Gods, which is nothing

thing but Mind God is pure Mind, all Reason. In his own terms thus, *Quid ergo interest inter naturam Dei & nostram? Nostrum melior pars Animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum.* Again, in his Epistles (Ep. 65.) He has this expression, *Nos nunc primam & Generalem causam querimus, hæc simplex esse debet; nam & materia simplex est;* now, says he, we seek the first Universal cause, which ought to be simple (or uncompounded) for even matter it it self is simple. Only, I doubt, he (as many other Philosophers did) took God but for an immanent an ingredient Cause of all; which perhaps is only true of the Mosaical Spirit of God.

But *God* as he is *Pure* mind, is an *Inaccessible Light*, that dazzles all the eyes that behold it; and therefore, we can hope to acquire but very little particular knowledge of *him* or acquaintance with him, under this notion. But then again, as the *Sun* that cannot be beheld directly, in its own proper light, may yet be seen by Reflection; so may the Deity, in an *Hypothesis*, and by way of Parable; by speaking of him after the manner of men. The holy *Scriptures* themselves go this way. They Represent God as an Infinite Almighty Person, (suppose a man,) that hath Understanding, Will, and Affections; that
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consults and decrees; and that is touched (*asmenare*) with the motions of Love, Hatred, Desire, Aversion; and in consequence of this Notion, do further Represent him, sometimes as a Father, sometimes as a Lord, or as a great King, that Governs the Universe, according to the Rules and Laws that he himself hath set, and by rewards and punishments. Now, all this is *Parabological*, and but Comparative Knowledge: However, we ought to satisfy and *Content* our selves therewith; for though it is not to know the Deity in in the Reality, as he is in himself, yet it suffices for the Principal *End* for which we should endeavour to know him; which is to Adore and Obey him. *Besides*, it is well nigh the only particular Knowledge of him that we Mortals are capable of, in this Terrestrial State; and, *in fine*, is almost as much, in effect, as that which we have of any thing else, even in the Corporeal World.

It is true we understand that *Matter* and *Motion* are Real things, and that all others that are Corporeal, do result from these; but this (at least) is only a *General Confused Knowledge*, and *no more than that* we have of the Abstracted Pure Mind. For, as to the *particular* Natures of things, their Internal Fabrick and Texture,

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and that degree of Motion, that is in the particles which compose them, (of this) we have only a weak imperfect Conjecture, without certainty. All the particular Knowledge that we have of things by which we distinguish them one from another, both in reference to their Kinds, and to the Individuals of those Kinds, and by which we resolve their Operations, is of nothing (to speak of) but of *Accidents*; and Accidents are nothing but (as I have touched before, and shall shew again more fully hereafter) the *Sentiments* we have of things; *they* being not so much as Grounds or proper Representations of Grounds, but only certain *Appearances*, under which our several Senses do dress up things, and so shew them unto us: and this is enough for *Use*.

As therefore any person would know but little of this *Corporeal World*, and nothing usefully, that would not take it in by his Senses, and know it (as he only can) under the Mascarade of *Sentiments*, that are not without him, but only in Appearances, and in their Grounds; so, he shall know but little of *God*, that will not condescend to see him in an *Hypothesis*, by way of Analogy and Similitude. What was said by *God* himself unto *Moses*, will hold

hold true in every Mortal; *Thou shalt see my Backparts, but my Face shall not be seen*: All our Knowledge of him at present, is but *ἐν ἀνίγνωσι*, we can but *Riddle* at him; the *Ideas* we have of him, are only *Attributes*; and Attributes are not *Qualities* really Inherent in him, but only *No-tions* of his Operations, and of the various Relations and Aspects which they bear, to one Another, and to Us;) that are excited into us, upon the view and considerations which we take of his works. Thus the several Attributes of God, that we conceive and know him under, are, in reference to him, just as the *Accidents* of things Corporeal, their Colours, their Odors, their Sounds, their Tangible Qualities are unto them; we see him but *ὡς ἐν ἑσόπτρῳ*, as in a Glass; and to see a thing as in a Glass, is not to see the thing it self, but only by Appearances; and yet, he that will look behind the Glass, to see more, shall see nothing at all.

What, then, must be said of those, who think, they *See all things in God*? When God, though in himself he is Pure Light, without any Mixtnre of Darknes, yet, as to us, in respect of any clear, just, distinct Knowledge of him, He dwells in the thickest *Darkness*: No

Windows in the *Sanctum Sanctorum* ; where the Seat of God was ; and the very *Heathen*, many of them, Adored him with *Silence*, as one that was Ineffable and Unconceiveable : Methinks, it is meer Enthusiasm, to talk of Seeing All Things in the *Original*, when we cannot so much as look upon *it* ; God is Pure Mind, and Pure Mind is Pure Light, of too Transcendent Glory to be immediately beheld by us, but Blear-eyed, Weak-sighted Mortals.

There are *two* Opinions in reference to the Nature of God, that *Differ* from mine ; both of which I will consider.

The *First* is, that of *Spinoza*, That he is *all* Substance, and that Particular Beings (even formally taken) are but Participations of his ; as being only so many several Modifications of the Divine Attributes. But this is a Notion (of the Deity) that I cannot receive, as for other Reasons, so for this particularly, that it makes him to be the *Universe*, and to be Matter, as well as Mind ; whereas, God is neither Matter, nor the World or Universe, but only Pure Mind ; for the

the Great World has a Mind, that made, and Governs it, as well as the Little. Even Mr. *Hobbs*, has said, *He that thinks this World without a Mind, I shall think him without a Mind*: And says *Seneca*, *Nat. Quaest. Lib. 1. C. 45. Eundem quem nos Jovem intelligunt, Custodem, Rectoremq; Universi; Animum ac Spiritum, Mundani hujus operis Dominum & Artificem, cui nomen omne convenit, &c.* Which I would Render thus; God is the Father All-mighty, All-wise, All good, the Maker of Heaven and Earth, Sovereign Preserver and Governor of All.

For my own part, I much doubt that those Philosophers, who profess themselves in this Opinion, [that God is *all* Substance, or that he is the World,] do really believe he has no Being at all, but, only in Fiction of Mind, and by way of *Prosofopæia*; and that as *Nature*, *Fortune*, *Chance*, which yet are said to do This, and to do That, do, really, only signifie *Causes* so or so considered; so, *God*, with them, is only a *Notion*, a Name, a Mode of Expression, by which they mean *all* Causes taken together; and so no more the Name of a Real Individual singular Being, than that of *Nature*, or *Fortune*. *Sunt* (says

Lucilius in Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deor.)
Qui omnia Naturæ nomine appellent, at
Epicurus, &c.

The unwary Expression of some Theologues, and Theologizing Philosophers, who Denominated God *Nature Naturing*, might give occasion to this improper conceit of him, among the moderns; as might also that mistaken *Idea* of *Infinity* (as an Attribute of God) that some have given, which seems to shock his *distinction* and singularity of Being. For *thence* it is Argued, how can God, be Infinite Being, if he be not all Beings? And if he be, how can he be One by himself? be a Singular Individual Being, distinct from all others? These were the speculations, that obliged *Spinosæ* to conceive of God, that he is the *Ingredient*, Immanent Cause of all Things; and the speculations too, that tempt others, to other mistakes concerning him. But when I come to discourse of the Notions of *Finite* and *Infinite*, and to Represent in what Sense the latter is truly Ascribed to God, I hope to manifest, that there is great *Mistake* in such Speculations and Arguings, and to exempt the true received Notion of Infinity both from these, and from all the like intangling Embarrassments and Difficulties.

The *Second* Opinion, is that of Dr. *More* and his Followers, who do hold, that God is an Infinite *Extension* ; that he is indued indeed with all Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, but he is an Extension so indued ; and of this they are so confident, that some require a belief thereof as of an Article as great as any in the Creed ; an Article that is the Foundation of all Religion ; both revealed and Natural. But as I believe, that no Man hath known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son hath revealed him, so, since among all the Revelations that the Son has pleased to make of God the Father, this is none [that he is an Extension] I cannot admit his being so, to be a Notion so Essential unto all Religion, as they would make it ; Especially when I consider, that it might as easily have been said, that God is *Extension*, as, that he is a *Spirit* ; and Christ hath said the latter but not the former. Besides, I cannot understand how Wisdom, Goodness, and Power should be said of meer Extension, which is but space ; it seems to me a lesser Incongruity (though even this is Incongruity enough) to say that God is *Matter* so indued, than that he is *Space* so indued ; seeing, even in common sense, there is more of Reality and Being in meer Matter, than

than there is in meer Extension or Space. But to urge this Argument more home: By *Extension*, (which the persons who are in this Opinion do Attribute to God,) they must mean either *meer* Space, or else a *thing* that in the Idea of it is *Spacious*. If meer Space is intended; As this does no ways differ from *inane* or *vacuum*, so one may think; it might as well be said (which yet its hard to say) that God is an Infinite *inane* or *vacuum*, that is, in plain English, an Infinite Nothing indued with Wisdom, Goodness and Power, as, that he is infinite Extension so indued. On the other side, if by Extension is understood a *thing that* in the Idea and first Conception of it is Extensive, that is, a thing that does essentially take up space; so as that it cannot be conceived, but withal space must be Imagined, as an Appurtenant of it; in this Sense, I cannot see how it differs from *Matter*; and then to say, that God is Extension, is to say, that he is Matter; whereas, God is Pure *Mind*, not *Matter*. *In fine*, as it is certain, that God is Mind, rather than Matter; so likewise it is certain, that in the Ideas that we frame of Mind, and of all the things that properly relate to it, such as Wisdom, Goodness, Thought, &c. We never do once think of Extension or Space;

Space : And if at any time we do endeavour to apply Extension or Space unto Mind, or to any thing properly mental, there always arises a Repugnance in us, upon but the thoughts of it ; an Inch, a Foot, a Yard of Understanding, or Goodness, is a *Bull*.

I know it is Argued from the *Omnipresence* of God, that he is Extended; and in truth it is very hard to imagine any presence with things that are extended, but withal, there must be an Imagination of some Extension in the thing that is present: but still, this is but *Imagination*, which is apt to impose upon us, and therefore it must be examined by Reason. And Reason tells us, that we cannot have a distinct and clear conception of the *presence* of God, if we have not (as we have not) such an one of his *Essence*, since the presence of God is but a Mode of his Essence; and if we have no distinct and clear Conception of the presence of God, nor consequently of his Omnipresence, or the way how he is present with all his Creatures, where ever they are; I do not see with what Cogency or Force an Argument can be Deduced from it, in this business. In short, since things are present one with another very *differently*, in proportion to their several Natures, it will follow, that things

things *Mental*, must be present with others, in much another way than those that are *Material*, and Consequently that God who is pure Mind, must be present with Material Beings, much otherwise, than these themselves are, one with another. Mind can no more be present the same way that Matter is, than be the same thing with Matter.

C H A P. IV.

Of Mind in Matter.

S E C T. I.

Mind as concerned with Matter comes under a double consideration, 1. As it actuates a most subtle and more than Etherial Matter, that is diffus'd throughout the World. 2ly. As it actuates some particular Vehicle or Body. In the first Notion of it, Mind in Matter is the Idea of the Mosaical Spirit of God This Spirit according to the Scriptural Hypothesis, is the Immediate cause of all things in the first Creation, and ever since. The Being of this Spirit Evinced, both by Authority and by Argument. Dr. Mores Distinction, between the Spirit of Nature (which he calls Principium Hylarchicum) and the Spirit of God, considered.

After a Consideration of Mind as it is in it self, Pure and *Abstract*, *Exempt* from all Intrinsic concernment, and composition with Matter: I come now to consider it as concerned with Matter, that

is, as Acting in, and by means of Matter; in which consideration Mind may be called *second* Mind, as in the former, it may be termed the *first*.

Mind concerned with Matter, may be considered in *two* respects, either *as* it has for the Vehicle which it actuates, and by which it acts, all that most subtle Matter that does permeate the Universe, in the utmost Extent and Capacity of it; or, *as* it actuates some particular system of Matter, that may be called a Body, and it is a particular Vehicle.

Mind in the *former* Consideration of it, as it doth actuate, and act in, and by, a most subtle matter diffused throughout the Universe, seems to me to be the *Mosaical Spirit* of God, mentioned, *Gen. 1. v. 2.* And the *same* that in the *Scriptural Hypothesis* (which never mentions *Nature* as the Efficient Cause of any thing, but Represents Philosophy only as a *Theology*, that swallows up the second Causes in Contemplation of the first,) is the *Cause* of all productions, the Births, the Growths, and all the Alterations and Changes that come to pass in the World. This, in that account, is the Principle of Human *Souls*, *Mal, 2. 15.* *Did he not make one? Yet had he the Residue, of the Spirit:* As if he had said, he wanted not Spirit, [he had more left]

left] to Animate more, had he been pleased to make them, but he made but one; and the Principal too of all *Corporeal Effects*, even of Snow, of Hail, of Ice, of Wind, &c. *Pfal.* 147. 15, 16, 17, 18. *He sendeth forth his Commandment upon the Earth, his word runneth very swiftly. He giveth Snow like Wool he scattereth the Hoar Frost like Ashes. He Casteth forth his Ice like Morsels; who can stand before his Cold? He sendeth out his word and melteth them; he causeth his Wind to blow and the Waters Flow.*

To understand this Text with the more clearness, we must have Recourse unto *Genesis*, Ch. 1. v. 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 14, 20, 24, 26. In which we find, in, v. 2. mention made of the *Spirit of God* that moved upon the Face of the Waters, as the *Active Principle* that wrought all; and in the 3. and the following verses, of the *Word or Commandment* of God, that as a *Directive Principle*, did regulate and order all, so that the *Spirit* acted accordingly; thus v. 3. *God said* let there be *Light*, and there was *Light*; and v. 6. *God said* let there be a *Firmament*, or rather an *Expanse*, in the midst of the Waters, and it was so, and v. 9. *God said*, Let the *Waters under the Heaven* be gathered together into one place, and let the *Dry Land* Appear and it was so.

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The like in the following works. Now the World in the account of the Holy Scriptures, has the same for its *Conserving*, that it had for its *Procreating* Cause; and therefore as God at first did make All by his Almighty *Spirit* through his *Word*, so the Psalmist tells us, that he still doth; for as at first he said, [*Let there be*] so still, he *Sendeth forth his* [*Commandment,*] and as all was ordered at first by the Divine Word, [*He said, let there be Light; He said, let there be a Firmament, &c.*] So still his *WORD* Runneth very swiftly: The Spirit of God doth still Execute, as he did at first, all the Directions and Commands are given it; He Produces the Snow; the Hoar Frost; and Ice; he maketh Cold; and Raiseth Winds; and causes all the Alterations that are made in the Air, in the Earth, in a Word, in all the Elements, and in all above them. This is the Scriptural *Hypothesis*; the meaning of which is, that God by his infinite *Wisdom*, as well as *Power*; both *Made* and *Governs*, the World; but to Return.

Of this Spirit, that Penetrates through all the World, and that doth All in it, not only *Moses* has written, but many of the Old *Philosophers*, have also told. *Velleius* in *Cicero*, l. 1. de *Nat. Deor.* acquaints

quaints us, concerning *Pythagoras*, *Quod censuit animum esse per Naturam rerum omnem intentum & Commeantem*, that he believed a Mind diffused throughout the whole Nature of things. The same *Velleius* also reports, concerning *Zeno*, that he in some of his Books, discoursed of what he called the *Reason of the Universe*; [*Rationem per omnem pertinentem Naturam.*] In fine, (to omit others) *Plutarch* mentions a *Spirit* that Penetrates throughout the World, [*πνεῦμα δίνκον ὅν κόσμος.*] And what can this Spirit be, that Penetrates throughout the Universe; that animates it; and is as a common Reason in it (for I will unite the Expressions, and so compleat the Idea;) but the *Mosaical Spirit*?

But not only *Authority* (Sacred and Profane) evinces, that there is such a *Spirit*, an Energetical Vital Principle, diffused throughout the World; but *Experience* also shows it, if the Experience that we have of such a Principle Diffused throughout *one* Region of it; [our own] may be sufficient to conclude, it is so in *all*; of which Experience I shall speak hereafter, when also the Nature of this Spirit, and the Influence it has upon, and in things, will be set out more clearly, and more fully.

I Know the Learned Dr. *More* hath told us of a *Principium Hylarchicum*; which he defines an *Incorporeal Substance, without Sense and Animadversion, that pervades the Matter of the whole Universe, and exercises in it a Plastical Power according as the Portions of the said Matter are Predisposed*; and this he calls the *Spirit of Nature*, and Distinguishes it from the *Spirit of God*; Affirming, that God doth actuate all the Matter of the Natural Corporeal World by the Spirit of Nature; but that he actually acts in and governs the world of Men and Angels by the Spirit of God. But I have shewed already from the Scriptural *Hypothesis*, that it is *one* Spirit, [the *Mosaical*] that Actuates, and Acts in All, in Men and other Animals, as well as in the World of meer Nature, as to all the operations commonly called Natural; for as to those that are called *Supernatural*, that come from the *Holy Ghost*, or the *Comforter*, these as they are of another Nature, so the Consideration of them belongs to another place: In fine, the *Principium Hylarchicum*, or Spirit of Nature (as this Learned person calls it,) is but a *Plastick Faculty*, of the *Mosaical* Spirit.

S E C T. II.

An Inquiry into the Original and Rise of Motion. What is meant by Motion in this Inquiry. That Motion comes from Mind in Matter, or the Mosaical Spirit. This shewed in many instances, by the Connexion between Cogitation and Motion. How Motion comes from a Principle at Rest, and how Matter from Mind set out in the Metaphysical Hypothesis, and by other Illustrations.

I Think I shall not step much (if I do at all) out of my way to make Inquiry in this place into the *Original* and Rise of Motion. By *Motion* now I mean not Actual Motion, or Motion as it is the (actual) Translation of Bodies from place to place; which some define [*The Successive Application of a Body in all it hath out wardly, unto the several parts of the Bodies which touch it immediately;*] which is the most usual Sense of the word. But here I mean by it, that *Force*, Energy, or Motive Vertue, called in Latine *Impetus*, from which this Actual Translation, or Successive Application of Bodies does immediately come. And my Enquiry now

shall be concerning the *Original* of This, not in *particular* as it is in this or that particular Body, but the Rise of *Impetus* or Motive Force in *general*, which having found, I will *first* remove an Objection, and *then* improve the Discovery, to shew *how* Matter comes from Mind, as well as how Motion doth from a Principle that is at rest.

It must be acknowledged, that there is some appearance (at first sight) of cause to believe, that as *mind* is the first subject of Cogitation, and *matter* the first subject of Extension, so, since *Energy* or Force (the immediate Principle of Action and of Actual motion) is neither Cogitation, nor Extension, that some *third* substance Distinct both from mind and matter, should be the first subject of it, and consequently, that there should be *three* Principles, Mind, Matter, and the first Mover. And indeed it looks as if the Scripture *Hypothesis* did countenance *this*; for there mention is made of the *Spirit* which wrought, as the first subject of motion; of the Abyſs of *Waters* wrought upon, as the first Recipient Subject; and of the *word* Reason, or Wisdom which directed the Work. But on second Consideration, as it is clear, that all that *Moses* says in his *Genesis*, concerning the Spirit, and the Word, is not
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said with design to intimate, that really the Spirit was only a meer senseless inartificial Force, or Energy, and that Wisdom or the Word was another distinct Principle, that directed and guided it in all its Motions; but to shew, since we men (in our inadequate way of Conceiving) do distinguish *Wisdom* and *Power*, that all the works of God were made in *Both*, but *Both* united in one *Demiurgical Mind*, or (to use *Seneca's* Expression) on *Ratio faciens*. Thus, *Ratio faciens* is the Idea or Notion of the *Mosaical* Spirit, the true *Natura Naturans*, that concurred to make the World, not in the manner that *God* himself did, who, in the *Mosaical* Hypothesis, Acted only as an External Efficient, but in the way that the *Soul* would do in a living Creature, if first by its Plastic vertue it should form all the members of the Body of it, and afterwards, should inform it, and act in it. And *Cotta* in *Cicero* has as finely as compendiously expressed the Difference between these *two* several ways of working, even in Reference to the World. When *L. 3. de Nat. Deor.* he says, *Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum [mundum] ædificatum, non quemadmodum docebo, à naturâ conformatum putarem.*

It is this Spirit that is the *Original Cause* of the *Impetus*, that is the *nearest cause* of

Local Motion ; and indeed, it is the Original Cause of all *Mundane Activity* and Energy : Motion comes from Energy or Action, and all Energy and Action from the Mosaical Spirit ; [not from meer matter, but from mind in matter.] In short, *Impetus* or Force arises from the *same* Principle that Cogitation or Perception does ; as is evident by the following Considerations.

First, The *first mention* that we have of *motion*, or Corporeal Action, is in Relation to the Mosaical Spirit, in *Gen. 1. 2.* where it is said, that the *Spirit* of God *moved* upon the face of the waters. It is true, the word used in this Text for motion, is seldom used, [but thrice in the whole Scripture, to wit, in this place, in *Deut. 32. 11.* and in *Jer. 23. 9.*] And therefore the direct particular meaning of it will not be easily agreed, but that it imports some motion (which is as much as I do urge it for,) is beyond dispute : *Motum aliquem Notari*, (says Hotting. in Exam. Hist. Creat. Quest. 33.) *non est Dubitandum.*

Secondly, It is farther Evident from the very *Ideas* that we have of things : For we cannot conceive mind as a Perceptive
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Cogitative substance, but withall, we must conceive it as *Active*, and that there is something *Energetical* in it ; whereas, on the other hand, matter may (and in its own proper Idea must) be conceived as a thing that is only *Passive*, not Active ; there being nothing of Active or Energetical in it as it is but spacious extensive substance ; and therefore Energy and Action cannot be conceived to proceed but from matter, which in its self is Idle and unactive ; but rather from mind, which is essentially active and busie.

Thirdly, It may also be argued from the *relation*, that (Experience assures us,) is between Cogitation and Actual motion. For we clearly perceive, that all our voluntary motions do arise from Thought or Imagination ; we do move our selves, or any particular part that hath the proper instruments of voluntary motion, and these duly qualified, at our pleasure, when we will ; that is, by imagination and thought. We go, we stand still (which is by Tonic motion ;) we put our hands, feet, heads, eyes, and other parts of our bodies into motion, and regulate them in their several motions, by will or thought, ay, even cogitation it self in all the several modes of it, as it is sensation, imagination, or rati-

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ocination, does ever bear a proportion to some motion; insomuch that as the minute parts of any Organ that serves unto Cogitation of any kind, are more or less in motion; or, (which is meant and is Equivalent,) as the *Organ* is in more or less Disposition and Aptitude to receive impressions; so answerably, the Act of Cogitation is graduated. Organs that are affected with heaviness or *torpor*, (as those are whose Particles are too little in motion, and consequently indisposed for receiving fitting impressions,) are answerably under a *Stupor*, or Diminution of sense and perception: but inflamed Organs, whose particles have too much motion, and consequently are apt to be too *easily*, or too *much* stirred, these are exquisitely sensible and tender. In fine, *Reason* it self, as to its grounds, is but *Harmony*; a certain modification and turning of the parts, (either the Spirits, or the Filaments,) that are the immediate instruments of that kind of cogitation; so that they be not wound up too high, or let down too low; that is, that they be not in too much motion, or aptitude unto it, or in too little, but in a just mediocrity; and this is to be in *Tune*, or in *Harmony*. The truth hereof is evident. For if the Organ of Reason is inflamed, so that the Particles of it are too
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much in motion, the action that it exerts in that instance is not reason, but *madness* of one sort or another; and again, if the Organ is torpid, through a defect of motion in the Particles of it, the Cogitation that is exercised in this instance is plain *stupidity* and folly; and the power a dulness or shortness of wit. Wherefore *Aristoxenus* the Musician, who affirmed that the Soul was a Harmony, as he receded not from his Art, so he did not much wander from the true nature of the Soul. In truth, *Harmony* or Proportion is the *Soul of the World*. For if we look well, we shall find that, that which formalizes things, and qualities, and which makes them be of this or that kind, and to act in this or that way, is nothing but the Proportion or *Logos* that is in them; that is, it is the *Tuning* of them in the world, and one to another, as to parts, and motions: most, if not all the *Specificical Qualities* and Operations that are in the World, arise from hence; which are therefore called *Occult*, because this Spring and Original of them is so little regarded; but of this more in another, and perhaps a more proper place,

But to more illustrate the former Argument, and show in a fuller light, the rela-

tion between Cogitation and actual motion; I will enter farther into the Consideration of *motion*; and will manifest, both the *subtlety* of it, and also the *Correspondence* which it holds with Mind, or the *Perceptive*. I will not speak now of the motion that is *Local* to such a Degree, that it falls under *Observation* of the sense, but of *that* motion (for motion it is) that contributes to the *being* of sense; which for *Distinction* sake may be called *Impression*. We are convinced by *sense*, that in the *Impressions* that make it, there is a great deal of subtlety, and this too in various *Degrees*; and we are equally convinced, that there are various sensitive *Powers* to receive *them*, in those several *Degrees*. Thus the impression made upon the *Eye*, that causes *Vision*, is by many *Degrees* more delicate and fine than that which causes the *Feeling*; since the Object seen by the *Eye*, and Consequently making a *Visive* impression (upon it) ordinarily doth not make any upon the sense of feeling. I say ordinarily, because sometimes, where the impression of the visible is very strong, as when one looks upon the *Sun*, or on some other very strong and vigorous *Light*, the *feeling* of the *Eye* is affected, as well as the *Sight*, so that there is a sense of *pain*, from a solution of *Continuity*. Which plainly evinces

evinces (to note it by the by) that all visible impression, tho' it be not sensibly a motion, yet really is so, since even visible impressions, if strong and vigorous, are painful; and consequently, are motions; for nothing causes pain but motion; pain being nothing but little Spasms and Tensions of the parts; and if strong impressions be motions, weaker ones are so too; tho' in a less degree.

Again, The impression made upon the *Ear*, that causes *sound*, tho' it be by much a less fine and delicate one than that upon the *Eye*, which causes *Light* or *Colour*, it is however of far greater fineness and delicacy than that Impression which produces *pain* in the *Ear*; For as we *see* without pain, so, ordinarily we *hear* without it; that is, we are affected by sonorous Objects, which do propagate their motions to our ears, with the sentiment of sound, without being sensible of this Affection any other way. And yet if the sound be too intense, it always *pains*, and often breaks, or too much stretches the *Timpanum* or *Drum* of the *Ear*. The observation that some Philosophers have taken of this latter effect, occasion'd them to make a *Maxim*, that an *Excellent Object* destroys the *Sense*; but possibly this must be understood with Correction, not so much in respect

spect of the Faculty or Perceptive *Power*, as of the *Organ*; for could the Organ bear those stronger impressions, without Alteration or Hurt, the perceptive Faculty would not be offended; it is not the sentiment, either that of *Light*, or that of *Sound*, that offends, but the motion that causes *it*, which is too strong for the Organ, and dissolves or alters its Texture. In fine, the impression that causes *Intellection*, is by much a finer and more subtle one, than that which causes sensation, whether External, or Internal; and that by as many degrees as *Intellectual Ideas* are more fine and subtle than *Images*, and the *Understanding* a finer and more delicate Faculty than the *Sense*.

By *Finer* and *Delicater Impressions*, I mean such as have less of Local Motion. By *Finer* and *Delicater Faculties*, I mean such as are sensible of *Finer* and *Delicater Touches*, or *Impressions*.

In this sense, the *Imagination* must needs be a finer and more delicate faculty than any external sense, for as much as it receives the impressions of External Objects but by *Reflection*, or Communication from the *Sensories*, but these have them *directly* from the very *Objects* themselves; and by the same Reason, the *Understanding*, that receives impressions from the *internal sense*, must

must needs be (as indeed it is) a much finer and delicatesr faculty than *That*.

Upon the whole, it is evident, that there is a near relation between actual motion and cogitation, and consequently, that it is no unreasonable thought to think, that as they are *near of kin*, so both are Off-springs of *one* Original cause, [mind in matter;] but then it will follow also, that motion, and indeed all Energy whatever in the Spring and Principle of it is *Rest*, for so mind is. But this is the difficulty. For that motion should come from a Principle that is at rest, appears as unintelligible, as that Frost should come from Fire, or Darknes from Light.

Wherefore to make this clear, I must consider things in the *Metaphysical Hypothesis*, as all are understood to come from one, by way of *Emanation*: and thus, all *Created Being* is compared to *Light*, that flows from the Sun; and then its *Emanation* is in the same manner, as the *Radiation* of Light, which is from a Center into an Orb or Sphere, in *Extenuating* Lines. Now in this Hypothesis, as all Beings (even those that are most opposite) do come from *one*, so they come from *it* in this way, that the more *Removed* any is from the *Central* Being, the more *Extenuated* it is; that is, as God or pure mind is the Central Being, that

that *Sun*, that is the Father of Lights; so all the Being that proceeds from *him*, has less of Light and more of Darknes, in proportion to the distance it has, upon the Scale of Being, and in its utmost *Elongation* or Removal from him, terminates in that, which in Appearance has nothing of Resemblance to the Original Light; but (to be compared with it) is only *Darkness* and shadow; and this last is the Idea of *meer matter*, as that of the Central Light is of pure Mind. God is Light; Matter is *Darkness*; all intermediate Beings are *Light* and *Darkness*, in several proportions.

What I have said is sensibly set out in the *shades* of Colours, and in *Colours* themselves, which are but shades of *Light*; For the Extremes of *any* Colour, for Example, the *Brightest* Red, and the *Darkest*; or the Extreams of *all* Colours, as *White* and *Black*; compare them each with other, and they are so contrary, that nothing can be more, especially the two latter; and yet they do participate, the former not only of Colour in general, but also of Red; and the latter, tho' of no particular Colour, yet of Light, which is the Ground of Colour in general; and also the Darkest Red, if it doth not come from the Brightest; and the Blackest Colour

lour from the Whiteſt; yet, by the Gradation of Shades, or Participle, intermediate Colours, they are ſo continued one to another, that the Aſcent and Deſcent from one unto the other is moſt Agreeable and Delightful, as made by eaſie ſteps, without any Patches, or Chafms. It is true, if we look on Contraries in their *Physical* Conſideration, ſo they are of *opposite Natures*, oppoſite Operations, and one expels the other, when they are immediately ſet together; but if we look upon them in their *Metaphysical* Conſideration, ſo they are but *degrees* of the ſame nature; and capable of being United and Reconciled; inſomuch, that One in a right ſenſe may be ſaid to come from Another; as Darkneſs from Light. For however contrary *Light* and *Darkneſs* are, each unto other, as to Qualities and Physical Operation, and ſo in their Physical Conſideration, yet as to their Metaphysical, they differ but in *degrees*; both have the ſame grounds; for Shadow really is but leſſer Light, occaſion'd by the interpoſition of an Opaque Body, and Darkneſs is but a great Shadow. And thus a *Flat* and a *Sharp*, tho' contrary ſounds, as to their *Physical* Conſideration, yet as to their *metaphysical*, they are but different degrees; the Sharp a greater, the Flat a leſſer degree


gree of Celerity. And thus as Darkneſs comes from Light, only by the Leſſning or Extenuating of it ; ſo may matter come from mind: *mind* is pure Light, or, all Being in Eminence; but *matter*, as it doth Participate nothing at all of mind, but only by meer Exiſtence, ſo it is meer darkneſs, without the leaſt degree of Vitality or Life; and *all Beings* between Mind and Matter, are as *Colours*, in reſpect of Light, or as *Shades*, in reſpect of any particular Colour.

But to add ſome further clearing to this Subject, and to ſhew how actual local motion may come from a Principle that is at reſt, which being ſhewed, will ſhew withall *how* Matter may come from mind, ſince there is no greater Repugnance (even to common ſenſe) in the one, than is in the other, I will conſider the Relation that the *Center* of a Circle has unto its *Circumference*, and how things are in the *one*, and how in the *other*; For this will afford it much Illuſtration. In the *Center* then of a Circle, or of a moved Sphere, all is at Reſt, and out of *it* all in motion, but in ſuch proportion, that that portion of a *Radius* which is at a farther diſtance from the Center, is *more* in motion, by reaſon of that diſtance, and that which is nearer
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is *less*; which is evident even to sense, in the following Diagram.

In the three Concentrical Circles, *B. C. D. E. F. G.* if the Ray *A. B. D. F.* is supposed to be moved from *F.* to *G.* it will appear to any that considers, that in the same time that in the inmost Circle it doth move from *B.* to *C.* and in the middle from *D.* to *E.* it moves in the outmost from *F.* to *G.* that is, it moves faster, and is more in motion, the farther it is from the Center *A.* and only because it is so. Again, on the Contrary, in the same time that the *Ra- dius* moves in the outmost Circle from *F.* to *G.* it moves in the middle but from *D.* to *E.* and in the inmost (which is nearest to the Center *A.*) but from *B.* to *C.* that is, it has more of Rest, and less of Motion, the nearer it is to the Center, and in the Center has no motion at all, but is at pure rest. Even sense acquaints us, that the Arch or Space *F. G.* is much Greater than the Space *D. E.* and that *D. E.* is Greater than *B. C.* and so on the contrary, that the Arch or Space *B. C.* is less by much than *D. E.* and *D. E.* (by much) than the Arch or Space. *F. G.* and yet all the Spaces are supposed to be passed by the Ray *A. B. D. F.* in the same time.

time. Now that which passes a greater space in the same time, is more in motion, and has greater Celerity; and that which passes a less, is less in motion, and has less of Celerity; and therefore since the nearer the Ray is unto the Center, the less space it passes in the same time, and the farther off it is, the more it passes, and that more or less as it is farther off, or nearer; it evidently follows, that farther off from the Center, a Ray has more of motion, and as it is nearer to it, it has less, and in the Center has none.



Well then, supposing that the Principle of Energy and Motion is in the *Center* of the Orb of Being, (and we may well suppose it, since even *Nature* has its Sphere of Activity, and Acts as from a Center to a Circumference; (so *Seeds* Act, so *Light* Acts and Diffuses itself;) it is certain that motion must come from something not in Motion, but at Rest; for so that is, which is in the Center; and indeed, else there must be infinite progression in Motions. *Again*, since in the Orb of being, Pure Mind is in the *Center*,

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and matter in the utmost Circumference, it follows, that the nearer things are unto pure mind, and the more they do participate of that, the more they have of Rest, and the less of motion ; but the farther off they are from pure Mind, and the nearer to matter, the more in motion they are. And indeed, all Energy in matter is Local Motion. Thus all the Effects of *Mechanism*, as they are purely material, so they are performed *only* by Local Motion ; but the business of Cogitation, even in the lowest step of it, which is sensation, as it is of nearer Relation unto mind than to matter, so it is performed rather by way of mutation, than of Local motion ; the *Eye* is not sensible of any motion imparted to it, nor is the Ear, or the Nose, or any other of our Sensories, and yet each is sensible of a mutation made therein, (or rather in the Faculty) which comes from motion. But tho' the more refined any Beings are, and the nearer that they are to the Central Mind, the more at rest they be, and the less in motion in their several Actions ; and consequently Abstract Spirits that do not live in gross Elementary Bodies, are more at rest, and have less of motion, in the exercises of their several Powers, than Men have, who are imbodyed in Elementary Vehicles ;

cles ; yet *no Spirit* whatsoever but only *God* himself, who only is Pure Mind, is *so* wholly, *so* Absolutely at Rest, *as* that it sees all Things at once, by one Entire view and Intuition ; all Principles and all Conclusions in them ; all Ends and all Means and Motives to them ; without the least degree of Succession, or any Addition. Only the *Central Being* sees *so*, and he doe's.

For seeing all the Circumference is in the Center, *so* that all the Lines however divided they be in the former, do meet together in the latter ; it is plain, that an Eye placed in the *Center*, must needs see all in the *Circle*, as clearly as any thing in it ; and this too with one Individual, single Intuition, without Succession, or, Addition ; seeing there is nothing of Motion, but all is Rest in the Center. And this properly is to *see in Eternity*. Thus *God* sees. But all *other Beings* beside *God*, *as* they are not *God*, or Pure mind, *so* they are not in the Center, and not being the Center, but at Distance from it, some at Greater, some at Lesser, but All at some, they All have something of Motion, and consequently cannot Act, or See, in the same manner as Central Pure Mind, by way of Absolute Rest, without Succession, or Addition,

and without Distinction of past, present, and to come: For tho' all the Lines do meet in the Center, yet there being no place without it in which they do so, Creatures cannot see as God sees, no more than they can be in the Center as God is. It is too short and Inadequate a way of Arguing to Infer that any Creatures can see All things at once, but from the notions (confused enough) that we Mortals have of *Time* and *Eternity*; as that *Time* is Successive, *Eternity* a Permanent Duration; together with a Conceit, that *all Spirits* (they being things Abstract and Separate from Bodies,) both Are, and Act, *in Eternity*, as all Imbodied Beings Are, and do Act, in *Time*. Certainly every Being but God, is in Time, tho' not in the same Kind of Time; for as God only is in *the Center*, so he only is Absolutely *in Eternity*. And if Time is taken for all Duration that is not Eternity, God only is without Time, and so without Succession of Actions. But to Return.

S E C T.

SECT. III.

Of Mind as it Aētuates a certain Particular Body; Mind in this Notion called a Soul. Body is a System of Organs. Soul and Body an Animal. Body Considered two ways. To wit, in Reference to External Objects, and in Reference to the Internal Principle that Aēt it. In the First Consideration of Body, the Ends and uses of Organs are shewed, and withal the Reason of their variety. This Illustrated by several Instances and Observations. The use of Body in Relation to the Internal Principle that Aētuates it, is to Individuate and Singularize that Principle. This set out in sensible and plain Resemblances. A Comparison between Vital and Locomotive Energy; with a Recapitulation of the whole Discourse, as it unfolds the Mystery of Animals.

WE have Considered Mind in the first Step of Relation that it carries unto Matter, Namely, as it doe's Aētuate a most subtle Matter diffused throughout the Universe, in which Notion it is called Spirit simply, as was showed from *Malachy, Ch. 2. v. 15.* Come we now to Consider

it in the next place, as it *Actuates some Particular System of Matter*, in a Particular Manner; and so it is called a *Soul*; and that Particular System of Matter, which it doth Actuate, is a *Body*, or a Particular Vehicle; and the Result of both an *Animal*. An *Animal* is nothing but Soul and Body together; or a Body Actuated by a Soul. A *Body* is a System of Organs; an *Organ* is Matter framed and Contrived after a Particular Manner for some Animal Use, and End; some Use, End, or Action of a Soul: A *Soul* is a certain Determinate Vital Energy; or a certain Portion of the Spirit of the Universe, Vested in a Body, or particular Vehicle; in which Notion all *Souls* are *Spirits*; as indeed they are stiled in the Holy Scripture, wherein we Read of the Spirit of the *Beast*, tho' it goes Downward, as well as of the Spirit of a *Man* that goes Upward.

This Discourse I fear will seem a little Mysterious; and therefore to Inlighten it, and withal to open (tho' but in general) the Mystery of the *Animal Nature*, and, by Analogy unto it, the Nature of *other Vivents*. I will Resume it from the Beginning, and speak more Distinctly: taking my Rise from *Bodies*, or Systems of Organs, which coming under Sense, are
better

better known unto us than Spirits or Souls.

Body then, as it is a System of Organs, has a *Double* Relation, and so may be Considered two ways; either with Respect to *External Objects* by which it self is Affected, and by means thereof, the Mind; or else with Respect to the *Internal Principle* that doth Inform and Actuate it, and Act in it, which Principle it doth *Individuate* and Singularize.

We will first Consider a Body in the Relation that it has unto *External Objects*, and here we must set out the *Nature*, that is, the Ends and Uses of the Organs which compose a Body, as also the Reason of the *Variety*, and number of those Organs; why *any* Organs at all, and why *many*: both which will be done with one Performance. An Organ properly, is Matter Particularly Textured, and Framed for some Particular use: And an Animal Organ is Particularly Textured, and Framed for an Animal use: I will give the Example in only Sensitive Animals, and in the Acts of Sensation, as being best understood; but what is said of Sensation, and of the Organs of it, will, by Proportion, hold in all the other Actions of Animals, and in all other Organs, with a due Alteration.

In all *Acts of Sensation* there is first an *Affection* of the Organ, and then a *Perception* of that *Affection* by the Soul; or rather, a *Perception* Excited in the *Soul* by means of that *Affection*; and this is the *End* of the *Organ*, and the only Use of it, that the Soul makes, to wit, to come by means thereof unto a *Perception* of External Objects; as, to see their Colours, to hear their Sounds, to Relish the several Tasts they have, and the like. In short, a Soul cannot but by the *means* of *Organs*, take any notice of External Objects, nor the Organ be a means of conveying any notice to the Soul, but by being first *Affected* it self. Now the *Affection* of the Organ arises from a *Perception* (may I so express it) or a Reception of the *Motions* Communicated to it by Objects; and a *Capacity* for this Reception from the Particular *Frame* of the Organ. For since all Matter indifferently is not capable of receiving all kinds of *Motions* and *Impressions*; but that for some *Particular Motions* and *Impressions* (of which sort are sensible ones) there must be *Particular Textures* and *Frames* of Matter to *Catch* them; it follows, that there must be *Organs*; and these too in such *Variety* and *Number*: there must be *Organs*, to Receive the *Impression* and *Motions* of Objects, which
without

without a Particular Texture of Matter could not be Received ; and there must be *Variety* of Organs, to Correspond these various Kinds of Motions and Impressions that are in Coloured, in Sonorous, in Sapid, and in other *Species* of Objects.

This will be better conceived in some Instances, by which it shall be made appear, that for the Reception of certain Particular Motions, there must be certain *Particular Textures*, and Dispositions of Matter ; so that Matter in some certain Frames and Dispositions of it will *Catch*, and be Affected with, some certain Particular Motions, that in others, it will not be *Touched* with. It is Generally Observed, that an *Unison* string will Receive the Motion, and so, Tremble, when another also Unison is made to Sound, and yet all other Strings of the same Instrument, that are not Unisons, shall remain insensible and unmov'd. *Cardan* Observed, that in a certain Church, in which were several Images of Wax, but one would move and Tremble, and one always would, at the Ringing of a Sacring Bell. Mr. *Boile* has taken notice of the like Mechanical Perception, in several Empty Drinking-Glasses of Fine white Metal ; he says, that causing the Strings of a Musical Instrument to be variously
screwed

screwed up, and let down, and briskly struck, he observed, that the Motion of one String, when it was stretched to a certain *Note*, or *Tone*, would make one of the Glasses Ring, and not the other ; nor would the sound of the same String Tuned to another *Note*, sensibly Affect the same Glass ; tho' perhaps, says he, it might have its Operation upon another. In fine, there are *Tonical Echo's*, that Return not the Voice but when it has some Peculiar Musical Note, and then it doe's. Thus Organs are Matter Particularly Textur'd, to the End to make them capable of Receiving some Particular Motions : so that a *Sensitive Organ* may be Defined, a System of Matter Particularly Framed, Disposed, and Textured for receiving some Particular Motion of External Bodies, and for Conveying it to the Soul.

So much concerning Body in its Relation to External *Objects* ; come I now to consider it in the Relation which it has to the *Soul*, (the Internal Principle that Actuates it, and Acts in, and by it ; and so, the Great work and Business of the Body is to *Singularize* and Individuate the *General Vital Principle* of the Universe, that it may become a *Soul*, or a Particular Vital Principle of a certain Particular Body. To understand this it must be Consider'd,

Consider'd, that the *Mosaical Spirit* (the Rise and Principle of all Created Cogitation,) as it is Extended throughout the whole Universe; so, to become in Particular a *Soul*, of any Particular *Animal*, it must be *Singularized*, and Individuated, that is, it must be *Apportioned* (as it were) to that Particular Animal, which it comes to be by means of the Body. To Illustrate this, it must be Remembred, that a *Voice* or Sound Diffused throughout the whole capacity of the *Medium* (as the *Mosaical Spirit* is throughout that of the universe) is yet in the *Phonocamptick Center* or object (which is nothing but a place conveniently Disposed for this Purpose,) so *Individuated* and Singularized (as the *Mosaical Spirit* is supposed to be by a Congruous fit Body,) that Really it has *other Affections* and Properties, than *those* it owns, in all the rest of the *Medium*, in-somuch that by Vertue of it, this *place* instead of being a *Medium* of Sound, becomes to all Appearance a *Principle* of it, and so a *Speaker*, and this is called an *Echo*. It may also be set out in a *Speculum* or Looking-Glass, (for a Body is to the *Mosaical Spirit*, what a *Speculum* or Looking-Glass is to the Image of an Object in the *Medium*;) A *Speculum* Catches the Diffused Image, and so *Singularizes* it, that
it

it becomes a very Different thing, and puts on other very Different Properties than those it has in the *Medium*, for in the *Looking-Glass* it doth appear as an Object which it doe's not out of it. But what doe's fet it out most naturally, is, that it is so in *Man*; For the Soul or Cogitative Principle of a Man, as it is Extended throughout the whole Capacity of the Body, in like manner as the *Mosaical Spirit* is, throughout that of the Universe; so it is *Singularized* and Individuated, in, and by, the particular *Organs*: infomuch that the *Eye* only does *See*; the *Ear* only does *Hear*, and only the *Tongue* *Tasts*, in Vertue thereof; for which Reason these are owned to have several particular *Faculties*, which are as so many several Souls unto them. Now what the Organs are to the Soul in any Body (that is but a System of Organs,) Bodies themselves are, unto the *Mosaical Spirit*, the great Soul of the Universe of which all particular Bodies are Organs. But since this Notion is of so much Importance, that it will deserve a more particular Consideration, and I design to give it one in another Chapter, I shall dismiss it at present, without further Insisting on it; and now will only add some *Improvement* to the former Discourse, by making a *Comparison* between

tween the Vital and the Mechanical Energy.

First then I lay it down as certain, that there is such a thing as a *Vital*, as well as a *Mechanical* Energy: by *Vital Energy* I mean all that is not meerly Mechanical; and therefore do comprehend in that Term whatever is properly *Mental*; by *Mechanical Energy* I mean Impulse or Springines, the nearest Physical Principle of Actual Local Motion. Now we are as sure by our senses, and by the Reflection that we make upon our selves, and upon the Notices which we receive from Things without us, that there is such a thing as a *Vital* Energy, as we are that there is a *Mechanical*: Because we are as much assured of the Effects of the *one*, as we are of those of the *other*; as much assured that there is Life, Sensation, and Intellection, that come from a *Vital*; as we are that there are Actual Local Motions; Motions of Ascent and Descent, Motions Direct, and Motions Circular, &c. which (as Motions) come from Impulse, the Mechanical Energy.

Again; As it is Certain that *Local Motion*, or that Impulse which is the nearest Physical Principle of it, is *not* Matter, or Materiate, but yet is *in* Matter, as United unto it: so by this Consideration we may
become

become as certain, that *Vital Energy* and the Effects of it, *though* they be Immaterial, *yet* they may be in Matter; since there needs no more of Hooks and Crooks to make the Latter, than to make the Former, to stick, and hold together.

In the next place; As the Mechanical, or Loco-motive Energy is Diffused *throughout the World* (for there is nothing in this, that is Entirely at Rest;) so is the Vital: Since it is certain that wherever, and whenever, any Matter becomes Disposed, the Vital Principle is *always at hand* to Actuate that Matter, and Act in it, according as the Dispositions of it do Invite or Permit: All *Putrefaction* or Digestion *any where*, determines in *Insects*, or little Animals, (as Experience evinces,) the Spirits being Unfettered and let Loose thereby.

And yet *as* the Mechanick or Loco-motive Impulse is not Received in all Textures of Matter indifferently, but that, (as I have showed already) there must for some certain Modifications of Local Motion, be certain particular Textures of Matter, *so* neither is the Vital Energy Caught and Received indifferently by all Textures of Matter; but as all Life consists in Motion, or in something Analogous, so for certain Gradations and Exercises of

Life,

Life, there must be certain particular Fa-
bricks and Textures of Matter, called *Or-*
gans, and also certain particular Disposi-
tions in the *Mechanical Spirits* (for so I
call the subtle Active Corpuscles in every
Concrete) that are the immediate instru-
ments of the Vital Principle in all its Acti-
ons of Life, in this Corporeal World.

So that as Actual Motion, the Effect of
Loco-motive Energy, and even Loco-mo-
tive Energy it self (as taken for Impulse)
is not Material in this Sense, that it does
consist of Matter, yet, if to be material be
understood of that which is *Dependent on*
Matter, and so Dependent that it cannot
be without it; in the Sense of the word,
not only actual Motion, but even *Impulse*
(the nearest Physical principle of Motion)
is material, since neither of them can be
but in, and by the means of Matter. In
like manner, the Vital Principle that Ani-
mates Corporeal Beings, though it is not
material in this Sense, that it is *only* Mat-
ter, or a mode of Matter, yet in another
it is, that it *so Depends* in all its Animal
Operations, that it cannot exercise any but
by means of Mater, and according to the
Texture and Quality of it. Nothing can
be plainer than this is to Sense, for in all
the Acts of Perception, not only the sensi-
tive, but the Intellectual, *as* the Organs
are,

are, so are the Actions ; if the Organs are sound and duly Disposed, the Actions are Conformable ; but if the Organs are out of Tune and Vitiated, the Actions are so likewise ; Ay, are Totally Abolished, if the Organs are spoiled ; Besides, the several Kinds, and Degrees, of Deliration, that men themselves are Subject unto, accordingly as their Spirits are ill Qualified and Distempered, do further Confirm it.

Upon the whole, as the Vital Energy it Diffused (as Light is) throughout the Universe ; so according to the several Textures of Matter that do catch it, as a *Speculum* does the Light; it Exerts itself ; and being Catcht and Retained by the *Congruity* of the Body, (for it is Congruity only, not Hooks or Crooks, that holds them together,) it is called a *Soul*, and the whole Complex, [of Body and Soul] an *Animal*.

What I have said, does more particularly regard the *Animals*, I call *Visible*, which we are better Acquainted with, than with *others of a Higher Nature* ; but yet, with a very easie Application, and by way of Analogy, it will also open the Nature of *these* : However, this Admonition doth Remind me of the next Head to which I must pass, and that is, the *Distribution* of Animals.

C H A P. VII.

Animals are either Invisible or Visible; in the Former sort I reckon Angels, Good and Bad, which are Etherial: As also the Genii, which are Aerial Animals. Invisible Animals, why called Spirits. That there are Spirits Evinced, 1. From the general Tradition of the World. Mr. Hobbs's Evasion of this Argument Considered. 2. From Operations that cannot be Accounted for but from such Causes. 3. From Intelligences and Notifications that cannot be Resolved but upon this Hypothesis. 4. From Spectra or Apparitions. Of the way and manner how Spirits do Appear, that it is twofold, Real and Visional. That Good Angels when they do Appear are called πνεύματα or Spirits; and the Bad φαντάσματα or Fantomes.

SECT. II.

I Have spoken of Animals in General, but to bring a greater Light toward the Understanding of the Animal Nature, I must consider its *Distribution*, and show the General Kinds or sorts of Animals

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that are in the Universe. And Animals in Conformity unto the Bodies that do help to compose them, are either *Visible*, or *Invisible*. By *Visible* Animals, I mean such as do consist of gross matter, and so have Bodies that naturally come under the perception of the external sense; by *Invisible* Animals, I mean such as have Bodies so refined, that naturally they come not under the perception of *All*, or *Any* of the External Senses.

Visible Animals, which are the Animals that compose this *Lower Elementary World*, (for I will not undertake to speak of any such as may be in the other, commonly called the Superiour and Celestial,) the farther Discourse of them is properly referred unto *Physicks*, and therefore I shall enter no farther thereinto at this time, but proceed to treat of the *Invisible*.

By *Invisible* Animals, I mean Angels, good and bad, which I call *Ætherial* Animals, as also those *Æreal* ones (some *Ludicrous*, some *Torvous*) that are called *Genii*; all which, with the several kinds they farther branch into, I will comprehend under one name [of *Spirits*,] and so speak something of their *Nature*; Demonstrate their *Reality* and *Existence*; and
in

in fine, add something concerning their *Apparition*, and the *ways* of it.

As to their *Nature* in General, I think I shall have said all is necessary for me to say at this time, when I shall have shewed, that there is a sense in which it may be truly said, they are *Incorporeal*, (as said they are, generally;) and yet there is a sense too, in which, they must be acknowledged to be *Corporeal*, if the having *any* mixture of matter in their Composition can suffice (as I know it will be yielded me it doth) to make them properly denominated *such*.

The sense in which Spirits are truly said to be *Incorporeal*, will be best understood by shewing the reason how the Attribute of being *Corporeal* becomes *Appropriated* unto visible Animals; to comprehend which, we must consider, that in order to our conversing with Objects, and taking Cognizance of them, we are endowed with *two* sorts of Faculties, the *Sense*, and the *Understanding*; and that the *Sense* (even to Sense) is an *Organical Material* Power, for we do see the Organs it uses, the Eye for Seeing, the Ear for Hearing, and the like for all the rest; but that the *Understanding* is (to *Sense*) an *Inorganic Immaterial* Power, there not *Appearing* any *Sensible Organ*, by means of

which, it does exert or put forth its Acts. Now in conformity to this *Distinction* between our Faculties, we do make *one* of their Objects, (nor can we do it more agreeably :) calling the Substances that do properly come under the notice and observation of our sense, *Bodies*; and those that do not, but are only inferred and perceived by the understanding, *Spirits*: the former are corporeal material Substances; because perceived by *sense*, which is a material Organical Power; but the latter, such as Angels and other Spirits, are said to be immaterial, incorporeal, because we *cannot* See, or Feel, or Taste, or Smell them in their own Substances: In a word, we cannot perceive them in their own proper beings by any of the *Senses* we have, but only by the Ratiocination and Discourse of the *Understanding*, which (to sense) is an Inorganical Immaterial Power. And our Saviour Christ, when after his Resurrection, he appeared to his Disciples, and they apprehended that they had seen a Vision, to convince them of the Reality of his *Corporeal* Existence, and that he was not a Spirit, or an Apparition only, as they took him to be, he Appeals unto their *Sense*, and particularly to that of *Touch*, *Luke 24. 39.* Behold, says he, *my Hands, and my Feet, that it is I myself,*

self, for a Spirit hath no Flesh and Bones as you see me have : Wherein he goes upon these Notions, that a Spirit is an invilible Thing, a Thing that in its own reality cannot be seen, nor be felt, but only be understood; and that, that substance which comes under the notice and cognifance of the sense is a *Body*.

And in this sense of the word [*Body*] all Spirits are really un-imbodied incorporeal things; they have not *such* Bodies of Flesh and Bone, or Organs that come under the Observation and notices of *sense*, as we have; but in another sense of the word, as *Body* is not taken restrainedly, for that only which is *sensible*, but more largely, for *any System of Matter* whatever, (whether so refined and subtle that it comes not within the compass of any external sense, or so gross, that it may be perceived by it;) so Spirits are Corporeal and Embodied: That is, they are material (as well as mental) Beings; minds indeed they are, but Minds *in Matter*, or Animals. In this, *Scaliger* consents with me, who in his Exercitations (*Exerc. 3. 7. §. 38.*) boldly says, *Spiritus Latinis & Graecis Omnibus, Philosophis, Medicis, Oratoribus, Corpus est: id est, Materia, & Forma.*

This will be Evident, if we consider (1.) That Absolute Purity, or Exemption

from *all* Matter, is the peculiar *Prerogative* of God, who only is Pure Light, without any mixture of Darknes; it is only *he*, the Central Being, (he that is absolute pure being) that is pure unmixed mind; all other beings but *he* must be impure, and have some ingredience of *matter* in their Composition; without *which*, as they would be pure Mind, so (being pure mind) they would be God. Secondly, Were all or any Spirits, except the infinite Almighty *Center* and Spring of All Absolutely pure, without any mixture of Matter; absolutely simple, without any Real Composition; there could be no *Distinction* among them, either in Respect of *Kinds*, or of *Individuals*; since *Alterity* (and where there is Distinction, there must be Alterity; *unus & alius, est alter & alter,*) cannot consist with *Absolute simplicity*; Composition is *Unity*, but simplicity is *Unicity*.

To be more Particular; were Spirits Absolutely Pure and Simple, without any Admission of Matter, there could be no Distinction among them in respect of *Kinds*. For what should difference them? if there were nothing in them but that, wherein they did all agree; as there would be nothing else but that, if all of them were pure and simple: Things that *Differ*

in something, and withal in something Agree, cannot be *Pure* or *Simple*: for all have something that is *Common*, in which they do agree, and all something *not* Common, in which they differ; it is plain, that each of them Consists of Thing, and Thing; and Things that Consist of Thing and Thing are Compounded; not Pure and Simple Things.

Again, were Spirits absolutely pure and simple, without any Concretion of Matter, there could be no distinction among them as to *Individuals*, as well as none in relation to Kinds. For since all Individuation (except only that of the Central pure mind) is *Numerication*, and all Numerication arises from Division, and Division has no place but in Matter, or in Things by means of matter. It is evident that there can be no distinction of Spirits as to Individuation, if there be no ingredience of matter in their making. Things are said to differ *in number*, (and so all Individuals differ, as well those of one and the same, as those of divers *Species*;) that however identified they be in other Respects, yet do so differ, that one is not the other; which cannot be without Division, of one from the other; nor Division be without matter: *Unum* is not only *Indivisum in se*, but *Divisum à Quolibet alio*. As for *Meta-*
M 4 *physical*

physical Matter and Metaphysical *Form*, or that distinction that some make of (substantial) *Power* and *Act*, they are but *meer Words*, without any signification (at least in my understanding.) if they are not reduced to *Matter* and *Mind*; which are the *only* Metaphysical Principles of Things, that are *Existent* and *Real*. In short, we may observe *in our selves*, (that Mind as I have noted before) is *Individuated by Matter*, since even sense is seeing in the *Eye*; Hearing in the *Ear*; Tasting in the *Tongue*, &c.

Another Consideration that Induces me to believe, that all Spirits are *Animals*, and vitally united unto Matter, of one sort or another, is, that the Apostle *Taul*, in a Discourse of his Concerning the Resurrection, 1 *Cor.* 15. doe's Speak of a *Spiritual* Body, in Contradiction to a *Natural*, as of the Body that All that do Arise in Christ shall be Cloathed withal; and Christ himself tells us, that All that shall Attain that glorious Resurrection, shall be *ισάγγελοι*, as Angels; to wit, in Respect of their *Spiritual* Bodies, that shall Invest them; and if Glorified Men shall be *as* Angels, Angels must be *as* Glorified Men; that is, they must have Bodies, tho' Glorious and *Spiritual* Bodies.

In fine, that Spirits are *Incorporeal* Beings in this sense, that they have not such Gross Elementary Bodies as we have, of Flesh and Blood and bones, doe's not Infer, that they are *so* in every sense of that word; especially if we Consider, that (as the Apostle assures us) there may be *Spiritual Bodies*; and there Appears not any Incoherence (in this,) that Spirits should have Spiritual Bodies. Besides, the Understanding it self, that, unto sense, is an *Inorganical* Immaterial Faculty, is not Absolutely *so*, but has the *Animal Spirits* for an Organ, since as these are Disposed and Textured, well or ill, even so the Exercises of that noble power, are either right, or depraved; and from the differences in *these* Spirits do come the differences of *Wits*, which are many. Ay, possibly those Animal Spirits (or something that resembles them) may compose the *Body* which accompanies the departing Soul: for that some kind of Body does, which in the *Greek* is called *ἀυρόειδες*, the Learned *Origen* has told us, *L. 2. Contra Celsum*: which *Body* he also says, is *that*, the Separated Soul is used to appear in; but as to this, I shall offer something hereafter.

By this Discourse it is Evident against Mr. *Hobbs*, and others of the Sadducean Opinion, that Spirits in their own Nature
are

are Real and *Subsistent Beings*, and not merely *Powers*, or *Operations* and *Actions*; tho' at the same time it must be acknowledged, that in the Language of the *Scripture*, such *Active* and *Directive Qualities* as are *Intelligible* only, and do not come directly within the Cognizance of the sense are called *Spirits*; thus we read of a Spirit of *Government* and of *Prophecy*, that was first upon *Moses*, and afterward imparted to the 70 Elders, *Numb.* 11. of a Spirit of *Wisdom*, *Deut.* 34. 9. of the Spirit of *Understanding*; the Spirit of *Counsel* and *Might*; the Spirit of *Knowledge*, and of the *Fear* of the Lord, *Isa.* 11. 2. Ay, that vexatious Distemper that afflicted *Saul*, and that seems to have been nothing else but melancholly, is called an Evil Spirit from the Lord, *1 Sam.* 16. 14. and in *Luke* 13. 11, 12. we read of a Spirit of *Infirmity*.

But tho' Spirit in the Holy Scriptures is often taken in the instanced sense; and that the *Name* of *Angel* is a *Name* of *Office*, rather than of *Nature*; yet it is certain, that Angels are represented in those Sacred Writings as *Real* subsisting Beings, all as real and subsisting as men themselves are, if the ascribing to *them* the like Affections, Offices, and Personal Operations, that Men

Men have, and do execute and exert,
can prove them so.

S E C T. II.

That there are Spirits, proved by General Tradition. Mr. Hobb's Answer to this Argument shewed to be but an Evasion, from the Evangelists Matthew, and Mark, &c.

AND this reminds me of the *Second* Point I have proposed to Discourse on, in relation to Spirits, and that is, their *Existence* or Being; wherein I shall endeavour to make it manifest, that really there are such Subsistent intellectual Beings, as are incorporated, but invisible, which commonly we call *Spirits*; so that the Names of Spirits, both of the Good ones, as *Raphael, Gabriel, &c.* And of the Evil ones, as *Belzebub, &c.* are Names of *Substances* or Persons, and not of Qualities only; ay, are *proper*, and not (as Mr. *Hobbs* tells us, the name of *Sathan* and *Devil* is) only *Appellative* Names.

The first Argument that I will use to Evidence that there are Spirits, shall be taken from the *General Tradition* of the World; it being received among all *Nations*, as well the Civilized, as the Barbarous,

rous, and among all *Philosophers* except the *Epicureans*, the Ancient and the Modern, and *some* Peripateticks; and to me it is very unintelligible, how such a Sentiment should obtain so generally, if it had not some foundation of Truth; for *who* should spread the Opinion to such an extent? and *what* should make it to take?

Mr. *Hobbs* himself acknowledges it a truth, that the belief of Spirits was very general all the World over; only he has a way (which is peculiar to him) of avoiding the Cogency and Force of the Argument, and therefore I will here consider what he says.

It is true, says he, 'that the *Heathens*,
'and all the Nations of the World have
'acknowledged that there be Spirits, which
'for the most part they hold to be incor-
'poreal, whereby it may be thought that
'a man by natural Reason may arrive
'without the Scriptures to the knowledge
'of this, that Spirits are, but the errone-
'ous Collection thereof by the Heathens,
'may proceed as I have said before, from
'the ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and
'Fantoms, and such other Apparitions.
'And from thence had the *Grecians* their
'number of Gods, their number of De-
'mons good, or bad, and for every Man
'his Genius, which is not the acknowledg-
ing

ing of this truth, that Spirits are, but a false Opinion concerning the force of Imagination.

Thus Mr. *Hobbs*, in his Treatise of Human Nature, *Ch. 11. S. 6.* wherein he plainly Affirms, that Spirits and Ghosts are meer Fantomes, or Effects of the Imagination: a conceit, in which he seems to have the Concurrence of *Seneca*, for this Philosopher *Epist. 24.* tells us as Mr. *Hobbs* doe's, *Nemo tam Puer est ut Cerberum timeat, & Tenebras, & LARVARUM habitum nudis ossibus Cohærentium.*

This *Notion* of Spirits, that Mr. *Hobbs* Insinuates, Reminds me of *Another*, that a Person whom I knew, and who was Reputed not of the Wisest, had of them; for being Asked what he thought a *Spirit* was, He Answered, that it was the *Shadow of Conscience*; and further Demanded, concerning a *Good Angel*, what that was; He Replied, a Good is the Shadow of a *Good Conscience*, and a *Devil* the Shadow of a *Bad* one, And Methinks he comes near to Mr. *Hobbs*. But without jesting.

I Find, that *Apparitions* of Spirits are stiled *Fantoms* [φαντάσματα] by two Evangelists, *Matthew* and *Mark*. For when the Disciples of our Lord saw him walking upon the Sea, and believed him to be a Spirit, the Former of those Evangelists tells

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us that they said *ὅτι φάντασμα ἐστὶ*, it is a Phantasm, or, as our Translators Render it, a *Sprite*, *Matt.* 14. 26. And the Latter has the same Expression, when speaking of the same Miracle, he says, they supposed him to be a *Phantasm*, *ἔδοξαν φάντασμα εἶναι*; or as in our English Version, they *supposed it had been a Sprite*. *Mark.* 6. 49. Whence it Evidently follows, against Mr. *Hobbs*, that Men that were not Ignorant of the power of *Fancy*, and of the Interest it had in the Apparitions of Spirits, yet believed their *Real* Existence. For the Disciples that believed our Lord to be a Spirit, *Appearing*, and therefore said he was a *Phantasm* (which it seems was the usual Expression at that time for such Apparitions,) did withal believe that a Spirit was a *Reality*, and of great Power. For upon the supposed Apparition, They are said, by *one* of the Evangelists, to be much *Disturbed*, *ἐταράχθησαν* says *Matthem*, Chap. 14. 26. They were *troubled* and cryed out for *Fear*; and the *other* says no less, for he says, *They cried out*, (*for They all saw him and were Troubled*,) *Mark.* 6. 49, 50. I would Demand of Mr. *Hobbs*, were he Alive, what can be Conceived to occasion so much Consternation, so much Affrightment, in the Disciples, at the Apparition of a Spirit,

if

if they did not take a Spirit to be something Real, tho' they called the Appearing of it a Phantome. Certainly, when they were so much Affrighted at it, They must be Apprehensive that it was a Thing of Great Power, that was come to hurt Them; for else, had They believed it to be a meer Effect of Their own Imagination, they would have been as *Unconcerned*, as Mr. *Hobbs* himself would be, at such an Appearance.

I Conclude then, that as Mr. *Hobbs* was not the First that called Spirits *Phantasmata*, or Fantomes, but that they were called so of Old, (and indeed the word *Speċtrum* in the Latin, and this of *Apparition* in the English Tongue, does answer very Properly to the word *Phantasma* in the Greek, a word too Adopted by the *Romans*, in the same sense;) so this Denomination was Given to them, not with Design to signify their *Nature* and *Essence*, (as Mr. *Hobbs* would have it,) but to set out the usual way of Their Appearing, of which more hereafter. This is Evident from the Younger *Pliny*, who in one of his Epistles, having put the Question, whether Apparitions or *Phantasmata* (for this is the word he uses) were Real and subsistent Things, he Affirms they are, and Instances in several Remarkable Stories

ries (as I shall shew hereafter) to Prove it.

So that this First Argument for the Real Existence of Spirits, taken from the General belief that all the World has of it (as Mr. *Hobbs* himself Acknowledges,) doe's hold Good and Conclusive, Notwithstanding all that this Philosopher has suggested against it. And indeed what he Proposes, is said so *Timorously* by him, [for he say's, *the Erroneous Collection thereof may* [but may] *Proceed &c*] and that so *Precariously*, (being only an Assertion, without any Proof), that I need not have Given myself the trouble of saying so much in Answer to it, but that in Things of this Nature, some have so very strong a Byass, both of *Credulity* on one hand, and *Incredulity* on the other, that if any Room were left for Cavil, they would be sure to make it.

S U B. I.

Another Argument to Prove Spirits. Of the Conversion of an Indian Raja. A Remarkable Story of Witchcraft, out of Mr. Gage's Survey.

AND Thus much for the First Argument, I now proceed to the second. And the second Argument that I will use to Evidence that there are Spirits, shall be taken from *Operations* we are certain of, which cannot be Accounted for but by supposing such Agents.

I have Read in *Purchas*, that a certain *Indian*, a Great *Raja*, and Greater *Atheist*, was brought to a Confession, as well as Conviction of his Folly, by a strange Providence. The Relation in that Author, goes in these Terms. "A Great *Raja* a
 " Gentile, a Notorious *Atheist*, and Con-
 " temner of all Deity, Glorifying to pro-
 " fess he knew no other *God* than the
 " *King*, nor believing nor fearing none:
 " sitting Dallying with his Women, one
 " of them plucked a *Hair* from his Breast,
 " which being fast Rooted, Plucked off a
 " little of the Skin, that Blood appear-
 " ed; this small Skar Festred and Gari-
 " gred Incurably, so that in few days
 N " he

“ he Despaired of Life, and being Ac-
 “ companied with all his Friends and
 “ Divers Courtiers he brake out into these
 “ Excellent words: Which of you would
 “ not have Thought that I being a Man of
 “ War should have died by the Stroak of
 “ a Sword, Spear, or Bow? But now
 “ I am enforced to confess the Power of
 “ that *Great God*, whom I have so long
 “ Despised, that he needs no other *Lance*
 “ than a little Hair to kill so *Blasphemous*
 “ a wretch and Contemner of his Majesty,
 “ as I have been. *Part. 1. l. 4. f. 600.*
 Thus God, is known in the World, by
 the *Judgments* which he Executes.

And as God is known by his Judg-
 ments, so may other Spirits, by some *E-*
vents that happen in the World, when
 they are so Extraordinary, and out of
 common course, that they cannot be Ascri-
 bed but to such Causes. I have here a very
 Large Field, but my Business being not
 to handle this Subject as a Common Place,
 but only to Touch it by way of Argu-
 ment, I shall content my self with the
 General Mention of *Prodigies*, that all
 History, Ancient and Modern, abounds
 withal; and the strange Performances of
Witches and *Wizards*; of which Last I
 will give an *Instance* or two, that carry
 great Credibility, and yet are Absolutely

Unaccount-

Unaccountable, if we do not Admit of Spirits, and in Truth not very Easy to be Conceived if we do. But the Matter of *Fact*, being Related by an Author not in every Bodies hand, I will lay it out at large in all its Circumstances, as I Find them set down by him, that so Ingenious Men, who have the Curiosity to Inquire into Things of this Nature, may have the surer Grounds to go upon, in making their Judgment.

In *Pinola* (say's Mr. *Gage* in his new Survey of the *West-Indies*, C. 20.) there were some who were much given to Witchcraft, and by the Power of the Devil did Act strange things; amongst the Rest there was one Old Woman Named *Martha de Carillo*, who had been by some of the Town formerly Accused for Bewitching many; but the *Spanish* Justices quitted her, finding no sure Evidence against her; with this she grew worse and worse, and did much Harm; when I was there, two or three died, *withering away*, Declaring at their Death that this *Carillo* had Killed them, and that they *saw her* often about their Beds, threatning them with a Frowning and Angry Look. The *Indians* for fear of her durst not complain against her, nor meddle with her; whereupon I sent word unto *Don Juan de Guzman*

the Lord of that Town, that if he took not order with her, she would destroy his Town. He Hearing of it, got for me a Commission from the Bishop and another Officer of the Inquisition to make Diligent and Private Inquiry after her Life and Actions, which I did, and found among the *Indians* many and Grievous Complaints against her, most of the Town Affirming that certainly she was a Notorious Witch, and that before her former Accusation she was wont withersoever she went about the Town to go with a *Duck* Following her, which when she came to the Church would stay at the door till she came out again, and then would Return home with her, which Duck they Imagined was her Beloved Devil and Familiar Spirit, for that they had often set Dogs at her and they would not meddle with her, but rather run away from her. This Duck never Appeared more with her, *since* she was formerly Accused before the Justice, which was thought to be her policy, that she might be no more suspected thereby. This Old Woman was a Widow, and of the *Poorest* of the Town in outward shew, and yet she had always store of *Money*, which none could tell which way she might come by it. Whilst I was thus Taking Privy Information

against

against her (it being the Time of *Lent*, when all the Town came to Confession) she among the Rest came to the Church to *Confess* her sins, and brought me the best Present and Offering of all the Town; for whereas a Riall is Common, she brought me four, and besides, a *Turkey*, *Eggs*, *Fish*, and a little Bottle of *Honey*. She thought thereby to get with me a better Opinion than I had of her from the whole Town. I Accepted of her Great Offering, and heard her Confession, which was of nothing but Trifles, which could scarce be Judged sinful Actions. I Examined her very close of what was the Common Judgment of all the *Indians*, and especially of those who dying, had declared to my self *at their Death* that She had Bewitched them, and before their Sicknes had *Threatned* them, and in their Sicknes *Appeared* Threatning them with Death about their beds, none but they themselves seeing her; to which she Replied Weeping that she was Wronged. I Asked her, *how* she being a Poor Widow without any Sons to help her, without any means of Livelyhood, had so much Money, as to give me more than the Richest of the Town; *how* She came by that Fish, Turkey, and Honey, having none of this of her own about her House? to which she *Replied*,

that God Loved her and gave her all these Things, and that with her Money she Bought the rest. I *Asked* her of *whom*? She *Answered* that out of the Town she had them. I Persuaded her to much Repentance, and to forsake the Devil and all Fellowship with him; but her Words and Answers were of a Saintly and Holy Woman; and she earnestly desired me to give her the *Communion* with the Rest that were to Receive the next day. Which I told her I durst not do, using Christ's Words, Give not the Childrens bread unto dogs, nor cast your Pearls unto Swine; and it would be a great Scandal to give the Communion unto her, who was suspected generally, and had been Accused for a *Witch*. This she took very ill, telling me that she had many Years *Received* the Communion, and now in her Old Age it Grieved her to be Deprived of it, her tears were many, yet I could not be moved with them, but Resolutely denied her the Communion, and so Dismissed her. At Noon when I had done my work in the Church, I bad my Servants go to gather up the Offerings, and gave order to have the *Fish* Dressed for my Dinner which she had brought, but no sooner was it carried into the Kitchen, when the Cook looking on it found it *full of Maggots*, and stinking; so that

that I was forced to hurl it away; with that I began to suspect my Old Witch, and went to look on her *Honey*, and Pouring it out into a Dish, I found it full of *Worms*; her *Eggs* I could not know from others, there being near a Hundred Offered that day, but after as I used them, we found some *Rotten*, some with *dead Chickens* in them; the next Morning the *Turkey* was found dead; As for her four *Rials*, I could not Perceive whether she had Bewitched them out of my Pocket, for that I had put them with many other, which that day had been given me, yet as far as I could I called to Memory *who* and *what* had been Given me, and in my Judgment and Reckoning I verily thought that I missed *four* Rials; At Night when my Servants the *Indians* were gone to Bed, I sat up late in my Chamber betaking myself to my Books and Study, for I was the next Morning to make an Exhortation to those that Received the Communion. After I had Studied a while, it being between Ten and Eleven of the Clock; on a sudden the *Chief door* in the Hall (where in a Lower Room was my Chamber, and the Servants, and *three other* doors) flew open, and I heard one *come in*, and for a while *walk about*; then was *Another* door opened which went into a Little Room,

where my Saddles were Laid; with this I thought it might be the Black-More *Miguel Dalva*, who would often come late to my House to Lodge there, Especially since my fear of *Montenegro*, and I Conjectured that he was Laying up his Saddle, I called unto him by his Name two or three times, from within my Chamber, but no Answer was made, but suddenly *Another door* that went out to a Garden flew also open, wherewith I began within to *fear*, my joynts Trembled, my Hair stood up, I would have called out to the Servants, and my Voice was as it were stopped with the sudden Affrightment; I began to think of the Witch, and put my trust in God against her, and Encouraged my self and Voice, calling out to the Servants, and knocking with a Cane at my door within that they might hear me, for I durst not open it and go out; with the Noise that I made the Servants Awaked, and came out to my Chamber door; then I opened it, and asked them if they had not heard some Body in the Hall, and all the doors opened, they said they were Asleep, and heard nothing, only one *Boy* said he *heard all*, and Related unto me the *same* that I had heard; I took my Candle then in my hand and went out with them into the Hall to view the *doors*, and I found them

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all *shut*, as the Servants said they had left them. Then I Perceived that the *Witch* would have Affrighted me, but had no power to do me any harm ; I made two of the Servants lie in my Chamber, and went to bed ; in the morning early I sent for my *Fiscal* the Clerk of the Church, and told him what had happen'd that Night, he smiled upon me, and told me it was the Widdow *Carillo*, who had often played such Tricks in the Town with those that had offended her, and therefore he had the night before come unto me from her, desiring me to give her the Communion, lest she should do me some hurt, which I denied unto him, as I had done to her self ; the Clerk bad me be of good cheer, for he knew she had no power over me to do me any hurt. After the Communion that day, some of the Chief *Indians* came unto me, and told me that Old *Carillo* had *Boasted* that she would play me *some trick* or other, because I would not give her the Communion. But I, to rid the Town of such a Limb of Satan, sent her to *Guatemala*, with all the Evidences and Witnesses which I had found against her, unto the President and Bishop, who commanded her to be put in Prison, where she died within two months.

Many more *Indians* there were in that Town, who were said in my time to do very *strange* things. One called *John Gonzalez*, was reported to *Change* himself into the shape of a Lion, and in that shape was one day shot in the nose by a poor harmless *Spaniard*, who chiefly got his living by going about the Woods and Mountains, and shooting at Wild Deer, and other Beasts to make Mony of them. He espied one day a *Lion*, and having no other aim at him but his Snout behind a Tree, he shot at him, the *Lion* ran away; the same day this *Gonzalez* was taken sick; I was sent for to hear his Confession, I saw his face and nose all bruised, and asked *how* it came? he told me then that he had fallen from a Tree, and almost killed himself, yet afterwards he accused the poor *Spaniard* for shooting at him; the business was examined by a *Spanish* Justice, my Evidence was taken for what *Gonzalez* told me of his fall from a Tree; the *Spaniard* was put to his Oath, who swore that he shot at a Lion in a Thick Wood, where an *Indian* could scarce be thought to have any business; the Tree was found out in the Wood, whereat the shot had been made, and was still marked with the shot and Bullet; which *Gonzalez* confessed was to be the place; and was Examined how
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he neither fell nor was seen by the *Spaniard*, when he came to seek for the Lion, thinking he had killed him; to which he answered, that he ran away lest the *Spaniard* should kill him indeed. But his Answers seemed frivolous, the *Spaniards* integrity being known, and the great suspicion that was in the Town, of *Gonzalez* his dealing with the Devil, cleared the *Spaniard* from what was laid against him.

But this was nothing to what after happened to one *John Gomez*, the chiefest Indian of that Town of near fourscore years of Age, the Head and Ruler of the Princallest Tribe among the *Indians*, whose Advice and Counsel was taken and preferred before all the rest; who seemed to be a very *Godly* Indian, and very seldom missed Morning and Evening Prayers in the Church, and had bestowed great Riches there. This *Indian* very suddenly was taken sick (I being then in my other Town of *Mixco*) the *Mayordomos* or Stewards of the Sodality of the Virgin, fearing that he might die without Confession, and they be chid for their negligence, at Midnight called me up at *Mixco*, desiring me to go presently and help *John Gomez* to die, whom also they said desired much to see me, and to receive some comfort from me.

me. I judging it a work of Charity, although the time of the night were unseasonable, and the great Rain at the present might have stopped my Charity, yet I would not be hindred by either of them, and so set forth to ride nine Miles both in the Dark, and Wet. When I came to *Pinola*, being thorow wet to the skin, I went immediately to the House of Old Sick *Gomez*, who lay with his face all muffled up, thanked me for my pains and care I had for his Soul, he desired to confess, and by his Confession and Weeping Evidenced nothing but a Godly Life, and a willing desire to die, and to be with Christ, I comforted him, and prepared him for Death, and before I departed, asked him how he felt himself; he answered that his Sickness was nothing but Old Age, and Weakness; with this I went to my House, changed my self, and lay down a while to rest, when suddenly I was called up again to give *Gomez* the Extream Unction, which the *Indians* (as they have been ignorantly taught) will not omit to receive before they die. As I Anointed him in his Nose, his Lips, his Eyes, his Hands and his Feet, I perceived that he was swelled, and black and blew, but made nothing of it, judging it to proceed from the sickness of his Body; I went home

home again, being now break of the day, when after I had taken a small nap, some *Indians* came to my door to buy Candles to offer up for *John Gomez* his Soul, whom they told me was departed, and was that day to be Buried very solemnly at Mafs. I arose with drousie Eyes after so unquiet a nights rest; and walked to the Church, where I saw the Grave was preparing. I met with two or three *Spaniards* who lived near the Town, and were come to Mafs that Morning, who went in with me to my Chamber, and with them I fell into Discourse about *John Gomez*, telling them what comfort I had received at his Death, whom I judged to have lived very Holy, and doubted not of his Salvation, and that the Town would much want him, for that he was their Chief Guide, and Leader, Ruling them with good Advice and Counsel. At this time the *Spaniards* smiled one at another, and told me I was much deceived by all the *Indians*, but especially by the deceased *Gomez*, if I judged him to have been a Saint, and Holy Man. I told them, that they, as Enemies to the *Indians*, judged still uncharitably of them; but that I who knew very well their Consciences, could judge better of them than they. One then Replied, that it seemed I little knew the truth of *John Gomez*

Gomez his death by the Confession which he made unto me, and that I seemed to be ignorant of the stir which was made in the Town concerning his Death. This seemed so strange unto me, that I desired them to inform me of the Truth. Then they told me that the report went, that *John Gomez* was the Chief *Wizard* of all the *Wizards* and *Witches* in the Town, and that commonly he was wont to be changed into the shape of a *Lion*, and so to walk about the Mountains. That he was ever a deadly Enemy to one *Sebastian Lopez* an Ancient *Indian*, and head of another Tribe; and that both of them two days before had met in the Mountain. *Gomez* in the shape of a *Lion*, and *Lopez* in the shape of a *Tyger*; and that they fought most cruelly, till *Gomez* (who was the older and weaker) was tired, much bit and bruised, and died of it. And farther, that I might be assured of this truth, they told me that *Lopez* was in Prison for it, and the two Tribes striving about it, and that the Tribe and Kindred of *Gomez* demanded from *Lopez* and his Tribe and Kindred satisfaction, and a great Sum of Money, or else did threaten to make the Case known unto the Spanish Power and Authority, which yet they were unwilling to do, if they could agree and smother it up among them-

themselves, that they might not bring an aspersiō upon their whole Town. This seemed very strange unto me, and I could not resolve what to believe, and thought I would never more believe an *Indian*, if I found *John Gomez* to have so much Dissembled and Deceived me. I took my leave of the *Spaniards*, and went my self to the Prison, where I found *Lopez* with Fetters. I called one of the Officers of the Town, who was *Alguazil Major*, and my great Friend, unto my House, and privately examined him why *Lopez* was kept so close Prisoner? he was loath to tell me, fearing the rest of the *Indians*, and hoping the business would be taken up and agreed by the two Tribes, and not noised about the Country, which at that instant the two Alcades and Regidores, Majors, and Jurates, with the Chief of both Tribes were sitting about in the Town-House all that Morning. But I seeing the Officer so timorous, was more desirous to know something, and pressed more upon him for the Truth, giving him an inkling of what I had heard from the *Spaniards* before. To which he answered, that if they could agree amongst themselves, they feared no ill report from the *Spaniards* against their Town; I told him I must know what they were agreeing upon amongst them-

them-

themselves so closely in the Town-House. He told me, if I would promise to say nothing of him (for he feared the whole Town if they should know he had revealed any thing unto me) he would tell me the Truth. With this I comforted him, and gave him a Cup of Wine, and encouraged him, warranting him that no harm should come unto him for what he told me. Then he related the business unto me as the *Spaniards* had done, and told me that he thought the Tribes amongst themselves would not agree; for that some of *Gomez* his Friends hated *Lopez*, and all such as were so Familiar with the Devil, and cared not if *Gomez* his dissembling Life were laid open to the World; but others he said, who were as bad as *Lopez*, and *Gomez*, would have kept it close, lest they, and all the Witches and Wizards in the Town should be discovered. This struck me to the very heart, to think that I should live amongst such People, whom I saw were spending all they could get by their Work and Labour upon the Church, Saints, and in Offerings, and yet were so privy to the Counsels of Satan; it grieved me that the word I preached unto them did no more good; and I resolved from that time forward to spend most of my indeavours against Satans subtilty, and

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to shew them more than I had done, the great danger of their Souls who had made any Compact with the Devil, that I might make them abandon and abjure his Works, and close with Christ by Faith. I dismissed the *Indian*, and went to the Church to see if the People were come to Mass; I found there no body but only two who were making *Gomez* his Grave. I went back to my Chamber, troubled much within my self, whether I should allow him a Christian Burial, who had lived and died so wickedly, as I had been informed. Yet I thought I was not bound to believe one *Indian* against him, nor the *Spaniards*, whom I supposed spoke but by hear-say. Whilst I was thus musing, there came unto me at least twenty of the Chiefest of the Town, with the two Majors, Jurates, and all the Officers of Justice, who desired me to forbear that day the Burying of *John Gomez*, for that they had resolved to call a Crown Officer to view his Corps, and examine his death, lest they should all be troubled for him, and he be again unburied. I made as if I knew nothing, but inquired of them the reason; then they related all unto me, and told me how there were Witnesses in the Town, who saw a *Lyon* and a *Tyger* Fighting, and presently lost the sight of

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the Beasts, and *saw John Gomez, and Sebastian Lopez,* much about the same time parting one from another, and that immediately *John Gomez* came home bruised to his Bed, from whence he never rose more, and that he declared upon his Death-Bed unto some of his Friends that *Sebastian Lopez* had killed him; whereupon they had him in safe Custody. Farther they told me, that though they had never known so much wickedness of these two Chief Heads of their Town whom they had much respected and followed; yet now upon this occasion, from the one Tribe and the other they were certainly informed that both of them did constantly deal with the Devil, which would be a great aspersion upon their Town, but they for their parts abjured all such wicked ways, and prayed me not to conceive the worse of all for a few, whom they were resolved to persecute, and not suffer to live amongst them. I told them I much liked their good zeal, and encouraged them as good Christians to endeavour the rooting out of Satan from their Town, and they did very well in giving notice to *Guatemala*, to the *Spanish* Power of this Accident; and that if they had concealed it, they might all have been punished as guilty of *Gomez* his death, and Agents with Satan, and his Instruments.

I assured them I had no ill conceit of them, but rather judged well of them for what they agreed to do. The Crown Officer was sent for, who came that night and searched *Gomez* his Body; I was present with him, and found it all *bruised*, scratched, and in many places *Bitten* and sore wounded. Many Evidences and suspicions were brought in against *Lopez* by the *Indians* of the Town, especially by *Gomez*, his Friends, whereupon he was carryed away to *Guatemala*, and there again was Tryed by the same Witnesses, and not much Denying the Fact himself, was there *Hanged*. And *Gomez*, though his Grave was opened in the Church, he was not Buried in it, but in another made Ready for him in a Ditch. So far in *Gage*.

There are multitudes of *Instances* in many Authors, of a Nature all as strange, and as surprizing, as the former; and *tho'* perhaps *most* of the Relations handed about with great Confidence, do, upon impartial Examination, prove either *Impostures* of Malicious, or *Mistakes* of Ignorant and Superstitious Persons; *yet some* come so well Attested, that it were to bid defiance to all Human Testimony to refuse them belief. Among Forreign Writers I will mention only the Learned & Judicious *Bodin* in his *Damonomania*, and

the Curious *Gaspar Schottus* in his *Physica Curiosa*, Part 1. C. 16. § 3. and C. 17. § 2. Among our own, the Eloquent Mr. *Glanvil*, in his *Sadducismus Triumphatus*; and Mr. *Baxter* (as Sagacious and Inquisitive a person as any) his *Historical Discourse* of Apparitions and Witches, who all abound with very Prodigious, but Credible Relations. To all which I might add the Confessions I have in Manuscript, (all Original Papers, and well vouched,) of a great number of Witches, (some of which were Executed) that were taken by a *Justice of Peace* in *Cornwall* above thirty Years agoe: In which there are so many Rare and Curious Passages, that I find my self under great Temptation of Promising to Annex them to the Second Part of this Discourse, when I shall have Occasion to say more upon the present Subject, under the Head of Supernatural Power. And Thus much for the *Second* Argument, which leads me to the *Third*.

S U B S. II.

The Third Argument from Supernatural Advertisements. An Instance out of Simocatto. Another, of a strange Omen out of Sir W. Rawleigh. Of the Corps-Candles in Wales, &c.

THE Third Argument to prove the Real Being of Spirits, shall be taken from the strange *Advertisements* of Events, and as strange *Premonitions*, that are sometimes Given, which cannot be Resolved but upon that *Hypothesis*. I will but mention the *Oracles* of Old; the many Admonishing and Predictive *Dreams*, that some Persons, in all Ages, have been Favoured with, (of which there is a Large Collection by *Strozso Cicogna* in his *Magia Omnisaria*, Part 1. l. 2. C. 4. as also in *Cicero*, in his First Book of Divination;) and in fine, the Prodigious *Omens* that do often occur.

Nor will I insist on what I find in Mr. *Stow* and other Historians, that *William*, Surnamed the Conquerour, though he died at *Roan* in *Normandy*, sooner than was Expected, yet his Death was known at *Rome* the same day he Died. But I lay more stress upon an *Advertisement* I find in

Theophylact Simocatta, concerning the Murther of the Emperour *Mauritius*, because the Relation of it being Particular and Circumstantial, carries Greater Evidence than the Former, and will endure the Test. There happened, says the *Historian*, on the very day in which *Mauritius* [the Emepror] was Murdred, a thing at *Alexandria* worthy to be Recorded. A certain Writing-Master or Scrivener (for so I do Adventure to interpret the word *Calligraphus*) being (that day) at a Merchants House at a kind of Gossips Feast, where he was obliged to stay till the Fourth Watch of the Night ; as he was going homeward, being come to the *Tycham*, a noted part of the City, (about midnight) he saw some of the chiefest *Statues* that stood there removing from off their Bases, and at the same time heard a *Voice* that seemed to come from the same Statues, which called on him aloud, by Name, and withal, very shrilly, but briefly, Related the Accident that that day had befallen *Mauritius*. In the morning the Writing-Master goes to the Palace to Discover what had happened to him, which coming to the Ear of *Peter* the Prefect of *Ægypt* then residing there (who was nearly Related to *Simocatta*) he diligently inquires concerning the whole Affair, and

and after he had fully informed himself thereof, enjoyns the Relater to Secrecy, and then setting down, in his Note Book, the whole Relation, he waits the Event. Of this not long after, he was assured by an Express, which on the Ninth day brought him News of the Emperours *Death*, and of the Time of it; and then he Declared Publickly, how that this Accident had been *Foretold* by the Statues, or rather by the Demons, in the manner above Related, and Vouched the Writing-Master as the Author. This is the sum of the Story, as *Simocatta* has Related it, (*Hist. Mauritian. l. 8. Ch. 13.*) A Story that is not told at Random, or by an Obscure Person, or by a Person Remote from the Scene, or from the time it was Acted on; but a Story told by a Grave and Understanding Historian, who lived at the same time; was well acquainted with the Persons concerned; and who made a Figure in the Government; so that he had all the Advantages that could be desired to render him certain of the truth of it. *Lucilius* in *Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deor.* tells us a story of the like Nature, *viz.* That the Elder *P. Vatienus* coming by night to *Rome*, was Advertized by the *Tyndarida* in the shape of two young men, on White Horses, that that day *Perses* was over-

come by the Roman Army, and taken Prisoner; This he Reports to the Senate, by whom he was committed to Prison for spreading False News; but afterwards, when it Appeared by the Consuls Letters, that the Advertisement was true, he was both Released and Rewarded.

And as for *Omens*, than which nothing is more Ridiculous to the *Epicureans*, and all those that deny the Reality of Spirits, (so says *Cicero de Nat. Deor.* l. 2. *Nihil tam Ierridet Epicurus quam Prædictionem rerum futurarum*;) I will Instance in one that leaves no Room for any Evasion, since I take it from a Person who was very Confident of the Truth of it, and yet was a Person as little subject to Superstition, or to Fancy, as any Epicurean whatever. Sir *Walter Rawleigh* (for it is he I mean) in his History of the World (*B. 4. C. 2. S. 7.*) says, ' The strangest thing that I have Read of
' in this kind [*speaking of Omens*] being
' certainly true, was, that the Night be-
' fore the Battle at *Novara*, All, [*not one,*
' or some, which might be Chance, but All,]
' the Doggs which Followed the *French*
' Army Ran from them to the *Switzers*,
' Leaping and Fawning upon them, as if
' they had been Bred and Fed by them
' all their Lives. And in the Morning
' Following, *Trivulzi* and *Tremovilli* Gene-
' rals

‘ralls for *Lewis* the 12th were by these
 ‘Imperial *Switzers* utterly Broken and
 ‘put to Ruine.

But to Proceed, What will an *Epicu-
 rean*, or meer *Somatist*, say to the *Corps-
 Candles*, or Dead Mens Lights in *Wales*?
 if all be true that is Reported of them in
 Mr. *B*’s. Historical Discourse, *Ch. 6.* And
 Methinks his Vouchers are Good. I will
 Relate the Account they give in their own
 Terms; The First is one Mr. *Lewis*, who
 in his First Letter to Mr. *B.* (*October 20.*
1656.) speaking of the Appearance of those
 Lights which are called *Dead-Mens Candles*,
 before Mortality, He says, ‘This is so or-
 ‘dinary in most of our Counties [of
 ‘*Wales*] that I never scarce heard of any
 ‘fort young or old, but this is seen be-
 ‘fore Death, and often observed to part
 ‘from the very Bodies of the Persons, all
 ‘along the way to the Place of Burial, and
 ‘Infallibly Death will Ensue. In his *Third*
 ‘Letter Dated *Febr. 14. 1656.* He says,
 ‘as for the *Candles*, all the Parts I know
 ‘of *Wales*, as our Neighbouring Counties
 ‘(as I hear) have Experience of them, I
 ‘scarce know any Gentleman, or Minister
 ‘of any standing, but hath seen them;
 ‘and a Neighbour of mine, will shortly
 ‘be at *Worcester* Abiding (who hath seen
 ‘them often, and I will Direct some to
 ‘Acquaint

‘ Acquaint you, and upon Oath, if need
 ‘ be,) a very Credible Aged Person; for
 ‘ my Part, I never saw the Candles;
 ‘ but those of my House have, and on a
 ‘ Time some two years Past, it was told
 ‘ me by them, that Two Candles were
 ‘ seen, one Little, and a Great one, Pas-
 ‘ sing the Church way, under my House,
 ‘ my Wife was then great with Child, and
 ‘ near her time, and she Feared of it, and
 ‘ it Begat some fear in us about her, but
 ‘ just about a Week after, her self first
 ‘ came to me (as something joyed that the
 ‘ Fear might be over) and said (as true it
 ‘ was) an Old Man, and a Child of the
 ‘ Neighbourhood Passed that same way to
 ‘ be Buried. This she and I can Depose.

Thus that Gentleman; who at that
 time (as Mr. *B.* files him) was a Learned
 Justice of Peace, and seems by his Letters
 to have been a very Cautious Circumspect
 Person, and a Person of Great Veracity,
 and therefore a Person who cannot be Im-
 agined to go about to Deceive, or that
 could be Deceived himself in a matter Re-
 presented to him (as this was) as of Gene-
 ral observation. For it was Easie for him
 to know if the thing were of so General
 Observation or Note, (since it was but
 to Ask People,) and if it was, it could not
 be False, as having the Testimony of com-
 mon

mon Knowledge and Experience to Avow it ; and if it was not, it would be Temerity in him to believe it true ; since it wanted even that Evidence that was Pretended to ground it ; but it seems the Gentleman Inquired , and found the thing Confirmed (as he says) by General Experience, and I believe him too Honest to say it, if it had not been so. Besides, what he mentions in Relation to his Wife and Family, if well Considered, Adds no little strength to the whole Story. And in Fine, he brings one Mr. *Davis* for his Voucher.

This Mr. *Davis* in a Letter that he wrote to Mr. *B.* at the Request of Mr. *Lewis*; is more particular and Full than that Gentleman, in Reference to those Lights, and therefore (the Matter being Rare and Curious, and well Deserving to be made a subject of Inquiry by the Noblest Wits) I will Transcribe it at Large. ‘ I am to give you, says he, the Best Satisfaction I can touching these *Fiery Apparitions*, which do as it were mark out the way for CorpSES to their *Κοιμητήρια*, and that sometimes before the *parties* themselves fall Sick, and sometimes in their Sickness. Of These I could never hear in *England*, they are Common in these Three Counties, *Cardigan, Caermarthen, and Pembroke*, and

‘ and as I hear, in some other Parts of *Wales*.

‘ These *φαντάσματα* in our Language
 ‘ we call *Cankwyllau Cyrth* (*i. e.*) Corps-
 ‘ Candles; and *Candles* we call them, not
 ‘ that we do see any thing else besides
 ‘ the Light, but because that Light doth
 ‘ as much Resemble a Material Can-
 ‘ dle Light, as Eggs do Eggs, saving that
 ‘ in their journey, these Candles be
 ‘ *modò Apparentes*, *modò Disparentes*, Ef-
 ‘ pecially, when one comes near them;
 ‘ and if one come on the way against them,
 ‘ unto him they vanish; but presently ap-
 ‘ pear behind him, and hold on their
 ‘ Course. If it be a *little* Candle, Pale or
 ‘ Blewish, then follows the Corps either
 ‘ of an *Abortive*, or some *Infant*, if a *Big*
 ‘ one, then the Corps of some one *come to*
 ‘ *Age*; if there be seen *two*, or three, or
 ‘ more, some Big, some Small together,
 ‘ then so many, and such Corps together;
 ‘ if two Candles come from Divers Places,
 ‘ and be seen to meet, the Corpses will
 ‘ the like, if any of these Candles be
 ‘ seen to turn sometimes a little out
 ‘ of the way, or Path that Leadeth unto
 ‘ the Church, the following Corps will be
 ‘ found to turn in that very Place, for the
 ‘ Avoiding of some Dirty Lane, or Plash, &c.
 ‘ Now let us fall to Evidence, being about
 ‘ the Age of Fifteen, Dwelling at *Lanylar*,

‘ late

' late at Night, some Neighbours saw one
 ' of these Candles Hovering up and down
 ' along the River Bank until they were
 ' weary in Beholding, at last they left it
 ' so, and went to Bed, a few Weeks after
 ' came a Proper Damsel from *Montgomery*
 ' *Shire*, to see her Friends, who Dwelt
 ' on the other side of that River *Istmyth*,
 ' and thought to Ford the River at that
 ' very Place where the Light was seen ;
 ' but being Dissuaded by some Lookers on,
 ' (some its most like of those that saw the
 ' Light) to Adventure on the Water, which
 ' was High by Reason of a Flood; she walked
 ' up and down along the River Bank, even
 ' where, and even as the foresaid Candle
 ' did, waiting for the Falling of the Water,
 ' which at last she took, but too soon for
 ' her, for she was Drown'd therein

' Of Late, my Sexton's Wife, an Aged
 ' Understanding Woman, saw from her
 ' Bed, a little Blewish Candle upon her
 ' Tables end, within two or three days
 ' after, comes a Fellow in, Enquiring for
 ' her Husband, and taking something
 ' from under his Cloak, claps it down
 ' directly upon the Tables end, where she
 ' had seen the Candle, and what was it
 ' but a Dead born Child: Another time
 ' the same Woman, saw such Another
 ' Candle upon the other end of the self
 ' same

‘ same Table, within few days after, a
 ‘ Weak Child, by my self newly Christ-
 ‘ ned, was Brought into the Sextons House,
 ‘ where presently he died ; and when the
 ‘ Sextons Wife, who was then Abroad,
 ‘ came home , she found the Woman
 ‘ Shrouding of the Child, on that other
 ‘ end of the Table, where she had seen the
 ‘ Candle. On a Time my self and a
 ‘ Kinsman coming from our School in
 ‘ *England*, and being three or four Hours
 ‘ Benighted, ere we could reach home,
 ‘ were first of all Saluted by such a *Light*
 ‘ or Candle, which coming from a House,
 ‘ which we well knew, held his Course
 ‘ (but not Directly) the High-way to
 ‘ Church ; shortly after the Eldest Son in
 ‘ that House Deceased, and steered the
 ‘ same Course. My self and my Wife in an
 ‘ Evening, saw such a Light, or Candle,
 ‘ coming to the Church, from her Mid-
 ‘ wifes House, and within a Month, she
 ‘ her self did follow ; at which time my
 ‘ Wife did tell me a story of her own Mo-
 ‘ ther, Mrs. *Catharine Wyat*, an Eminent
 ‘ Woman in the Town of *Tenby*, that in
 ‘ an Evening being in her Bed-Chamber,
 ‘ she saw two little Lights just upon her
 ‘ belly, which she Assayed to strike off with
 ‘ her hand, but could not ; within a while
 ‘ they vanished of themselves. Not long
 ‘ after,

' after, she was Delivered of two Dead-
 ' born Children : Long sithence there hap-
 ' pened the like in my own House; but
 ' to a Neighbours Wife, whom my Wife
 ' did sometimes call for, to do some work
 ' or other; and (as I Credibly heard
 ' within these three days) to some Good
 ' Gentlewoman also in this very Parish ;
 ' where also not long since, a Neighbours
 ' Wife of mine, being great with Child,
 ' and coming in at her own door, met
 ' two Candles, a Little, and a Big one,
 ' and within a little after, falling in La-
 ' bour, she and her Child both Dyed.
 ' Some Thirty four, or Thirty five years
 ' bygone, one *Jane Wyat* my Wives Sister ;
 ' being Nurse to Baronet *Rudds* three
 ' Eldest Children, and (the Lady Mistrefs
 ' being Deceased) the Lady Controuler of
 ' that House going late into a Chamber
 ' where the Maid Servants Lay, saw there
 ' no less than five of these Lights together.
 ' It Happened a while after, the Chamber
 ' being newly Plaistred, and a Great
 ' Grate of Coal-fire therein, Kindled to
 ' Hasten the Drying up of the Plaistring ;
 ' that five of the Maid-Servants went
 ' there to Bed, as they were wont ; but
 ' (as it fell out) too soon, for in the Morn-
 ' ing they were all Dead, being Suffocated
 ' (I conceive) in their Sleep with the
 ' Steam

steam of the New Temper'd Lime, and Coal. This was at *Llangathen* in *Gaermarthenshire*.

‘Some Thirty three or Thirty four
 ‘years ago, upon a *Tuesday* coming towards
 home from *Cardigan*, where I had been
 enjoyned to Preach the Session-Sermon: *In-*
cipiente adhuc Crepusculo, and as light as
 Noon, and having as yet, Nine long Miles
 ‘to Ride, there seemed twice or thrice
 ‘from behind me, on my right side, and
 ‘between my Shoulder and my Hat, to
 ‘fly a little whitish thing about the big-
 ‘ness of a Walnut, and that *per Intervalla*,
 ‘once in seventy or eighty pace: at first I
 ‘took no notice of it, thinking it had been
 ‘but the giimping of my little Ruff, for
 ‘such then I wore, by degrees it waxed
 ‘reddish, and as the night drew on, Red-
 ‘der and redder, at last not *Ignis Fatuus*,
 ‘(for that I partly knew) but *Purus putus*
 ‘*Ignis*, both for Light and Colour. At
 ‘length I turned my Horse twice or thrice
 ‘to see from whence it came, and whether
 ‘it would flash into my face, then nothing
 ‘I could see; but when I turned home-
 ‘wards it flashed as before, until I came
 ‘to a Village called *Llanvillid*, where as
 ‘yet I did not intend to Lodge, though
 ‘there were four Lodgings, and
 ‘one of them (save one) the next House
 ‘in

' in my way, which when I passed by
 ' close, being just against the door, my Fire
 ' did flash again upon, or very near the
 ' Threshold, and there I think it lodged,
 ' for I saw it no more; home still I would
 ' go, but bethinking my self, that so I
 ' might tempt God, and meet a worse
 ' Companion than my former; I turned to
 ' the farthest Lodging in the Town, and
 ' there after a little rest, in a brown study
 ' because mine Host was an understand-
 ' ing Man, and Literate, and such as
 ' could, and had but lately read his Neck-
 ' Verse in pure Roman Language) I could
 ' not contain, but must needs tell him of
 ' the Vision, he the next day to some go-
 ' ing to the Sessions, they to others there,
 ' at last it came to the Judges ears, inso-
 ' much that the greatest News and Won-
 ' der at the then Assizes was the Preachers
 ' Vision. To come at length unto the Pith
 ' or Kernel (for I have been too long a-
 ' bout the Husk and Shell) at that very
 ' Sessions, one *John William Lloyd*, a Gen-
 ' tleman who dwelt, and whose Son yet
 ' dwells within a Mile of *Glasterig*, fell
 ' Sick, and in his coming homewards, was
 ' taken with such a violent Paroxysm, that
 ' he could Ride no farther than the House,
 ' where I left my Fire to Entertain him,
 ' and there he lighted and Lodged, died

about four days after. *Ex Abundanti*, you shall understand that some Candles have been seen to come to my Church within these three weeks, and the Corpſes not long after.

Mr. *Davis* ſeems to have been a Learned and Underſtanding, as well as a Pious Religious *Minifter*, and therefore his Teſtimony muſt needs carry, with Conſiderate and thinking Men the more Authority and Force; but now I cannot ſtay to preſs it farther. In truth, I have ſtaid ſo long already on this Head of Argument, and eſpecially on the *Dead Mens Candles*, that nothing can excuſe it, but the Rarity and Surprizingneſs of the Subject. Wherefore I will only deſire the *Anti-pneumatist* to Reſolve me, *how* theſe Dead Mens Candles come to be Lighted, and *how* to be directed to go ſo right from the Houſe of the Perſon whoſe Death they do preſage, to the Church, or Church-yard where he is to be Lodged, without the influence of Spirits, or ſome Inviſible, but Knowing and Sagacious, ay, Fore-Knowing Beings; I now proceed to the next Argument.

SUBS. III.

The Third Argument from Apparitions. Three Stories of them from the Junior Pliny, in his Epistles. A Recent Story of an Apparition.

AND the next Argument (the last I will insist upon) to prove the Existence of Spirits, shall be taken from their *Apparition*. By their Apparition, I mean their shewing of themselves to Men in human (or other Animal) shape, and so conversing and dealing with them; I know the word is, and may be taken more largely, but this is the sense I take it in now.

On this Occasion I must mention again the Epistle of *Pliny*, which he sent his Friend *Sura*, to have his Opinion upon this Question, Whether really there were any such things as *Spirits*, that have a Figure of their own, and are a kind of *Numens*; or else, that all are meer fancies, and effects of fear, without any substantial Real Being. *Pliny* himself declares, that he believes their Real Subsistence, and owns he was induced to it by three *Stories*, which he there relates, and I will repeat.

The first is, concerning *Q. Curtius Rufus*, to whom being in *Africk*, where he followed the *Quæstor*, that had that Province assigned to him, there appeared as he was walking alone, a thing in the shape of a Woman of great Beauty, and of a size much larger than ordinary, which told him that he should see the City of *Rome* once again; should bear very honourable Charges; and in fine, return unto *Africk*, with Supream Command, and there die. All which could not but much surprize a Person that was very mean and obscure, (for so was *Q. Curtius* at that time,) and yet says *Pliny*, it came all to pass to a Tittle. He adds, that *Curtius* Sailing to *Carthage*, as soon as he came on shoar the same *Speçtre* appeared to him again; and that afterward falling Sick, with a Sickness which none about him thought any any danger of, he remembering what the *Speçtre* had told him, and comparing past Events with future, abandon'd all hopes of recovery, and in fine, according to the Prediction of the Apparition, and to his own perswasion, dies in *Africk*. This Story is also in *Tacitus*.

The next is of a Magnificent House in *Athens*, that was Haunted, but in so terrible a manner, that all that dwelt in it
died

died with the fright ; so it lay void a long time. But at last, a Philosopher called *Athenodorus*, coming to Town, and wanting a House, and seeing an inscription upon this, that it was to be Lett, and for a very low price ; he liking the House, and admiring the lowness of the price, inquires, and was fully informed of the Reason. He resolves however to take it, and the rather, for that it was said to be Haunted. Accordingly, in the Evening he orders a Bed to be made for him in the forward part of the House, next the door, and that a Writing-Table, and a 'tile to write with, as also Light should be prepared ; which being done, he disposes all his Domesticks in the inner part of the House, and then applies himself to meditation and Writing ; by that means employing both his Thoughts, his Eyes, and his Hands ; lest otherwise his un-ingaged mind should be possessed of fear, and this impose upon him. While he was thus occupied, all was silent, still, and quiet for a while ; but at last he hears at a distance the clattring of Iron, and jingling of Chains, which yet did not so much disturb him, but that, without looking up, he continued his Writing, and encouraged himself all he could. In the mean time, the noise increaseth, and comes nearer and

nearer; first without doors, afterwards within, which makes him look behind him, and then he saw a most terrible *Speetre*, in shape the same as had been represented to him; to wit, a Lean, Meager, Deformed Old Man, with a Long Dangling Beard, his Hair standing an end upon his Head; gives upon his Feet, and Chains in his hands; this Old Gentleman stood still, and seemed to becken with his finger as if he had called to *Athenodorus*. *Athenodorus* answers him the same way with his hand, intimating to him, that he should stay a while, and then goes on writing. But the *Speetre* rattling his Chains over the Philosophers Head, obliges him to look up the second time, when seeing the *Speetre* still beckning as before, he takes up the Light and follows him; who leads the way, but very softly, as one loaded with Fetters; and at last, at a certain place in the *Area* of the House, he Vanishes, and leaves *Athenodorus* alone. *Athenodorus* being thus left, gathers some Herbs and Leaves, and what he could scrape together, and puts them on the place as a mark; and the next day applying himself to the Chief Magistrate, acquaints him with the Story, and advises that the place should be digged, which being done, there were found the Bones of a Man, and Chains,

but

but the Flesh entirely Consumed; they gather the Bones together and bury them, after which the House was Haunted no Longer.

The Two former Stories, tho' they are Related by *Pliny* but upon Tradition, seem very Credible, But the Third, which follows, he tells of his own Knowledge. He had, he says, a Certain Freed man, whose Name was *Marcus*, a Learned Understanding Person. This *Marcus* one Time as he was Lying in Bed with his younger Brother, thought, that he saw something sitting on the same Bed, that, with a Razor, Shaved his Head all over; and in the Morning it was found, that Really his Head had been Shaved, the Hairs Lying all about the Place. Not Long after says *Pliny*, Another, the Like Accident Hapned, that Confirm'd the Former. For a Certain Youth Lying with many others in the Servants Lodgings, there came unto him through the Window, (for so the Youth Related the Story) two Persons in white Tunicks, who, as he Lay, fell to Shaving of him, and having done it, Returned the same way they came; and that this was a Reall Thing, and not a Dream only, or only a Fancy between Sleeping and Waking, was Manifested (says the Author) by the Day, for

when this came, it was seen that the Youth was Shaved, and that the Hairs lay Scattered about the Bed.

These are the Instances that Convinced *Pliny*, a Person used to Business, Wise, and Circumspect, not Credulous, or Easie to be Imposed upon, and Abused; to which I will Add but one more, but that shall be a *recent* one, of our own Time, and well Attested: a Story Licensed by a Person of Quality, and of Great worth; who I believe has more Honour than to suffer the World to be Palm'd upon by what He knew a Falsity; and Greater Prudence than to give such a Story a License without some Inquiry after the truth of it. The Story is This,

‘ The 22 of *February*, 1671, we (says the
 ‘ Master that tells it) Sailed from *Graves-*
 ‘ *end*; and the 26th, by Gods Providence we
 ‘ Sailed over the Bar of *Newcastle*, and there
 ‘ Loaded the 2^d. of *March*. About Nine
 ‘ or ten of the Clock in the Night Fol-
 ‘ lowing, we having made all clear and
 ‘ Ready for the Furtherance of our Voyage,
 ‘ some time after Supper I went to Rest,
 ‘ when about twelve of the Clock in the
 ‘ Night; to the best of my Remembrance,
 ‘ I was Awaked out of my Sleep by a
 ‘ Great *Noise*, (but saw nothing) which
 ‘ to the best of my Capacity bid me *Be gone*,
 ‘ and

‘ and that I had nothing to do there, but
 ‘ being so hastily Disturbed, and not cer-
 ‘ tain what might be the Cause, I gave it
 ‘ over for a *Dream*, and past that Accident
 ‘ as Uncertain of the Truth. Now after
 ‘ the First Day was Past, about Eight or
 ‘ Nine of the Clock at Night I went to
 ‘ rest; and about Twelve, my Mate was
 ‘ striking a Light to take a Pipe of Tobacco
 ‘ (as I suppose) and Expecting the Wherry
 ‘ to go up to the Town, being the Tide
 ‘ fell out about Two in the Morning, I
 ‘ desired the Candle might not be put out,
 ‘ and being as well *Awake* as now I am, to
 ‘ the best of my Remembrance, I was then
 ‘ *Pulled* by the hair of my head off from
 ‘ my Pillow, and the *same* words Declared
 ‘ unto me as before; and then I *saw* the Per-
 ‘ fect Face and Proportion of a *Man*, in a
 ‘ Black Hat, Stuff-Coat, and Striped Neck-
 ‘ Cloth, with Hanging down hair, and a
 ‘ fowre Down-looking Countenance, and
 ‘ his Teeth being set in his Head, I had then
 ‘ time to say, Lord have Mercy upon me,
 ‘ What art? at which he Vanished, yet
 ‘ the Candle Burned very Blew, and al-
 ‘ most went out: Hereupon being much
 ‘ Discontented, I did by the Following
 ‘ Post give my owners a just Account of
 ‘ what had Befallen me.

‘ The Fifth of that Instant, we set Sail:
 ‘ about four of the Clock in the Day, the
 ‘ Wind at *W. S. W.* fair Weather, and a
 ‘ Brave Gale off the Shore, which Con-
 ‘ tinued until half an hour after Eleven on
 ‘ *Wednesday* night; at which time the Man
 ‘ at the Helm called out that he could not
 ‘ *stir* the Helm: but after I had pulled off
 ‘ the Whip-staff; the Ship steered as before,
 ‘ being still fair Weather, the Wind then
 ‘ coming to the *N. W.* and Snowing Wea-
 ‘ ther, but very fair and clear. I was yet
 ‘ Doubtful of more Wind; and therefore
 ‘ caused the Men to furl the Fore Top-sail,
 ‘ and Lower down the Main Top-sail upon
 ‘ the back of the Main sail, but could not
 ‘ with all the strength we had hale in; the
 ‘ Weather brake off the fore Top-sail,
 ‘ when this was still in my Judgment,
 ‘ that our Ship did hale as much, as when
 ‘ our sails were out, then we haled up
 ‘ our Main-sail, and still the Ship had the
 ‘ same Lift as with a Large Wind, which
 ‘ to my Judgment might be half a streak,
 ‘ or thereabout.

‘ By This time it was Two of the
 ‘ Clock, then our Men tried the Pump,
 ‘ and found Little or no Water in her:
 ‘ the Man at the Helm called out, that
 ‘ the *Candle* Burned so Blew in the Lan-
 ‘ thorn;

‘ thorn; that it gave Little or no Light,
 ‘ and three several times went out, so that
 ‘ I held the Candle to the Look-out, which
 ‘ Candle did burn very well, and shewed
 ‘ a good Light, but of a sudden our Ship
 ‘ would not feel the Helm so kindly as
 ‘ before, and brought all our Sails Aback,
 ‘ then our Ship heeled as much to Wind-
 ‘ ward, as before to Leeward: the Glas
 ‘ being out, we went to the Pump, and
 ‘ found no Water in the Ship, but she
 ‘ did not steer well, Neither could I find
 ‘ the Reason, being still so fair Weather,
 ‘ this unkind steerage made me Urgent
 ‘ to try the Pump yet more, but I could
 ‘ not get the upper Box to work, nor
 ‘ stir, but having taken that up, and try-
 ‘ ing with the Pump-hook, we could not
 ‘ come near the Lower Box by a foot and
 ‘ half, which to my Judgment was Hin-
 ‘ dred by something like a *Bull-fish* or
 ‘ Woolfack, that as we forced down, gave
 ‘ up again with the Hook: Whereupon
 ‘ Mistrusting that all was not well, I
 ‘ caused our Men to keep the Coat of our
 ‘ Pump up; and my self Loofned the Tack;
 ‘ in the mean time I ordered two Men to
 ‘ Loose the Boat, which they did being
 ‘ Lashed in three Places: yet they do not
 ‘ Remember to this hour, that they Loof-
 ‘ ned any of them but the Middlemost;

‘ and

‘ and with three Men in her, the Boat
 ‘ *went over* the Top of the Foresheet;
 ‘ which lay above the stem, without
 ‘ Touching it, with such Violence, as
 ‘ even Amazed us that saw it; And they
 ‘ that were in the Boat, gave such loud
 ‘ cries, as frightened him at the Helm, who
 ‘ came Running out unknown to me, but
 ‘ finding the Ship coming nearer the Wind
 ‘ then formerly, I Ran to the Stair-case,
 ‘ to bid him put the Helm over, but
 ‘ could not : and hearing one jump down
 ‘ at the Hatch, which was open at the
 ‘ half-deck, did suppose that the Helms-
 ‘ man came Down again; and calling him
 ‘ by his Name to come and help me, the
 ‘ word was no sooner out of my Mouth,
 ‘ but I Perceived the *same* Person that I
 ‘ had formerly seen before we came out of
 ‘ the Harbour; who came violently to
 ‘ me, saying, be gone, you have no more
 ‘ to do here, Throwing me in at the
 ‘ Cabbin door, clear upon the Top of
 ‘ the table; When I crying out, In the
 ‘ Name of God what art, he *Vanished*
 ‘ away in a Flash of Fire; thinking withal
 ‘ that the Ship had split in a Thousand
 ‘ pieces, it giving such a Crack. The Men
 ‘ thereupon calling out, Master, if you be
 ‘ a Man come away, did something Re-
 ‘ vive me, and striving to have got to my
 ‘ Chest

‘ Chest. being I had got some Money in
 ‘ it, I found that something Hindred me,
 ‘ but what it was I could not tell. Then
 ‘ Perceiving the Main Sea coming in so
 ‘ Fast, that I was up to the waist, before
 ‘ I could get out of the Cabbin, and find-
 ‘ ing all our Men in the Boat but only
 ‘ one, I desired him to get a Compass;,
 ‘ which he did, yet could never after
 ‘ know what became of it. We were no
 ‘ sooner in the Boat, but the Ship *Sank*
 ‘ Down, and yet having a Great Sea Fur
 ‘ Gown, which lay upon the Dicker, up-
 ‘ on the Ships going Down, the very up-
 ‘ set of the Water brought it to the Boats
 ‘ side, and one of our Men took it in, we
 ‘ Reckoned our selves to be Ten or Twelve
 ‘ Leagues *E. S. E.* from the *Spern*, I Per-
 ‘ ceived the Fane at the Main-top-Mast-
 ‘ Head, when the Ship was sunk: we
 ‘ Continued in the Boat from three in the
 ‘ Morning till ten or eleven that day,
 ‘ when we were taken up by a *Whitby*
 ‘ Ketch, who used us very Kindly, and
 ‘ towed our Boat at his Stern with two
 ‘ Ends of a Haufer, till she brake away:
 ‘ She being Bound for *Newcastle*, and the
 ‘ Wind being Contrary, did on the *Satur-*
 ‘ *day* Following, set us a Shore at *Grimsby*
 ‘ in *Hull* River, where the Mayor gave us
 ‘ a Pass for *London*. This is a True and
 ‘ Perfect

‘ Perfect Relation to the best of my know-
 ‘ ledge in every Respect. *John Pye* Master.
 ‘ And Attested by *Nine* Men more, all Be-
 ‘ longing to my Ship.

‘ I Had forgot to Express, that one side
 ‘ of my Face is Burnt and Blasted forely,
 ‘ which I felt within half an hour after I
 ‘ was gone out of the Ship ; but how it
 ‘ came upon me in the Ship I could not
 ‘ tell being then in a Great Horror and
 ‘ Amaxement. Thus *John Pye*.

This seems an Undeniable Evidence of
 the Reality of Apparitions.

S E C T.

SECT. III.

The Apparition of Spirits twofold, Real, or Visional; both ways Explained. A Conceit about the Appearing of Ghosts Rejected. That most Apparitions of Spirits are Visional; not Real, Evinced by several Considerations. Some Phænomena of Apparitions Salved. Of the Distribution of Spirits.

THIS Last Argument for the Real Existence of Spirits taken from their Apparition, Invites me to Consider the *Ways* in which they use to Appear. And There are *two* ways in which they do, or may *Appear*, the one Real, the other I call Visional.

I call it *Real* Appearing, when they present themselves to some of the Outward senses, and (particularly to the Eye,) in some thing that does Really Affect it; and so, by means of the sense, (in the same way as all Corporeal External *Objects* do) they Affect and stir the *Imagination*. I call their Appearing *Visional*, when by Affecting or Stirring the *Imagination*, they occasion such Appearances as seem External to the *Eye*, or other *senses*, tho

tho' indeed there is nothing that does really affect *it*, or *them*, from without. This Conception is grounded upon comon Observation. For few are ignorant that things appear as external to the sense, *not only* when impressions are made upon it from without, by real Objects that move it, *but also* when the imagination is smartly stricken by something from within, for so it is in *Dreams*, in which all things do seem as really transacted for the time; (and not seldom, where the impression is very strong, even after that men are awakened) as when the External Sense is affected by Objects.

Well then, in real Apparitions of Spirits, the external sense is immediately affected; but in those that are Visional, the Imagination.

The real appearing of Spirits is generally thought to be performed, *either* by their assuming of Bodies that are already prepared; *or* by Figuring the Air, or some other Elementary Substance into the shapes in which they appear; which latter is done by the *Plastic* Power of the Imagination; a Power a Spirit is believed to have, because we truly experience *such an one* in our incorporated selves, not only upon the *Spirits* in the Brain, which are *Figured* into a Thousand shapes at our pleasure,

pleasure, in the several things we do imagine; but in some cases, upon external Bodies; as in the *Signatures of the Fetus*; not to mention other less certain, but strongly asserted instances.

And indeed, I take the former *Thought* in this Matter, for a much more *probable* one, than that of some others; which is, that Spirits do appear by Condensation of their *Vehicles*, and disappear by Attenuating them; this being not a very easie Conception, for of what Matter must such Vehicles consist? ay, of *what* vast *Extension* must the Vehicle of a Spirit be, in its own proportion? if when it is Condensed and Shrunk so much, as it must to become an Object of Sense, it is yet in *Dimension* Equal, and sometimes Superiour, unto *that* of a Man.

Some are of the Opinion, that *Ghosts* (by which I mean the Apparitions of Souls Departed) do for the most part by virtue of their Formative *Plastic* Power, frame unto themselves the Vehicles in which they appear, out of the *Moisture* of their own deserted Bodies; this being a Matter that is believed more Congenial to them, and more Sympathetical; and for that Reason, they say, it is, that *Ghosts* do often appear in *Church-Yards*; and that they do not appear but for *some short time*,

to wit, before the moisture is wholly dried up; as also, that the Ancients used to *Burn* not to *Burie* the Dead; for *Cardan* tells us, that during that Custom, there was no such Appearing of Ghosts as is now.

But this Opinion has very little ground; for besides, that it does account but for the Apparition of *Souls*, and not that of *Angels*, good, or bad; tho' it is very probable that Departed Souls, if at any time they appear, they do it the same way that Angels are used to do, since there is the same reason they should. I say besides this, it is certain (if any Stories of such a nature are certain) that pretended Ghosts have appeared so long after their decease from their several Bodies, that nothing could remain of these but the Dust; and it is also certain, that many Persons have been *seen* (to all Appearances) while alive, in their proper Shapes and Meen, and with the very Cloaths they were used to wear; and this could not be done by means of Vehicles framed of their Radical moisture. In truth, this last is a very cross *Phænomenon*; a *Phænomenon* that renders all Apparition of Ghosts uncertain and questionable, since it seems to infer, that it is not the Departed Soul it self that appears, whenever there is such an Appari-

Apparition, but some other Spirit that *Personates* it.

For my own part, I see many Difficulties in the way, of the real Apparition of Spirits; for besides that of the *assuming* of Bodies, many times they do Eat and Drink, and perform several other *Vital Actions*, that seem very hard to be accounted for in that way; so that I am much inclined to believe, (that) their Apparition is mostly, if not only *Visional*; not by an immediate affection of the External Sense, but by affecting and striking the Imagination in the way I have mentioned before. And herein I am confirm'd, in that it seems to have been the common Sentiment of all the Ancients; who did for this reason (as I noted before) call the *Apparitions* of Spirits *Phantasmata*, or *Idola*; to wit, because they were rather *Imaginative*, than *Real*, not as Mr. *Hobbs* would carry it, as if they thought that all Spirits were only *Phantasmata*, or meer Fancies, but because they thought that Spirits used not to *Appear* but by affecting and striking the Fancy. And this is Evident, in that they did call Apparitions not only *Phantasmata*, or Images, but also *Pneumata* or Spirits; by the latter Expression signifying the *nature* of the things that did appear, as by the former, the *way* in

which they appeared. Thus *Luke*, when he would intimate that the Disciples (at the time they saw our Lord after his Resurrection) supposed that they had seen a Spirit, does not use the word *Phantasma*, as the two other Evangelists, *Matthew*, and *Mark*, do, on the like occasion, but the word *Pneuma*, Luke 24. 37. *But they [the Disciples] were terrified and frightened, and supposed they had seen a Spirit. [πνεῦμα.]* I add, that from the different Expressions that these Evangelists do use, on the like occasion; *Matthew* and *Mark* expressing the supposed seeing of a Spirit, by seeing of a *Phantasm*, [φάντασμα,] but *Luke*, by seeing of a *Spirit*; [πνεῦμα,] one may infer, that when they thought the Apparition to be of a *Good Spirit*, they called it πνεῦμα, or a *Spirit*; but when of a *Bad*, they called it *Phantasma*, as who would say, a *Sprite*, an *Hob-Goblin*, an illusion of Devils; without conceiving, what perhaps some others will judge as probable, that they had an Opinion (as, if I do not mis-remember, the Modern *Platonists* had,) that *Good Spirits* did use to appear *really*, but *bad ones*, by disturbing and troubling the *Fancy*.

Another Consideration that induces me to think the Apparition of Spirits to be mostly (if not always) *Visional*, is, that
all

all *Appearance* will be the same in this business of Apparitions, upon the *Hypothesis* that they are but Visional, as upon that, that they are real; since *Common Dreams*, in those that sleep; and *waking ones* in the Melancholy, the Maniacal, and the Hysterical, do seem as real to them, as any things that are most so. And as *some* Appearances will equally as well be saved upon one *Hypothesis* as upon the other, so there are *others*, that will be better saved upon the Visional, than on the Real Hypothesis; particularly this, that *Spectres* are often said to be seen by one Person in a Room, that are not by others in the same Room, tho' they look where they are said to be seen. A Spirit may be easily Conceived to affect and strike the *Imagination* of one Person, without doing so to another's; but that the same *External Object* should be seen by one, and not by another that has the same advantage, is somewhat harder to think, and I had almost said, cannot be conceived without a double Miracle. In short, one can better conceive how Spirits should eat, and drink, &c. in the Visional, than in the Real Hypothesis.

I know it may be told me, that it is more usual for Spirits to appear by *Night* than by *Day*, and in *Dark* and *Gloomy* places,

places, than in open and lightsome; and those who hold the real apparition of Spirits, will think that they can give a better account of this *Phænomenon*, than others can, who do believe it but Visional. For they will say; *Those* of them that do hold the Opinion of a Spirits appearing by *Condensation* of his own Vehicle, that the *Cold* of the Night, as also of umbragious and gloomy places, where the Sun does not enter, or of solitary uninhabited ones, where Fire is not used, does much contribute to the Conspissation of the Spirits Vehicle: And *Those* that hold the Opinion that Spirits appear *by Forming* to themselves a Body of Air, will say, that the Spissitude of the Air, which is greater by Night than by Day (when the presence of the Sun attenuates it,) and greater in gloomy and uninhabited, than in lightsom and inhabited places, does make the Formation of a Body (and by consequence their Apparition) more agreeable and easie to them. But what can be said of this appearance in the *Visional* Hypothesis.

I cannot foresee how very acceptable, or otherwise, such a Discourse as this will be unto others, but to me it is of an Aspect (that is) not very Agreeable. For that the *Angelical Vehicle* should be obnoxious to the impressions of Heat and Cold,

(as

(as is in the *First* Opinion,) seems somewhat a gross Conception; nor can I see how the Spissitude, or the Tenuity of the Air should signifie much, either to further or to hinder the making a body of Air by a Spirit, (as it is apprehended to do in the *second* Opinion,) if a Spirit be conceived (as he must) to work *Magically*, and not *Mecannically*, in it. But not to insist on this, but to answer directly. The Reason then why Spirits do appear in the Night rather than in the Day, and in dark gloomy solitary places rather than in others, is from the *silence* and vacancy that is at such times, and in such places, so that the Imagination not being possessed, or diverted, by External Objects, is more attentive unto, and Consequently more susceptible of internal impressions; there being the same Reason for *this* Phenomenon, as there is for some *others*, to wit, our better hearing a Sound by Night than in the Day, and our seeing of the Images in a Darkned Room upon a Paper, or Wall, that Disappear as soon as a greater Light is admitted.

By these and other Considerations, I am more inclined to a belief of the *Visional*, than of the *Real* Apparition of Spirits; the *Former* being accompanied with fewer Difficulties, and also being a thing that is

easily conceived ; for one that thinks, will more easily admit an Angel can affect and stir the imagination, (which we see both many *Distempers*, and more *Meats* and *Drinks* can do ;) than that it should *Create* a Body, or assume one Created ; or in fine, be able to alter its own Vehicle, so much from its proper *Dimension*, that the squeezing of an Elephant into that of a Mouse, is of no Comparison with it.

I confess, I should be more inclined than I am to the *Real Hypothesis*, if I could believe the *Spagirical Resurrection* of Plants, or the *Reality* of Apparitions resembling Men, that are said to be seen in Distilling-Vessels, upon the Distillation of Human Blood, of which *Peter Borellus* (a Curious, but too credulous Author) tells us in his Observations, *Cent. 4. Obs. 62.* I fear, with more presumption, than certainty. For my part, I must acknowledge my unbelief as to it.

I will only add, for the fuller clearing of the Theory of the Apparition of *Spirits*, that what *Gravity* or weight is in respect of Elementary Bodies, That a strong *Inclination* or *Habit*, and *Will* or *Passion* is unto Souls ; and Consequently, that we seldom hear of the Apparition of *Any* but of such as went out of the Body with great *Reluctance* ; with a violent *Passion*

sion of *Revenge*; or with a strong *Desire* of having something done, that was in their will, but not in their power. And of the appearing of *such* we often hear; but *whether* the Apparition is of the Deceased *Soul* it self, or of its *Representative* only, to wit, some *Genius Personating* the Deceased; and *why* (often times) it appears unto Persons no way concerned, and not to those that are, when it would have something revealed; as *also* the Laws of the Spiritual World, (for Laws there must be, which do confine and regulate the motions of Spirits;) these, and many other points in the business of Spirits are all unknown unto me, and perhaps are only known unto God.

I should now proceed to the *Distribution* of Spirits; but this entirely depends upon the History of them, and we know but little of that History: Besides, there is in what we are thought to know, so much of Tale, Romance, and Invention, that, upon strict inquiry, not one Relation of a hundred holds true, even of their Apparitions; an Observation which obliged *Lucian* of old, and *many* now, to Ridicule them all. Wherefore I resolve to Omit, as a Task too hard for me, to discourse of their *Kinds*, and their *Orders*; only in
General,

General, I will adventure to affirm (if this be to Adventure, to say, what few will deny,) that that there are several *Species*; Angels in *Heaven*, and Devils out of it; and perhaps a *Lower sort* of Spirits than those we commonly call Devils. But for the *Celestial Hierarchy*, as *Dionysius* (the True, or the False) has set it out, and the *Distinction* in it, that he makes of *Seraphim*, of *Cherubim*, of *Thrones*, of *Dominations*, of *Vertues*, of *Powers*, of *Principalities*, of *Arch-Angels*, and of *Angels*; as also of the Politick *Government* of *Devils*, and the several *Orders* that are in it: One had need be a Saint, and as illuminated with Revelation as *Dionysius* himself was, to understand the *Former*; and for the *Latter*, he must be a Conjuror of the Highest Class, and possibly more than a Conjuror, to have any, or any certain Account of it. One that is Curious may find many, and very strange, things upon this Subject in *Cardan*, in his Books, *de varietate*, and *de subtilitate*; and in *Cornelius Agrippa*, in his, of Occult Philosophy, L. 1. C. 11. *Fernelius* also has something, which he has gathered out of *Plato*, and others, concerning the

Kinds

Minds of Spirits, in his Treatise *De Abditis rerum Causis*, L. i. C. 11. but all is but Guess and Conjecture. See *Gaspar Schottus* his *Physica Curiosa*, L. 1. C. 12. &c.

CHAP.

*Another Essay about the Nature of Animals
and Spirits.*

S E C T. I.

The Subject farther Illustrated, by a Comparison of the Universe with a particular Animal. The Universe a whole; Particular Animals but Members of that whole. A Particular Animal is as an Organ with its faculty; the Universe, as a Body composed of several Organs, with a Soul that endues these Organs with several Faculties. A Demonstration even to sense, of a common Principle that penetrates throughout the Universe. In what sense a Soul is a faculty, and in what a Principle of Faculties. Two senses of the word Soul, and how in both, it may be conceived as a Principle of Faculties. The Soul in its state of separation becomes a Spirit properly. Soul is the name of a part, a Spirit the name of a whole Substance. God the Central Sun, and Fountain of all Souls and Spirits. The Emanation of Souls and Spirits from God, or from his Spirit, set out in the Comparison of Light and Colours. Not only Philosophers, and Poets, but even many Christian Doctors, and particularly St. Augustin, compared God in respect of his influence in and over the Universe, unto the Soul in a Man.

IN the Precedent Chapter, I have offered to my Reader something concerning the nature of *Animals*, as well those that are Invisible, called *Spirits*, as those that are Visible; but the subject being Obscure, I think my self obliged to turn it every way, to see what further Light may be Given to it; and therefore I will now Enlarge upon *one Point*, in Relation unto it, that I did but touch before, whereby I hope to Illustrate it.

It is Received on all hands, except by *Cartesians*, that in every visible *Animal*, as well as in *Man*, there is a Body Composed of several Organs, and there are several Faculties or Powers, according to the several Organs; and there is a Common Principle (called a Soul) that Permeating throughout the Body, doth Furnish it in its several Organs with those several Faculties.

Now, As all the *Organs* of any Particular Animal, tho' being Compared *one with Another*, they are *several*, not Parts one of Another, but a kind of wholes, and have their several Faculties; yet in respect of the *Body*, they are but *Parts*, and all Influenced by a *Common Principle*, which giveth being to *its* several Faculties, but is none of them it self. Why may not
all

all the *Animals*, themselves (as well the Invisible as the Visible,) that do Exist in the *Universe*, be, in respect of *this* but as so many *Parts*, so many *Organs*, (some more Simple, others more Compound) Actuated by some *Common Principle* that Penetrates throughout *it*; and yet, in Respect *one of Another*, be several *wholes*, that have their several Powers and Faculties? And then, *as* all the Particular Animals would, in truth, be but as so many several *Organs* Endued with several *Faculties*, in which the *Organ* or *System* of *Organs* would be the *Body*, the *Faculty* or *System* of *Faculties* the *Soul*; *so* all of them taken together, would be an Entire *Body* [of the *Universe*] Actuated by an *Universal Principle*, (as by a *Common Soul*) that should Endow it with those several Powers and Faculties. In short; why may not the *Universe* Really be *Body* and *Soul*, and every Particular Animal as a part thereof) be *Organ* and *Faculty*, in the same sense that in our ordinary Common way of Conceiving, every Particular Animal is *Body* and *Soul*, and the *Parts* of it, *Organs* and *Faculties*? But to Proceed.

This is Certain, that what in Animals, and particularly in a Man, we do Commonly

monly call a *Faculty*, is neither that which commonly is called the Soul, nor is it merely the Body, or any Part of the Body, but a *Result* ; some Third thing Arising from them both in Conjunction. For the *Eye*, for Example, tho' never so well Qualified, doth not see, unless the Mind or Soul do Attend ; and again, the *mind* or Soul, tho' never so Attentive, cannot see, unless it has the use of an Eye, to see with ; so that the *Power* of seeing neither is in the Eye barely, nor in the Soul barely, but belongs to the *Animal*, which is Soul and Body: as arising from the presence of the Soul in such a Particular Part, or Organ, of the Body. And the like is to be said of other Powers.

And yet if all the Faculties that are united in Man, were supposed *Separated* each from other, *with* their several Organs, and so to be in the Nature of *wholes*, and this without the supposal of any Thing else ; for Example, that the *Eye* could see apart, the *Ear* hear apart, and the *Tongue* taste apart from the Body ; there would, to all Appearance, be so *many* several Animals, and Consequently so many several Souls: So that what is called a *Faculty* only, while it is in a part, is Denominated a *Soul*, in the whole ; and then, where the Body is a Compage, or System
of

of Organs, the Soul must be a *System* of Faculties : and yet be *one* still, in the same sense as the Body is.

But here I must expect it *shall be told* me, that the True and commonly Received Notion of a Soul is, that it is the *Principle* of the Faculties called Vital and Animal, and not any one of them it self, or any System of them All: To which I *Answer*, that this is indeed the *Popular* and Common Notion, but how true it is, and how much Adjusted to the Nature of the Soul, cannot be understood but by making some Distinction in the sense of word [Soul.]

The word [Soul] may be taken *Two ways*, the one of which I will call the *Philosophical*, the other the *Popular* sense of the Word.

First then, word [Soul] may be taken *Philosophically*, as a Name of *all* the Causes together, that are necessary for the Producing of Vital and Animal Actions, in the several Species of Animals: and so, tho' it is commonly considered as if it were some *Substantial thing*, that Differ'd from them All, yet *indeed* it is nothing but a *Modification* of their Action, as they are All in Conjunction. And *Dicearchus*, who Affirmed there was no such

such thing as a Soul, if he meant but thus, was very Excusable; for in this sense, a Soul is nothing but a *Result*, that is, a *Mode of Conceiving*. (for this I mean by Result) of all the *Causes* that must be Joyned for Animal, or Vital Actions, as *they* do either *Qualifie*, or else *Aid*, each others Influence. And in this sense, as a *Soul*, in respect of the *Action*, of a Particular Organ, may be called a *Faculty*; so in respect of the whole *Body*, a *Soul*, is a *System* of Faculties. Thus *Life* in Animals, arises from the Concurrence of many things; which things therefore, in that *Concurrence*, as they are the *Prince* of *Life*, so they may be called the *Soul*; [for by *Soul*, is meant nothing, but the Principle of that, we call the *Life*;) if one of these is wanting (that are necessary,) the *Life* ceases, and we say, the *Soul* is *gone*; but then again, (supposing all the other *Requisites* Remaining as they ought to be, and Ready to do their Parts,) if that *one*, which was wanting is Restored, there is again a Concurrence of *all* the *Causes* Requisite to *Life*, and so, with the *Life*, the *Soul* is said to *Return*, or come again. For Example, there is in Snakes, in Dormice, in Swallows, and in other *Dormitive Creatures* of that kind, and (if we

shall believe *Guagninus*, *apud Schottum*, *Phyf. Curios. l. 1. part. 2. C. 38. §. 4.*) in some *Men* too, (for so he fays of the Inhabitants of *Lucomoria*, a certain Country of *Russia*, that there is) an Actual Suspension of the Exercise of Life in all the Species of it during Winter, while their Spirits lie Congealed and un-active; so that tho' all the Organs of those Animals, in other Respects, are duly Qualified and Disposed, yet there being not, for that season, sufficient Heat Imparted to them from the Sun, to put their *Spirits* in Motion, *These*, like *Mercury* while Cold, are wholly un-active, and so for several Months there is a Cessation of Life (for Life is a Sort of Action) in all the sensible Instances of it. But then again on the other side, nothing being wanting but a due *Heat*, (as unto *Mercury*, to put it in Actual Motion,) as soon as the Sun Returns, and with its warmth, Communicates that Motion that is Requisite to the Spirits, and other Parts, for the Invigorating, and the stirring of them, there Results that Action, or Exercise of Organs, which we call *Life*, and which in many Places of Holy *Scripture*, is called the *Soul*, tho' commonly we call the *Soul* the *Principle*, not the *Exercise* of Life; but then by a *Principle* we must mean the *Concourse* of all the Requisite Causes,

Causes, and so the Soul in Effect will be but a *Faculty*, or rather a System of Faculties. And so much for the *Philosophical Sense* of the Word Soul.

But besides the *Former*, there is Another meaning of the word [Soul], which I call the *Popular*, because it is the most usual, and that is, when it is Taken not for *all* the Causes together, or the Result of them, as in the Former, but for the *Principal* and Chief Cause of Animal and Vital Actions, which in the Holy Scriptures is called the *Spirit*; [*who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth Upward, or the Spirit of a Beast that goeth Downward?*] And so when a Person dies, he is said to to give up his Spirit, to Give up the Ghost.

And thus a Soul may be Conceived, a System of very subtle Refined *Matter*, such as *Light*, (but in some more, in others less Refined) that gives the last Disposition to a Body and its Organs for the receiving of Vital *Cogitative Influence*, from the Original Mind; it is the *Texture* and Qualification of the *Body*, and the Organs that compose it, that is the *Ligament* and *Bond* of union between this subtle Matter or Spirit, and *That*; but it is the *Subtle Matter* or Spirit that is the *Vinculum* or Bond of Union between the Body and the *Original Mind*.

In this way of Conceiving; This System of Subtle Matter while it is in the Body, tho' it is called a *Spirit*, because of its subtlety, in truth, may be but a *Soul*, that is, a *Means* only of Conveying the Vital Influence into the Body, from the Original Mind; but then again, out of the Body, as the System of it may be, it may become a *Spirit* properly so called; it being then no longer a Part, (as a Soul must (be), which is only a Mediate Subject,) but a whole, and so a Terminative Subject, of the Influence of the Original Mind: in short, it becomes a *Suppositum* or Subsistent by it self. That the Soul is but a Mediate Subject while it is in the Body, and not a Terminative, so that properly the *Animal*, (which is Soul and Body,) and not the Soul only, is Agent in all that Passes, seems Probable, in that all the Ordinary *Actions* of the Man, that commonly are said to be the Souls, are plainly *Organical*; nothing can be Instanced in, as Proceeding from the Soul while it is in the Body, that is not properly *Animal*: even *Intellection* it self, is not an Action only of the Soul, or *Anima*, but (as the *Latins* would Express it,) an Action of the *Animus* or Understanding; which is to be Conceived as an Animal and Organical Faculty, that is, as a thing arising

rising Principally, but not only, from the Soul : for so does *Cotta* Distinguish, *apud Cicerol.* 3. *de nat. Deor.* when he says, *Probabilius videtur tale quiddam esse Animum, ut sit ex Igne, atque Anima temperatum.*

It is true, the *Ordinary* way of Conceiving is much *otherwise*, for the Soul is Considered by the *Most*, as if it were an *Angel* or Spirit, that only dwelt in the Body as in a House ; and thus the Soul is the *man*, the Body but as a *Tabernacle*, or a Garment to it : nor is this a meer *Platonical* Notion ; it is Conformable to the way of *speaking* in the Holy Scriptures ; as, where *St. Paul* says, *I Desire to be Dissolved, and to be with Christ* ; Also, where he tells the *Corinthians*, *we know if our Earthly House of this Tabernacle were Dissolved, &c.* And for certain, if the Theory of the *Pre-existence* of Souls is a True one, this Opinion is beyond dispute. However, I will not Determine in this matter, since the Language of the Scripture is often Adapted but to the Conceptions of the Vulgar, and therefore cannot be the Standard of Philosophical Truth ; and it is certain, that even in our Saviours time a many *Pythagorean* and *Platonical Doctrines*, and *this* in particular of the Pre-existence of Souls, and the Souls being the Man, had obtained to be Vulgar among the *Jews* ; As appears by

that Question of the *Disciples*, which they put to our Lord, *was this Man Born Blind for his own; or for his Parents sin?* for it supposes, that the Man might sin, and therefore also supposes that he *was*, before he was Born, for he could not Sin, if he was not (in Being.) Besides, the *Genesis* or way of Generation of Animals, seems to Favour the former opinion more than the latter; for in the latter Opinion, the Soul is conceived as an *Assistent*, rather than an *Informing Form*, and so rather as an *Animal*, than as a *Part* of one: which doth not so well consist with the Method of Generation. In fine, the Distinction between *Souls* and *Abstract Spirits*, as to their Natures, cannot be set out with that Distinctness and clearness in the Latter, as in the Former Opinion.

But Take it either way; if we Distinguish *Soul* and *Faculties*, and do hold, that *Animal Actions* are the Effects of *Faculties*, but that the Soul is the Principal cause of those *Faculties*; why may it not be Affirmed (as I Hinted before) that the *Mosai-cal Spirit* is, unto all the *Bodies* in the Universe, (those of *Invisible*, as well as of *Visible Animals*) what the Soul Conceived of, after this manner, is in our selves unto *ours*? So that All particular *Animals* in respect of the Universe, should
be

be but as the several Organs in any Particular Animal; and then Particular Souls should be but as so many *Portions of the subtle Matter*, through which, and by means of which, the *Mosaical Spirit* (as a *Soul of the Universe*) should Radiate into the several Bodies, and give them their *Faculties*. In short, we may conceive particular Souls as so many *Animi* (for now I Distinguish, as *Cotta* do's, between *Animus* and *Anima*;) and that the *Anima*, that is the Source of All these *Animi*, is but one, throughout the Universe. Why may not this be so? And if it may, it must, since then, the being of Subordinate *Anima* (other than *Animi*) would be superfluous and unnecessary; and Beings are not to be Multiplied but on Necessity.

Besides, there is Reason to think there is but *one Soul* Diffus'd throughout the Universe, if it be Allowable to make the same Judgment in Reference to the whole, that, upon good Considerations, may be Framed of the Parts which come Distinctly within our View. For in this *Terrestrial World*, as to the several *Regions* of it, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral, it is as certain, that all had but one *Plastic*, as that the Body of a Man, or any other particular Animal, had not

more. The Evidence is the same for Both. There is a sensible *Analogy* and Correspondence in *Fabric* and *Conformation*, not only between the several *Species* of *Animals*, (which is very manifest in *Comparative Anatomy*); but also, in a good degree, between *Plants* and *Animals*, and *Minerals* and *Plants*. Again, there is a like *Connexion* between the *Beings* that fill those several *Regions*, as there is between the *Parts* that compose particular *Animals*; There are no *Vacuties*; or Gaps in *Nature*, in respect of *Species*, no Jumps or Leaps, but all in orderly *Gradation*: Extrems are Knit and United by *Participles* that partake of Both; and all is full, without any Chasms. Thus (to touch it in an Example) *Minerals* and *Vegetables* are Joyned by *Lithodendra* or Stone-Plants, such as Coral and the like; *Vegetables* and *Animals* by *Zoophytes* or Plantanimals, such as the sensible Plant, the Scythian Lamb, and the like. And in the *General Kinds* of *Animals*, between *Fowls* and *Beasts*; the *Bat*; Between *Fishes* and *Fowls*, the *Flying Fish*; between *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic* *Animals*, those that are called *Amphibious*; are Middle *Uniting Species*, &c. Farther, there is a *Conformity* in their *Origination*, as well as in their *Structure* and *Fabrick*; for *Plants* as well as *Animals* are Produced

by

by *Semination*; and even Minerals and Mettals have their *Matrices*; and tho' they have not what is properly called *Seed*, they have something that is Analogous in their Production. In fine, the *Transmutation* of things, and the Easie Transition of them from one Region unto Another, evinces it. The *Transmutation* of Earthly and Aqueous Bodies into *Vegetables*, is so Obvious, as I need not to Instance; *That* of Vegetables into *Animal Concretes* is as certain, tho' not so Obvious and Usual. The Animation of *Horse-hairs* that fall into Pools in the Summer time, may be an Example; but those are more Adequate, that are Given in the Generation of *Barnacles*; and in the Animation of the Branches of certain *Trees*. I Vouch not these Instances upon uncertain Report (tho' some will believe it no other,) but on the credit of a Person Grave and Unsuspected, I mean the Excellent *Schottus*, who in his *Physica Curiosa*, l. 1. C. 20. among other Examples very pertinent to this purpose, relates those I have mentioned, on his own Knowledge. *Pili*, (says he, *è caudis equorum in aquam pluviam, fossis ac scrobibus exceptam decidentes Animantur, & in graciles ac Longos vermes instar Serpentum convertuntur, ut ipsemet non semel vidi. Aves Anatum formâ ex Ramis Arborum deciduis intra aquas in*

Scotia

Scotia & Hebridibus Insulis nasci testantur multi Scriptores ; Ipsemet vidi Ramorum extremitates paulatim animà sensitiva Informatas decidisso & Avolasse.

Now, so much *Uniformity* even in *disformity* ; such *Connexion* ; and so *Easie Transition* from one *Region* into Another, cannot be conceived to be in the *World*, without conceiving at the same time, that as it had but *one Author* or common *Plastic* at first ; so still it has but *one Principle*, that hath the ordering, the *Disposing* the *Framing* and *Actuating* of it, in all its *Parts*.

But to make it more *Conceivable*, that *all Particular Beings* may be *Animated* by but *One*, and yet being such *Diversity* as they are, let us consider that *Glorious* thing we call *Light*, which as it *Proceeds* and *Issues* from the *Sun*, is of *one Nature*, but meeting with divers *Objects*, and *Receiving* *Different Modifications*, according to those of the *Objects* it meets with, is varied into a *Thousand Colours*, of *Different Natures* from the *Light*, as well as one from Another. And it is even thus with the *Vital Energy*, or *Light* that flows from *God* (the *Intellectual Sun* and *Father of Spirits*,) for *This*, tho' as it *Proceeds* and flows from him, it is but of *one Nature*, yet, according to the *Bodies* it meets with,

(it)

(it) becomes Diversified and Varied, into a Thousand shall I say ? or rather into Infinite *Faculties* and Powers, that, in their particular Natures, are as Different from the Original Vital Energy it self, (taken in it self,) as All are one from Another. In short, the first Subject of Vital Energy is the *Mosaical Spirit* ; but This, as it is Received in Bodies of several Fabricks, Dispositions and Textures, (as well in Visible, as in Invisible Animals,) become *Diversified* into several Powers and Faculties ; or (which is the same in Effect,) becomes in *Each* a *Principle* of Actions that Differ one from Another, as much as the *Bodies* do that Invest it, and as the *Motions*, that, by means of those Bodies, do Affect and Modifie it. Modifications of the Cogitative Faculties, or of the Immediate Principle that makes the Being Cogitative, are called *Ideas*, or *Images*, and are the same unto the Mind, in the *Sense*, and the *Understanding*, that *Sensible Species* (as they commonly are called) are unto the Light in the Air : for as *These* are nothing but Modification of the Light, so *Those* are of the Mind.

S E C T. II.

Several Objections against the Former Hypothesis considered, First, that it makes Souls to be Faculties or Powers, whereas indeed they are Actions, or Acts. This Objection Answered, and the notion of the Souls being a Principle and Faculty, rather than an Action, cleared. The Second Objection, that in this Hypothesis the Deity is considered as an Immanent, and not (what he is) as a Transient cause of all things, Removed; and how he is both the one and the other, shewed, and Confirmed by the Authority of St. Austin, and other Christian Fathers; as well as of the Chiefest Philosophers. The Third Objection, that hereby God and Nature are Confounded; Answered, by shewing how God and Nature are Distinguished in this Hypothesis. The Last and strongest Objection, that if there were but one Original Perceptive Principle throughout the Universe, all Animals would have the same Perceptions, which they have not. This Objection Removed, and the Reason of Different Perceptions in Different Animals cleared.

THO' I have Endeavour'd to Anticipate Objections in the Discourse that I have made, all along as I made it, yet, to give them a farther clearing, and thereby elucidate more fully the *Hypothesis* that I Espouse, this Section shall be Employed in proposing in exprefs Terms, such *Objections* as do lye against it, and in giving them the necessary Answers.

The First *Objection* against this Hypothesis is, that it speaks of Souls as of *Faculties* or Powers, and not as of things that are Essentially *Active*; whereas a Soul is a *Knowledge*, a Cogitation; or at least a thing that is always Busie and Doing; in somuch, that even in sleep it does not all Rest, but that Men do always Dream when they sleep, tho' perhaps they are not always sensible, that they do.

I know not how truly it is said, that the Soul is always Busie, and that Men do always *Dream* when they sleep; but I could wish they did only Dream at that Time; for then we should not be Troubled with so many Groundless Fantastick Opinions. But to come nearer the Matter, I know a person who Affirms, that, to his Knowledge, he *never* Dreamt in his whole Life; and certainly, since we are
 always

always *Conscious* that we Dream, when ever we do, we ought to believe we have not Dreamed at all, when we are not sensible we have. Besides, *how* do they know that the Soul is always Doing? for my part, I am much mistaken if I do not Experience in my self (what I think any other may) that I am able to *suspend* all Thought, or (as we commonly Express it) think of nothing. To be sure, every one who hath made the Least Reflexion must needs know, that as we have Eyes, and Ears, and other sensitive Organs, and so do see, and hear, and are Conscious of other Sentiments, in Case our Eyes and Ears and those other Organs which we have, are Impressed by External Objects; so (ordinarily) we do neither see, nor Hear, or are Conscious of any other sentiment of any External Objects, if *these* do not Affect our Organs: without the presence of Objects we are only said to have the *Faculties* or Powers, that is, we are said, only to be *Able* to see, to Hear, &c. but upon the presence of Objects, and the Application of our Faculties or Powers, we are said to have the *Exercise* of them, and actually to See and Hear, &c. Thus it is in the External *Sense*. Now, since the *Mind* or Understanding is an Organical thing as well as the External sense, I
 see

see no Reason to think, but that as there is no Actual Sensation but when the Organs of the sense are stirred, so there is no Actual Intellection but when that of the Understanding is; and that tho' we have always the Power of Understanding, as we have that of seeing, yet we do not actually Exercise that Power, but when it is *drawn into Act*, by some Impression upon it, either from the *Will* within, or from *Objects* without; any more than we do Actually see, &c. but when the Eye, &c. is Affected. In fine, since nothing of Cogitation is done within us by the Soul *Immediately*, but only by *means* of the Understanding, or of the will, or of the sense, External, or Internal, and All these are rather Faculties than Actions, I believe I have Reason to Conclude, that the Soul is rather a System of the Faculties, or else a Principle of them, than that it is a Perpetual never ceasing Exercise or Action, It is rather *Actus*, than *Actio*, in the Language of the Schools. And tho' in the Opinion of these, it be Essentially an Act, *Actus Corporis*, an Informing *form* to the Body, yet, in other Respects it is but *Actus Primus*, not *Actus Secundus*; for tho' it be an Original Principle of Action, and so an Active Power, yet, in it self, it is but a Power, and not Actually Active, or

Acting

Acting, but in the Requisite Circumstances. Thus we are Obliged to speak, to wit, *inadequately*, in the Notions of *Power* and *Act*, or Faculties and Exercise. And thus much for the First Objection.

The *Second* is, that in this *Hypothesis*, in the last Result, God is made the *Immanent* cause, whereas Really, and according to the truth of Revelation, Gen. 1. he is only a *Transient* Cause of all things. But to this the *Answer* is Easie; for tho' in Gen. 1: God is Represented (as he is in Reality) to be the Almighty Creator of all, and so as a *Transient* Cause, yet in this sense, he is also the *Immanent*, that, by the Mosaical Spirit, he giveth Life and Being, and Motion unto all; and this according to the *Apostle*, who says, that *in him* we live, and move, and have our being; as well as to Common *Metaphysicks*, which tell us, that all Beings are either First, or second Beings; and that Second Beings are *Participations* of the First. And however strange it may Look now, it was certainly of Old, the Common sentiment of all the Wiser part of the World; the *Jewish* Doctors, as well as *Gentile Philosophers*, and even of many *Ancient Fathers* of the Christian Church; it would be Superfluous, as well as Tedious, to mention all (if I could,) and therefore to
 confine

confine my self within Fitting Bounds, I will instance two or three of the Chief for Examples. The first shall be *Apuleius* in his Book *de Mundo* (a Book ascribed to *Aristotle*, and by *Huetius* to *Posidonius*, and for certain it was originally *Greek*;) where he says, *vetus opinio est, atque Cogitationes omnium hominum penitus Insedit, Deum Essentiae originis haberi Auctorem, Deumque ipsum salutem esse & Perseverantiam earum quas effecerit rerum, neque ulla Res est quae viduata dei Auxilio, sui naturâ contenta sit. Hanc Opinionem vates secuti profiteri ausi sunt, omnia Jove plenz esse.* It is an Ancient Opinion, and imprinted on the hearts of all Mortals, &c. And afterwards he adds, *Sed cum credamus Deum per omnia permeare, & ad nos, & ad ultra, potestatem sui nominis tendere, quantum abest, vel Imminet, tantum Existimandum est eum amplius minusve rebus utilitatis dare.*

Tho' it is true, that in conclusion he compares God to a Great King, that does many things by his Ministers.

The second shall be *Seneca*, who in his 65th Epistle, among many other expressions to the same purpose, has this in so many words. *Quem in hoc Mundo Locum Deus Obtinet, hunc in homine Animus.* What God is, in reference to the World; that same the Soul is, in respect of a Man.

The third shall be the Emperor *Marcus Antoninus*, who in his 4th Book, *Seēt.* 40 τῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν, says, ὡς ἐν ζῶον τὸν κόσμος, μίαν εἶσιν, καὶ ψυχῆν μίαν ἔπεχον, συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν, &c. Be always minding that this World is like an Animal, that hath but one Substance or one Soul. I had not cited this Emperor, after I had cited *Seneca*, seeing both were *Stoicks*, but that in doing so I knew I should have occasion to refer my Reader to Mr. *Gataker*, who, in his Annotations on this passage of *Antoninus*, has made a large Collection of Authorities to the same intendment, which saves me a farther Labour.

The last that I will mention shall be a most Celebrated Father in the Christian Church, the great St. *Austin*, (for I omit the Excellent *Origen*, tho' as Learned as he, for being more obnoxious,) and I will cite the Testimony he gives, as I find it in a Schoolman, to show, that some even of the Schoolmen were in the same Opinion. *Orbellis* then (for he is the Schoolman I intend) upon the first of the Sentences, *Dist.* 8. *Q.* 2. says (just as *Seneca*) *Sicut Deus in Majori Mundo, sic Anima in Minori*; as God is in the greater World, so is the Soul in the lesser: and then by a simple Conversion of the Sentences, what the Soul is in the lesser World (of Man.)
that

that God must be in the greater ; and this he says is according to St. *Augustine*, *sicut enim* (says he) *Deus est in Majori Mundo, sic Anima in Minori, viz. in homine, secundum Augustinum.*

Only here it must be observed, that when God is compared unto a *Soul*, it must be understood with due limitation ; to wit, as a Soul is taken only for a *Principle* of Powers and Actions, and not as it is an informing *Form*, or part of the Animal ; for that God should be a Soul in this latter sense, is a notion no ways agreeing to him, who, in himself is all, and only perfection.

Another *Objection* is, that *God* and *Nature* are confounded in this Hypothesis, so that it is not easie to say what is the interest of *God* in things, and what is *Natures*, or how they differ ; to which I *Reply*, that indeed in the Holy Scriptures all is ascribed to God, and the Spirit of God, without any mention of Nature ; and yet since there are second Causes, as well as a first, and so there is a thing which we call *Nature*, (for by this I now mean nothing but *second Causes* and their working ;) it will be very convenient to show *how* God, *how* Nature does operate, and how they differ : and *this* perhaps may be done upon the proposed *Hypothesis* better than on any other.

other. For in *this*, God and Nature are distinguished, as the Soul of an Animal, and the System of Faculties; taking the Soul (as it is in the common Opinion) for the Principle of Faculties, and Faculties for the immediate Principles of all actions of Animals; and thus *Active Nature* is the System of all the Powers, all the Faculties of the Universe, and *God* the essential Principle of them. Or more plainly, since Faculties and Principles are notions rather than things, and some will be apt enough, without considering their grounds, to regard them only as meer notions, I shall therefore set out the difference that is between them, in more Real Expressions, by saying, that the *Influence* of God, or his active presence in things by means of the Mosaical Spirit, is as *Light*, and that *Nature*, (the System of all the Powers in the Universe) is as a Complex of all *Colours*; so that as Colour is the Modification of Light, and Light the essence of Colour, so particular Powers and Actions (that are but Powers in act,) are Modifications of the Divine Energy, and the Divine Energy the substance both of the Act and the Power; and thus the influence of the *first* and *second* Causes differ, as *Motion*, and *Modification* of Motion; the Motion arises from the *first*, the Modification from the *second* Cause,

Cause, either as it is an *Organ*, or as an *Object*: and so too, the *Aberrations* of Nature in Monsters, and in other instances, are accounted for, either by the ill Texture of the Organs, the over-whelming of matter, or by some other vitiosity and defect in the second Causes, without any impeachment of the first. As the scriblings of a bad mishaping Pen, are not imputed to the hand that guides it, which perhaps may be skilful enough) but to the Instrument that depraves the motion; and this, tho' the Motion comes from the Writer. In fine, I do not see any reason why *vital Energy* may not be *Imparted* and Communicated, as well as *Local*, which our sense evinces to be so: one Body that is in motion, striking another that is not, thereby *Communicates* its Motion to it; and thus a Cogitative vital *Energy* may come from God, and being *diffused* as Light is throughout the Universe, may be caught by agreeable Organs, and *Modified* by Objects, in the way that I have shewed before. I only hint this by way of Anticipation, to such as will inquire, whether this Cogitative vital Energy, diffus'd throughout the World, be *God* himself or no, or what it is; for there I stick, and call in the assistance and united force of greater understandings, mine beginning to be dazled

with the lustre, or the subtilty of the Object: as yet I take it to be the *Mosaical Spirit*. So much for this *Objection*.

The *last* I shall propose is the Herculean one, that is insisted upon by many Great and very Judicious Men, which is, that if there is *but one* Original Perceptive throughout the Universe, all Animals would have the *same* Perceptions, so that what is known by *one*, could be ignored by *none*; ay, the same sentiments, the same Resentments, the same Pains, the same pleasures, that are in *any* one, would be in *every* one; and there could be no *Numerication*, no individuation of Spirits, or Souls, because *no separate*, particular Perceptions.

But this Objection as it is greater in appearance than in reality, so it can have little effect, if we consider, that it does equally destroy the *diversity* of Perceptions in the several Organs and Parts of *one* Animal, which yet our own Experience attests unto, as *that* of the perceptions of *several* Animals in the Universe; since, as there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Universe, in the proposed Opinion; so in the common, there is but one in every Animal; and yet, tho' the *Soul* is but *one*, the *Faculties* are *many*, and the *exercises* of them *several*. For if but

one

one Eye is inflamed, the sense of Pain is not in both; and when but one Arm, or one Hand is wounded, the smart thereof is only in one; ay, the pains and ailments of the *Superior* Parts, are not felt in the *Inferior*, nor the sufferances of *these* in *those*; so that though the Animal it self may be said to have the Perception of all those of its several parts, yet these cannot be truly said to have one anothers. I acknowledge, that as the Soul may be said to have a common sense of all perceptions, but the several Members, each to have but a private sense for it self; so answerably, tho' the *Original Perceptive* is sensible of *all*, (and needs must, for he that made the Eye must needs see, and he that planted the Ear, must needs hear; and he that gave an heart unto man must needs understand,) yet *Particular Percipients*, particular Animals, as so many particular Organs must have *but* their share: one Animal can no more pretend to have the perceptions of another, (tho' the Original perceptive is the same in both, and is conscious to the perceptions of both) than in the same Animal the *Eye* can pretend to *Hear*, or the *Ear* to *See*, or either of them to *Smell*.

Hence it is evident, that the *Individuation* and *Numerication* of *Perceptions*, and

quently of Perceptive *Powers*; arises from the *Bodies*, or *Organs*, by means of which such perceptions are made; for where the *Bodies* are *separated*, or the *Organs distinct*, there the *Perceptions* made in those *Bodies*, and by means of such *Organs* are likewise *so*. In short, as I hinted before, perceptions and perceptive powers are individuated by *Bodies*, in the same ways as *Images* are by *Looking-Glasses*, or *Eccho's* by the contrivance of *Objects*.

But to demonstrate it in *Experience*. as well as by discourse, I will add a History or two of Monsters, that will do it plainly. The first shall be out of *Trivet*, and in his own Terms, (as I read them in an Ancient Manuscript) who reports the Accident just as *Sigebert* also does in his Chronicle add, *An.* 396. ' In the time of this *Valentinian*
' says he (but it should be as others say,
' in the time of *Theodosius*) at the Town of
' *Emaus* in *Jewry*, there was a *Child* bore,
' the which from the Navel upward, had
' *double* Body, that is to say double Breast,
' and double Head, and *proper* feeling of
' all parts; and sometimes the *one* sleepeth,
' and eateth, and drinketh, when the o-
' ther *doth* nought, and otherwise they
' eat, and drink, and sleep *together*; and
' sometimes they *weep* and *smile* together,
' and sometimes *strived* and chid together,
' and

‘and when they were almost of two year
‘Age, the one of them died four days be-
‘fore the other.

Schenckius the Son, Reports another, but resembling story, and with more Particularity and Circumstance, and Consequently more to our purpose, out of *Buchanan* his Scottish History; *Monstrum novi generis* (says he) *in Scotiâ natum est, inferiore quidem corporis parte specie Maris, nec quicquam à communi hominum formâ discrepans, Umbilicum vero supra, trunco corporis ac reliquis omnibus membris geminis & ad usum atque speciem discretis; id Rex diligenter & Educandum, & erudiendum curavit, ac maxime in musicis, quâ in re mirabiliter profecit, quin & varias Linguas edidicit, & variis voluntatibus duo Corpora secum discordia dissentiebant, ac interim Litigabant, cum aliud alii placeret, interim veluti in communi consultabant. Illud etiam in eo memorabile fuit, quod cum inferna crura lumbive offenderentur, commune Corpus utrumque dolorem sentiret, cum vero superne Pungeretur, aut alioqui Læderetur, ad Alterum corpus tantum doloris sensus perveniret. Quod discrimen in morte fuit magis Conspicuum. Nam cum alternum corpus complures ante alterum dies extinctum fuisset, quod superstes fuit, dimidio sui Computrescente paulatim contabuit. Vixit id monstrum Annos Viginti Oâto, ac de-*
cessit,

cessit, Administrante rem Scoticam Joanne Prorege. Hac de re scribimus eo Confidentius, quod adhuc supersint homines honesti Complures, qui hæc viderint. So Buchanan, and Schenkius from him.

I will not give my self the trouble to translate the Relation, because I find it in Mr. *Ross* his continuation of Sir *Walter Ramleigh's* History of the World, who thus tells the Story, *ad An. 1490.* About this time (says he) a strange Monster was born in *Scotland*, which *beneath* the Navel was *one* Body, but *above*, *two* distinct Bodies, having *different Senses*, Souls, and Wills; any hurt *beneath* the Navel is equally felt by *Both* Bodies above, but if any of the *upper* Members were hurt, *one* of the Bodies *only* felt the pain. This Monster the King caused to be instructed in Musick, and divers Languages. One of the Bodies died some days before the other, which also shortly after pined and consumed away. It lived Eight and Twenty years.

I might instance in many other Stories of this kind, but these suffice to evince what I induce them for, that the *numerical* of Souls, and consequently of other Spirits, depends upon *that* of Bodies; for in the alledged Examples, especially the latter, it is plain, that where the *Bodies* were

were *divided* and separated, the *Powers* of Perception *likewise* were; so that the offences of but one, were not felt by both, but by one only; and yet again, in the parts beneath the Navel, common unto both the Bodies, any hurts in these were equally perceived by both. I take the *Theodosian* and *Scottish* Monsters to be evident illustrations of my Hypothesis. And so much for Substance, Harmonically considered.

CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

Of Substance in the Scholastical Consideration of it. Substance what, that it is First or Second. Second Substance is called a singular, a suppositum, or a subsistent. Of the Principle of Individuation, or that which makes a singular to be so. Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Individuation of Spirits. Of a Person. The true Idea of it. Laurentius Valla his notion of a Person, the unusefulness of it to the salving of the Holy Trinity shewed. The Trinity a Mystery, and Doctrine of Faith; not a Point of Philosophy; and so the Idea of it to be derived only from Revelation in the Holy Scriptures, and not from bare Discourses of Reason.

I Have Discoursed of *Substance* after the *Harmonical* way, in the Precedent Chapters. It now remaineth that I add something concerning it in the *Scholastical*; and thus, *Substance* is defined to be a thing that is by it self, or that is under others called *Accidents*; and is divided into *First*, and *Second*. The *Second Substance* is that which is not in a Subject, but may be Prædicated of it, and such are *Generical* and *Specific* Substances; as
for

for example; Living Creature; and Man; neither of which is in a subject, as an Accident is, but both are Prædicated of it; for Living Creature is Prædicated of *Man*, and Man of *Peter, James, John, &c.*

As for first Substance (which is the substance I design to speak of more particularly,) it is defined to be that which neither is in a Subject (as an Accident is,) nor is Prædicated of it, as the second substance is; it is also called a *Suppositum*, a subsistent, or a singular, in which is wont to be distinguished *Nature* and *Subsistence*; *Subsistence* is a mode of Existence, to which it adds Perseity, and *Existence* is Essence in Act; the *Nature* is the Idea or Definitive Conception of a Substance. Or thus, the *Nature* is the Thing or Substance as it is defined; a *Suppositum*, is the Thing or Substance that hath that Nature or Definition. Nature and Subsistence differ but as Essence and Existence; Subsistence being but the Existence of a substantial Nature. But Nature and a Suppositum Differ, as *Essentia* and *Ens*, the Former signifying (as the Schools speak) *ut Quâ*, the latter *ut Quod*.

In a singular Substance or *Suppositum*, that which comes particularly into Consideration, is the *Principle* (as Schollars call it) of *Individuation*, or that which makes

a singular to become a singular, for the *Nature* is supposed to belong to one particular no more than to another, but to be a thing abstracted from all Particulars, and thence the question arises, what that is that *singularizes* the Nature; (for example, that of Man,) and makes it to belong to *Peter*, or to *John*, or to *James* in particular. This Principle of Individuation, (be it what it will,) may (as is thought by some,) be called the individuating *difference*; as well as that which does divide the *Genius* and constitute the Species, is called the *specifical*, since this individuating Principle doth as much divide the *Species*, and constitute the individual, as the *specifical difference* divides the *Genius*, and constitutes the species. Much ado there is what this Principle should be; but after all, they seem to me to come nearest to the Truth, who do affirm, that a singular or individual becomes so, not by any distinct Principle of individuation, but immediately and *per se*, and in that, that it is in being; just as *Quantity* is *Terminated* by self, and not by mediation of another Thing, that should confine and bound it; and in like manner is *Figured*, not by any thing superadded to it, but barely in that it is thus and thus *Terminated*.

I am already almost tired with this idle fruitless way of talking, and should not overcome my self to proceed any farther in it, but that the *Notion* a Learned Person has of late delivered to the World, about the *Individuation of Spirits*, will oblige me to Consider *it*, and by affording matter of more intelligible Discourse, make some amends for the dryness and barrenness of the former. It is Dr. *Sherlock* I mean, who in his vindication of the Trinity, S. 4. p. 48. tells us, ‘ that in Created *Finite Spirits* their numerical oneness can be nothing but every Spirits *Unity*, within it self, and distinct and separate subsistence from all other Created Spirits; now this self-unity of the Spirit can be nothing else but *self-Consciousness*; that it is Conscious to its own *Thoughts*, Reasonings, Passions, which no other Spirit is Conscious to but it self. This makes a *Finite Spirit Numerically one*, and separates it from all other Spirits, that every Spirit *feels* only its own *Thoughts* and *Passions*, but is not Conscious to the Thoughts and Passions of any other Spirit; and therefore if there were *three* Created Spirits so United as to be Conscious each to others Thoughts, I cannot see any Reason why we might not say that three such Persons were *not* numerically one.

He

‘He adds, let any Man, who can give me
 ‘any other notion of the numerical One-
 ‘ness of an *Infinite Mind* but self-conscious-
 ‘ness.

Thus this Learned Person:

It must be confessed, that the *Numerical Oneness* of Spirits can be nothing else but (as this Learned Author says it is) every Spirits *Unity* (he might as well have said Oneness) with it self, and its distinct and separate subsistence from all other Created Spirits. But this is not the oneness of *Spirits* only, but of *every* thing else that is one; for as *omne ens est unum*, so *unum est, quod est indivisum in se, & Divisum a quolibet Alio*; and therefore it doth hold in *Bodies* as well as in Spirits, and perhaps in the Infinite first Being, as well as in all Created Finite Beings. But to confine my self, (as this Learned Author does) to the *Numerical Oneness of Spirits*; I cannot say farther of it, as he has, that it can be nothing else but *self-Consciousness*, in the sense of the word as he unfolds it, I say as he *Unfolds* it; for else, taking self-consciousness for a Spirits self-being, so I take it the numerical oneness of a Spirit is nothing but its self-consciousness, for then the meaning is, that a Spirit (which is a Cogitative Being) is *it self*, and not any other thing; but taking Consciousness as he
 does,

does, for a Spirits Being *sensible* of its own *Actions* and *Passions*, to its numerical oneness cannot be its self-consciousness. For as a Being (and even a Cogitative Being as a Being) must be conceived to *be*, before it can be conceived to *Act*; so again, it must be conceived to act, that is to *Think*, to *Reason*, to *Love*, to *Hate*, (for these are the Actions he instances in) for some moment of Reason *before* it can be conceived to be *Conscious* of these its actings. Now for that *Moment* of Reason, in which a Spirit is conceived *in Being*, without being conceived to be acting, and in which it is conceived *Acting* before it becomes *Conscious* of its actings, in that precedent moment, (which speaks *order*, not *duration*,) it must be conceived to be *one with it self*, and numerically different from every thing besides; and therefore that it is *so*, cannot arise from self-consciousness, or its being conscious of its own actings. So that if there were (as in the Authors supposal) *three* created Spirits, that were as conscious to each others Thoughts and Passions, as each of them unto his own, there would yet be no reason, that we should say (as he says we must) that three such persons would be numerically one; for if they were, how could they be Three? since the number Three, is not the number One, and they

cannot be Three in number, if they are but one in number; to be Three is to be more than One; to be but One is not to be more than one. All that could be said of them is, that upon that supposal they would be *intimate* with one another, but with numerical distinction; for still one of them would not be the other, and so they would remain Three Persons still, not one Person. Self-Unity is before Self-Consciousness, and may consist with Consciousness of others. *Again*, in Dr. *Sherlock's* way of Discourſing, which is, that Three Persons ſo intimate to one another as he ſuppoſes, would become numerically one, I do not ſee but that inſtead of the *Three* Persons of the Blessed *Trinity*, (which doubtleſs he will own to be really as intimate to one another, as he ſuppoſes his Three Finite ones to be,) we ſhall have but *one* Person (in number.) *In fine*, if Persons by being ſo intimate to one another do become numerically one, I do not ſee but that, by this reaſoning, God who is as conſcious to all the Actions, Paſſions, and Thoughts, of all Finite Created Spirits, as theſe are to their own, and as the Doctors Imaginary Persons are to one anothers, he muſt be numerically one with them all. Put perhaps the Doctor will tell me, that he affirms the Three Eternal Minds (for ſo he calls them) are numerically

cally one *God*, not one *Person*, [Three Persons, one *God*;] but then it will be demanded of him, since Three are *thrice one*, what that is that makes each Person one in it self, and distinguishes it from both the others? for it must be something that is not *Common*, which self-consciousness is, (in his sense of the word,) all being as conscious to one anothers Thoughts and Actings, as each unto its own: whereas, *that* which makes a thing numerically one, must be *Differencing* and Particular. Not to insist, that to be an Eternal Mind is the true *Idea* or notion of *God*, and then if there be (as he owns there be) Three Eternal Minds (really distinct,) it will I confess, be no great difficulty to evince them Three Persons, but I doubt it will, intelligibly to make it out, that these Three (Three Eternal Minds, really distinct from one another,) are not Three *Gods*, as well as Three Persons. So that methinks the knot remains untied. For my own part, I believe as the Scriptures instruct me, that there is but *one God*, tho' *Three Persons*; each of which is *God*; which I say on'y to prevent Mistakes. But I resolve to Discourse more fully of *Unity* or Oneness, when I come to treat of the notions of *Whole* and *Part*.

As for the name [Person] it properly belongs to *Men*; we do not commonly ap-

Ply it to *Beasts*, or unto *Angels*, or other Spirits, but by Translation and Metaphor, when they do appear in the Figure or shape of Men. Nor is [Person] a name of *Nature*, taking nature in the sense of the Schoolmen; for Nature is *Common* unto all of the kind, but that only is *Personal* which is distinguishing and peculiar among those in the same kind. Thus, *Man* is a name of the *kind*; or specific Nature, the Nature in common; *A Man* an expression of the Nature as *singularized*; but *Person* properly is the name of that which differences Men from one another. When we speak of the Person of a Man, we mean by it that Cumble of Accidents, External, Internal, of Body, of Mind, Adventitious and Extrinsic, Absolute or Relative, whereby he is distinguished, and known from others. Hence *Persona* in Latin, is *πρόσωπον* in Greek, and *πρόσωπον* signifies the Countenance or Face, in the first place; and from thence, a Person, in the second (place,) because the Countenance or Face is that by which we do chiefly distinguish Men. In conformity to this Idea or notion of Person, I understand *Levit. 19. 15. Thou shalt not favour the Person of the Poor, nor honour the Person of the Mighty*; the word for Person is *πρόσωπον* in the Septuagint Translation, and the meaning of the Text is plainly
 This,

This, thou shalt not in giving Judgment have regard to the Poverty of the one, or to the Riches of another ; for these concern the *Person*, not the *Cause*. In this sense also is God said to be Ἀπροσαπολέπτης no *Acceptor of Mens Persons*, for that he in judgment respects not (as Men too often do) the foreign *Qualities* and Accidents that do distinguish them from one another, as, their wit, or their weakness ; their comeliness, or their deformity ; their riches, or their Poverty ; their Grandeur or their Littleness of Figure in the World. But all is as one to him, when he enters into Judgment ; for he judges uprightly, according to the *merits of the Cause*, without regard to the Person, save where the Consideration of the Person is of moment (as sometimes it is) in the merits of the Cause. But as *the Person* of a Man is that bundle of *Qualities* that do distinguish him from others ; so *A Person* is a Man with those *Qualities* ; that is, a Person is a *Distinguished Man* ; and so the word comes to be taken, not only for the *Qualities* that do distinguish, but for the *Man* that is distinguished, by those qualities ; in which sense the word is used, not only by the *Schoolmen*, who after *Boetius*, define a Person to be a rational subsistent, *Rationalis Naturæ Individua substantia* ; but by the *Apostle*, when he

speaks

speaks, 2 Cor. I. II. of Thanks being given by many Persons for him.

By what I have said (and I have said the more for that the cause of late has had a fresh Rehearing) we may judge of the justice of *Laurentius Valla*, who in his Elegance, l. VI. c. 34. severely, (or rather insolently) reflects upon *Boetius* for asserting that a Person was not a Quality, or in any other Predicament but that of Substance; he shows in many instances, that [Person] signifies Quality, and thence infers, that the same man may sustain a hundred Persons; [*Quo fit, says he, ut Assit mihi Multiplex Persona ac Diversa, sed una tantum substantia;*] and to give an Example, he fancies himself a *Hector*, and says [*ad Priamum sum Personam Filii, ad Astianaeta personam Patris, ad Andromacham personam Viri; ad Paridem personam Fratris; ad Sarpedonem personam Amici; ad Achillem personam Inimici.*] In fine, making application of what he says unto the *Deity*, he thinks that he has carried the Prize, by demonstrating how God may be but one Substance, and yet be Three Persons; But 'tis in a way in which his *Hector* may be a Hundred, and God as many, and more. So that I had not believed it worth my while to mention this Opinion, but that an Excellent Person of our own has given it fresh reputation, by going the same way; for the Learned Author of the *Three Sermons concerning the Sacred Triny*, shews, as *Laurentius Valla* does, that the word [Person] was used of old to signify the State, Quality, or Condition of a Man, as he stands related to other Men, either as a King, or a Subject, or as Father, or a Son, &c. Thus he observes the Latin Phrase is *Personam Imponere* when a Man is put


put into Office or a Dignity Conferred upon him; *Induere personam*, when he takes upon him the Office; *Sustinere personam*, when one bears, or Executes an Office, &c. In short, he tells us, (as *Laurentius Valla* has) that 'tis nothing strange for the same man to sustain Divers Persons, instancing in *Tully*, who says; *sustinet unus Tres Personas, Meam, Adversarii, Judicis*, I being but one, do yet sustain Three Persons, my own, that of an Adversary, and that of a Judge. *In fine*, he makes the same application of it to the Divine Trinitunity that *Laurentius Valla* doth, for (says he) if Three Persons may be one man, what hinders but that Three Divers Persons may be one God? and that the same God as Maker of the World, or God the Creator may be God the *Father*; and as Author of our Redemption be God the *Redeemer*, or God the *Son*; and as working effectually in the hearts of his Elect, be God the Sanctifier or God the *Holy Ghost*.


I confess if this is *all* that is in the Mystery, it is very Conceivable, and (which will be an unvaluable happiness to the Christian World) there will need to be no more dispute about it: but as the *Received Doctrine* of the Divine Trinitunity is quite another thing, so must it have a very different *Exposition*. Besides, *Laurentius Valla* seems to suppose that the difficulty is only about the word [Person.] But this is his mistake; for the word [Person] as applied to the Trinitunity is but of a *later* use, and of the *Schoolmen*, rather than of the *Fathers*, whose word is *Hypostasis*, which is also the *Apostles* word: So that unless it can be found, that one Man can be three *Hypostases*. or Subsistents, and that for God to be a Creator, a Redeemer, and a Sanctifier, is,

to be three *Hypostases* in the *Fathers* sense, as well as Three *Persons* in *Cicero's*, the *Difficulty* is not removed, but only avoided. *In fine*, it is not the same thing to say that one *sustains* Three *Persons*, as to say that one *is* Three *Persons*: For he that only sustains a *Person*, doth but *Act* the part of that *Person* which he is said to sustain; and thus *Cicero* sustained Three *Persons*, when he acted as if he had been Three several *Men* under different *Characters*: To *Personate* a *Judge* is not to be one: And in this sense of the word *Person* *Seneca* says, *Ep. 24. non hominibus tantum, sed & Rebus PERSONA Demenda est, & reddenda facies sua.*

I say not this with any intention to enter into a *Discourse* of the *Divine Trin-unity*, the doing of which would be improper, in a *Treatise* that pretends but to *Metaphysicks*: I have only mention'd it on occasion, as an inquiry after the *Idea* and notion of a *Suppositum*, and that of a *Person*, obliged me. The *Doctrine* of the *Trinity* is a point of pure *Revelation*, not of *Philosophy* or *Science*; all *Discourses* and explications of it, not derived from the *Holy Scriptures*, and grounded upon them, but on *Analogies* and *Resemblances* in *nature*, or on *Principles* of *Human Discourse* and *meer Reason*, are as *Foreign* unto it, as *Earth* is to *Heaven*. It is an *Article* of *Faith*, and a *Fundamental* one too; indeed the chief of all those of which the *Apostle* says, they are such as *neither Eye saw, nor Ear heard of, nor entred into the heart of man to conceive*, before they were brought to light in the *Gospel*. Wherefore, 'tis there only that we are obliged to seek it, and there only, in the *Analogy* of *Faith*, that we can hope to discover it, in its true *Idea* and *Notion*. And so much for *Substance* as *Scholastically* Consider'd.

F I N I S.





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